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LOCALMULTIDEM

Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants' Social Capital in Europe:
Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local
Level

SPECIFIC TARGETED RESEARCH PROJECT (STREP)

PRIORITY 7: Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society

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CITY REPORT: BUDAPEST²

Introduction

The Hungarian fieldwork was carried out between September 2007 and December 2007 in Budapest. The Hungarian survey has been conducted on a representative sample of 600 autochthonous subjects and three samples of migrants. The control group represents 1.7 million inhabitants of the capital of Hungary. This representation matches the socio-demographic dimensions of the total population of the city by gender, age, education and local residence. The sample size guarantees the all socio-demographic groups of the population of the city will be well represented in the final sample (in the four dimensional space of the socio-demographic variables).

The first migrant sample, of a size of 290 respondents, consisted of ethnic Hungarians born in neighbouring countries. Sampling was made through a simple random selection, relying on data derived from a research project on immigrants carried out by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office Demographic Research Institute in 2002. The migrant sample of the Chinese was compiled in two steps: first, we contacted 100 people, who were selected from a list provided by Hungary's Office of Immigration and Nationality, then this sample was expanded to include 249 subjects through the snowball method from 31 starting points. The Arab/Turkish sample was constructed similarly: 100 members were selected from the list, then the sample was completed through the snowball method from 27 starting points to include 286 respondents.

The snowball method was necessary because the available registration of the migrants only include selected migrant categories. The registration of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office gave information of those who already received their citizenship in Hungary, and the statistical database of the Hungary's Office of Immigration and Nationality does not cover all types of temporary migrants staying in the territory of Hungary. The snowball method is quasi-equivalent with the probability sample selection if the number of starting points is greater than the square root of the sample size. In all cases this criterion has been met. The 31 and the 27 starting points ensure that the structure of the ties originated from the snowball method selection is not too close. To monitor the reliability of the snowball selection we compared the subsample that was selected by the representative random method and that selected by the snowball method. The results show that the two subsamples are identical in the main socio-demographic variables.

The questionnaire was written in multiple languages, so that the representative autochthonous sample and the sample of ethnic Hungarians could be interviewed in Hungarian, Chinese respondents in Chinese, while Arabs and Turks were asked in Arabic or Hungarian, and Hungarian, respectively.

Hungarian-language interviews were conducted by professional interviewers, while Chinese-language interviews were conducted mainly by university students learning Chinese, and members of the Arab/Turkish sample were interviewed by immigrants from Muslim countries who have been living in Hungary for several years and speak

² This report has been produced by Antal Örkény, Mária Székelyi, and Zoltán Várhalmi members of the Hungarian LOCALMULTIDEM team.

fluent Hungarian. Interviews were usually conducted within the subjects' homes, and had a duration of 50 to 90 minutes.

Weighting was necessary for all four samples. Data have been weighted by gender, age and education for representativeness. Information required for weighting has been obtained from Budapest-related databases compiled by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, as well as data aggregated from the preceding stages of our research. For the Chinese and Arab/Turkish samples, snowball sampling had to be applied because a high proportion of respondents refused to answer.

Part I. Descriptive analyses

1. Sociodemographic characteristics

The sample of autochthonous residents in Budapest consists of 600 respondents, and it reflects the known population profile by gender, age and education. The sample of ethnic Hungarians includes 290 respondents, the Chinese sample 249 respondents, the Arab/Turkish sample 286 respondents; all samples were weighted according to data from WP2 to reflect the known profiles.

Table 1. Sample composition by gender

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Male	49.7	50.3	45.4	77.3
Female	50.3	49.7	54.6	22.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

A strong dominance of men is shown for Muslim immigrants, while the male/female ratio is balanced in the other samples. For the autochthonous group the average age is 50 years, while ethnic Hungarians are much younger, with an average of 34 years. The average age is 37 years for the Chinese sample and 40 years for the Arab/Turkish sample, respectively.

Table 2. Sample composition by age

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
15–22	7.0	12.7	17.1	8.2
23–29	11.5	44.7	17.5	19.0
30–44	26.0	23.0	33.3	38.6
45–59	23.1	10.9	30.1	28.6
60+	32.5	8.7	2.0	5.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The sample distribution by education is as follows:

Table 3. Sample composition by education

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Did not complete primary education	0	0	4.9	0

Primary education or first stage of basic education	13.7	1.0	8.9	3.9
Lower level of secondary education or second stage of basic education	20.7	6.8	27.7	1.8
Upper secondary education	41.6	54.1	21.8	50.4
Post-secondary, non-tertiary education	0	0	0.4	0
First stage of tertiary education (not leading directly to a *degree)	0	0	1.1	0
Second stage of tertiary education (leading directly to *advanced studies)	21.6	37.3	22.0	41.5
Refusal	2.4	0.7	13.2	2.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Half of the autochthonous respondents are employed in paid jobs, and most work or formerly worked as employees. The proportion of self-employed people and those who work within the family business is extremely low. The proportion of employees is much higher among ethnic Hungarians (61%) and the Chinese (77%) than it is within the autochthonous sample. The proportion of students is especially high (28%) among ethnic Hungarians.

Table 4. Distribution of respondents by occupational status

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
In paid work	51.4	60.5	77.3	60.8
In education (not paid for by employer)	5.9	28.1	15.2	14.2
Unemployed and actively looking for a job	3.0	2.7	2.8	4.5
Unemployed, wanting a job, but not actively looking for it	0.1	–	2.0	2.1
Permanently sick or disabled	2.1	–	–	.6
Retired	34.2	4.7	1.5	3.6
Doing housework, looking after children or other persons	2.4	1.4	.6	8.5
Other	0.8	2.6	.6	5.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	75.4

Table 5. Distribution of respondents by type of employment in Hungary (only for those who formerly had jobs or currently do paid work in the country)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Employees	87.1	96.7	40.7	46.1
Self-employed	11.7	1.9	34.5	47.4
Work for own family business	1.2	1.4	24.8	6.5


Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
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Nearly nine tenths of working people within the autochthonous sample are employees, compared to one tenth who are self-employed. For ethnic Hungarians, almost all of the active are employees. The proportion of the self-employed is the highest among the Chinese (35%) and Muslims (48%).

Table 6. Distribution of respondents by occupation (only for those who formerly had jobs or currently do paid work in Hungary)

		BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Self-employed	agricultural workers	–	0.9	–	0.6
	craft workers	2.6	0.7	0.3	0.7
	sales workers	3.1	6.9	38.0	24.9
	service workers	4.2	2.7	41.9	18.0
	freelance professionals	3.2	0.5	3.8	6.3
Managerial	senior managers	1.0	2.1	1.2	8.4
	middle managers	5.3	7.3	0.4	2.6
	managing directors	2.2	2.6	2.0	2.6
Non-manual	production managers	2.4	–	1.1	0.2
	professionals	13.1	21.9	4.3	26.4
	other non-manual	21.0	26.6	4.6	6.4
	skilled workers	25.7	14.9	0.5	1.3
Manual	semi-skilled workers	12.3	9.3	–	0.7
	unskilled workers	3.6	2.7	2.0	0.9
	unskilled agricultural workers	0.3	0.9	–	1.3
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Figure 1. Sample composition by occupational group (percentages)



In the autochthonous sample manual work seems to be dominant, while most ethnic Hungarians do some non-manual work. The proportion of the self-employed is extremely high in the Muslim sample (51%), and especially in the Chinese sample (84%). The lowest proportion of white-collar workers can be found among Chinese respondents, with only 9 per cent in their sample.

Table 7. Distribution of respondents by type of workplace (only for those who formerly had jobs or currently do paid work in Hungary)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Private	49.1	67.0	90.3	43.6
Public	47.7	24.7	5.9	24.6
Not-for-profit	3.2	8.3	3.8	31.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The active members within the autochthonous sample of Budapest are employed in the private and public sectors in nearly the same proportions, while only 3 per cent work in the not-for-profit sector. More than two thirds of ethnic Hungarians work in the private sector, almost a fourth in the public one, and nearly a tenth in the not-for-profit sector. The vast majority of the Chinese (90%) work in the private sector. It is a remarkable phenomenon that there is a high proportion of respondents from Muslim countries in the not-for-profit sector.

Obviously, most immigrants were not born in Hungary, and thus the samples radically differ in their composition by origin. While ethnic Hungarians were born in neighbouring countries, most members of the Chinese and Arab/Turkish samples were born in some non-European country.

Table 8. Distribution of immigrant samples by birthplace (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
15 Romania	45.1		
17 Yugoslavia	19.0		
1 Hungary	2.0		
26 Czechoslovakia	6.8		
29 Soviet Union	26.2		
2 Afghanistan			2.3
3 Algeria			4.3
5 Egypt			5.0
6 Iraq			22.0
7 Iran			3.6
8 Jordan			2.0
9 Kuwait			1.6
10 Lebanon			2.2
11 Libya			1.8
12 Morocco			3.6
14 Palestine			2.9
15 Romania			0.7
16 Saudi Arabia			0.8
18 Syria			7.9
21 Sudan			1.5
22 Turkey			28.7
23 China		100	
25 Other	0.9		9.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Immigration from most countries to Hungary became possible only after the Hungarian regime change. Consequently, 94 per cent of ethnic Hungarians and 97 per cent of the Chinese arrived in Hungary after 1990. A third of Arab/Turkish respondents had already moved to Hungary before the regime change, but their more or less even influx began after 1985. The members of this sample have been living in Hungary for 14 years on average.

Table 9. Reasons for moving to Hungary (percentages mentioned)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Job related / work opportunities	29.2	60.2	26.4
Family reasons / love	23.3	39.5	19.7
Study	48.3	16.2	45.4
Seeking asylum / protection	4.7	2.3	9.4
Quality of life in general	16.7	18.5	3.1
Other	7.9	1.6	2.9

While most ethnic Hungarians (48%) and Muslims (45%) entered to study in Hungary, the majority of the Chinese migrated to Hungary for work and job opportunities. For the

latter group, Hungary does not offer any special prospect in terms of education: only 16 per cent told that study opportunities in Hungary had a role in their decision to migrate.

Table 10. Respondents arriving in Hungary alone or as group members (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Alone	41.7	46.2	61.0
With family	33.2	41.3	32.8
With friends	13.1	9.5	4.6
With other people, neither friends, nor relatives	11.9	3.3	1.9
Other	2.3	0.8	1.2

42 per cent of ethnic Hungarians, 46 per cent of the Chinese and 61 per cent of Muslims arrived in Hungary alone, but were followed by their families in the cases of 33 per cent of ethnic Hungarians and Muslims, and 41 per cent of the Chinese, respectively.

Moving from another country is considerably easier when migrants can rely on family members, relatives and friends living in the destination country (Table 11). Hardly a fifth of ethnic Hungarians and less than a fifth of the Chinese had no acquaintances in Hungary when they arrived. Almost a third of Muslim immigrants said that they did not know anyone in Hungary at that time. Nearly 49 per cent of the Chinese were 'welcomed' to Hungary by close kin, while 42 per cent of ethnic Hungarians were received by friends on their arrival.

Table 11. 'Did you have any relatives, friends or acquaintances in Hungary before you moved here?' (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
No one	21.5	18.2	30.4
Close family member	27.3	49.3	23.3
Relative	39.6	22.7	10.4
Friend	41.5	22.8	32.4
Other	8.8	0	1.0

Most migrants are satisfied with their decision to migrate, and they would move to Hungary again if they had the opportunity to begin a new life.

Table 12. Judgments on moving to Hungary (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
I would still move to the host country	72.8	65.4	66.6
I would not move to the host country but to a different one	16.1	13.0	25.3
I would not move from my homeland	11.1	21.6	8.1
Total	100.0	100	100

12 per cent of ethnic Hungarians have already obtained citizenship, and an additional 16 per cent are dual nationals. A meagre 4 per cent of the Arab/Turkish sample is a

Hungarian citizen, while almost 24 per cent live as dual nationals in Hungary. As to the Chinese sample, only 6 persons have been granted Hungarian citizenship. The ethnic Hungarian and Muslim migrants who are not Hungarian citizens generally want to obtain citizenship, but many of them insist on their original citizenship too. These proportions essentially differ for the Chinese: 56 per cent do not plan to apply for Hungarian citizenship at all.

Table 13. 'Do you wish to obtain Hungarian citizenship?' (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Yes	44.0	18.3	66.6
Yes, but only if I don't lose my current nationality	33.7	26.0	25.3
No	22.4	55.7	8.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Most ethnic Hungarians have residence permits, approximately 21 per cent have permanent residence (settlement) permits, and almost 10 per cent stay in Hungary more or less illegally. 58 per cent of the Chinese and 49 per cent of Muslims live in Hungary with permanent residence permits.

Table 14. Types of permits held by migrants staying in Hungary without Hungarian citizenship (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Short-term permit of 5 years or less	57.9	37.2	45.0
Long-term permit of more than 5 years	21.3	58.1	49.0
Expired permit under renewal	4.1	4.4	0.7
Never had any permit	9.7	0.2	1.1
Other	7.0	0	4.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0

More than half of ethnic Hungarians live in Hungary with residence permits for students, and almost a third have work permits. More than half of the Chinese stay in the country with work permits, while a third have documents of family reunification. The highest proportion of Muslims (42%) also have work permits.

Table 15. Types of short-term and permanent residence permits (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
EEA national (or relative to EEA national) residence / work permit	1.8	–	–
For work	29.5	53.9	41.7
For study only	53.1	10.3	20.2
For family reunification / due to marriage	7.6	30.2	19.9
For tourism	2.0	–	0.6
As a refugee / asylum-seeker	–	–	11.2
For residence only (not linked to family reunification / marriage)	1.1	3.6	4.5
Other	4.9	2.0	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

For all three migrant groups, migration took place mainly in the generation of respondents.

Table 16. Parents' native country (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Parents were born in the same country as the respondent	92.5	95.1	89.9
Parents were born in a country other than that of the respondent	7.5	4.9	10.1

The composition of samples by family status was as follows: most of the autochthonous respondents are married or living with partners, almost a fifth are single, while 13 per cent and 16 per cent are divorced and widow(er)s, respectively. Families with at least two members have 0.5 children under age 16, on average. An overwhelming majority of people living in the same household are related through kinship ties. Most ethnic Hungarians are single, due to their young age. Married people can be found in the highest proportions among the Chinese (56%) and Muslims (60%), and they also have the greatest average household size. Chinese households have the highest number (0.71) of children under age 16 and the lowest proportion (90%) of relatives.

Table 17. Family characteristics for the different subsamples

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Married	41.0	29.7	56.2	59.7
Cohabiting/ living with partner	11.8	18.6	5.7	3.4
Never married	19.1	48.8	32.9	28.5
Divorced	12.7	2.5	2.4	6.5
Widowed	15.5	0.4	2.7	1.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Average number of children under age 16 ³	0.5	0.37	0.71	0.22
Proportion of relatives within the household	97%	96%	90%	96%
Average household size	2.36	2.32	3.38	3.34

The ethnic composition of immigrant families is greatly dependent on their nationality. Almost 40 per cent of Muslims, the group whose members have been living in Hungary for the longest time, have a spouse born in Hungary. For ethnic Hungarians, 37 per cent of spouses/cohabiting partners were born in Hungary, while their proportion is much smaller within the Chinese sample.

³ For families with at least two members

Table 18. Spouses' country of birth for the immigrant samples (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
1 Hungary	36.8	5.8	39.1
2 Afghanistan			1.3
4 Austria	2.0		
5 Egypt			2.3
6 Iraq			13.7
7 Iran			4.6
8 Jordan			1.5
9. China		91.2	
10 Lebanon			1.3
11 Libya			1.8
12 Morocco			1.3
14 Palestine			3.3
15 Romania	35.9	0.7	0.7
16 Saudi Arabia			0.7
17 Serbia	3.5		
18 Syria			9.1
22 Turkey	0.7		10.6
24 Ukraine	13.0		0.2
27 Yugoslavia	4.9		
29 Soviet Union	3.1		
Other		2.2	8.5

On the other hand, it is true of all immigrant groups that most spouses were born in the same country as respondents themselves. For Muslims, the high proportion of Hungarian spouses can be explained with the finding that these migrants have been living in Hungary for a long time. As a result of the common linguistic and cultural background, ethnic Hungarians have a similarly high proportion of spouses born in Hungary.

Table 19. Homogeneity of origin for marriages/partnerships (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Spouses/partners with homogeneous origin	51.5	90.5	47.7
Hungarian spouse/partner	34.3	5.8	40.4
Spouses/partners from different countries other than Hungary	14.2	3.7	11.8
Total	100	100	100.0

Occasionally, migration forces spouses to split. This is often the case especially in the Chinese group.

Table 20. Respondents with spouses living in Hungary (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Yes	91.3	78.7	81.7
No	8.8	21.3	18.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Three fourths of ethnic Hungarians live in ethnically homogeneous (Hungarian) families. This proportion is the highest (88%) among the Chinese and the lowest (65%) among respondents coming from Muslim countries.

Table 21. Ethnic composition of families in the different subsamples (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Same	76.8	87.8	64.8
Mixed	19.2	10.2	34.7
Different	4.0	2.0	0.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Evidently, the native language of migrants differs greatly across the different samples. All respondents in the Chinese sample consider Chinese to be their mother tongue, while 90 per cent of ethnic Hungarians consider Hungarian to be their native language.

Table 22. Respondents' native language in the different subsamples (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Hungarian	91.1		3.5
Arabic			67.0
Turkish			26.3
Chinese		100	
Other	8.9		3.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

For obvious reasons, ethnic Hungarians have no linguistic difficulties in Hungary. In contrast, 71 per cent of the Chinese and 26 per cent of respondents from Muslim countries speak little Hungarian.

Table 23. Respondents' command of Hungarian in the different subsamples (percentages)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
I don't speak	–	16.8	8.3
I speak a little	–	54.2	17.7
I speak reasonably well	36.7	15.9	32.8
I speak fluently	35.4	8.6	35.7

I speak as if it was my native language	27.8	4.5	5.5
Total	100.0 ⁴	100.0	100.0

In the autochthonous sample the average per capita net income is 312 euros. If income inequality is described as a ratio of the top and bottom deciles, then its value will be 5.8 for the autochthonous sample. For ethnic Hungarians, average per capita net income is 384 euros. They are characterized by an extremely great inequality of income, since the average per capita income for respondents in the top income decile is more than eleven times greater than the average income of those who fall into the bottom decile. This substantial income inequality can be also explained by the fact that the sample includes students as well as workers, and students have strongly limited sources of income. However, we should also recognize that ethnic Hungarians with employment have much better paying jobs than members of the autochthonous sample.

Only 37 per cent of the Chinese sample (97 respondents) answered the income question. Due to the high proportion of refusals the following results cannot be considered representative of the target group. The mean for the Chinese sample was 692 euros, while the median value was 400 euros. The significant difference between the mean and the median implies a high dispersion of incomes. 25 per cent of the Chinese who responded to the income question live in households with total earnings of 267 euros or less and 520 euros or more after taxation. As to the Arab/Turkish sample, only 11 respondents answered the question concerning the net monthly income of the household, therefore here we cannot use this indicator, which also prevents us from outlining income inequalities within the group of Arabs/Turks living in Hungary.

In the autochthonous subsample most households earn their income from wages and salaries deriving from employment. For almost half of them, pension and unemployment or social benefits mean additional sources of income.

Table 24. Sources of income for families belonging to the different subsamples (percentages)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Occupation	61.4	77.1	84.1	39.6
Social assistance: unemployment benefit, pension, housing benefit	41.4	19.1	3.8	24.9
Maintenance from parents, partner, relatives	7.5	10.5	16.9	8.6
Capital, savings	1.8	9.6	34.7	15.2
Social assistance from churches or private foundations	.7	1.9	0.9	3.9
Other sources of income	6.0	16.9	7.8	4.8


⁴ These percentages are only applicable to 26 respondents whose mother language is not Hungarian.

The proportion of households with wages and salaries is higher among ethnic Hungarians because they have younger members and fewer pensioners. Compared to the autochthonous respondents, fewer ethnic Hungarians benefit from the provision offered by the social safety net in Hungary, which is probably one reason for the greater role of support from the family and other sources of income.

The Chinese have the highest proportions of respondents with wages and salaries (84%) and some savings or capital (35%), while they have the lowest proportion (4%) of respondents living on the dole or some other kind of social benefit. The Muslim sample has the lowest proportion of respondents who earn a living from employment. A fourth receives social benefits, which reflects the high degree of their integration.


For ethnic Hungarians, people with lower income experienced a moderate decline in their living standards after they moved to Hungary. Respondents who had higher-than-average living standards in their homeland clearly reported increased living standards in Hungary.

Figure 2. Definition of present and pre-migration living standards on a 10-degree scale by ethnic Hungarians (percentages)




The Chinese generally experienced a slight improvement in their subjective status. Nevertheless, a smaller group shows a clear decline in living standards.

Figure 3. Definition of present and pre-migration living standards on a 10-degree scale by Chinese respondents (percentages)



For the Arab/Turkish sample, living standards prevailing before and after migration do not differ significantly – mainly because respondents in this sample have been living far away from their homeland for relatively longer periods.

Figure 4. Definition of present and pre-migration living standards on a 10-degree scale by the Arab/Turkish sample (percentages)



Migration and related change in living standards are strongly influenced by the respondent arriving in Hungary as a worker or a student. On average, workers say that their standards of living in Hungary are 0.6 points higher than they were in their homeland, while students feel that their present living standards are almost 0.5 points lower.

When defining present living standards, the reference situations for workers and students within the sample of ethnic Hungarians also differ. Students tend to compare their living standards to those of people living in Budapest and their homeland, or Europeans, as opposed to workers, who choose Hungarians as their primary reference group.

Table 25. Reference groups for defining living standards in the different immigrant groups (percentages)

		ETHNIC HUNGARIAN		CHINESE		MIXED MUSLIM	
	Reference groups	work	study	work	study	work	study
	People living in Budapest	30.6	35.9	7.2	6.1	2.6	10.5
	Native Hungarians	43.3	23.1	23.1	29.0	81.4	42.1
	Europeans	9.4	16.7	2.3	4.3	.6	2.6
	Immigrants living in Budapest	3.7	1.7	3.2	-	.6	.0
	Their own migrant groups living in Budapest	2.6	3.7	33.0	22.2	5.1	.0
	People living in their native countries	6.0	9.6	15.2	24.9	4.5	34.2
	The regions or settlements they came from	4.5	9.2	15.9	13.5	5.1	10.5
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The highest proportion of the working Chinese respondents defined other Chinese people living in Budapest as their primary reference group, while most Chinese students mentioned Hungarians. Presumably, what underlies this phenomenon is that students – the youngest cohort – have been living in Hungary since their infancy, and they are possibly the ones who have integrated most into mainstream society.

As opposed to ethnic Hungarians, the Arab/Turkish sample also shows a tendency underlying worker/student status such that workers have been living in Hungary for a long time, while students are usually newcomers. Consequently, employees choose Hungarians as their reference group, while students consider people in their native country as well as native Hungarians to be the bases of comparison.

Most autochthonous respondents belong to the Catholic denomination, almost a fifth have no denomination, and 7 per cent are Protestants. Due to historical traditions, there are more Protestants and members of the Greek Orthodox church among ethnic Hungarians, and there are fewer respondents without a denomination. Among the Chinese, 62 per cent said they had no denomination, and 25 per cent considered themselves Buddhists. The majority of the mixed-Muslim subsample adhere to Islam.

Table 26. Distribution of respondents by denomination in the different subsamples (percentages)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Protestant	6.5	34.6	8.3	0.4
Roman Catholic	56.3	44.2	1.9	3.4
Eastern Orthodox	0.8	4.3	–	4.0
Jewish	0.8	–	–	0.6
Muslim	0.2	–	–	84.1
Buddhist	–	–	25.1	–

Atheist/Agnostic	17.8	4.2	61.9	3.9
Protestant	7.6	12.7	2.8	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The variable measuring religiosity through the frequency of participation in religious ceremonies and offices shows great variation across the different subsamples.

Table 27. Frequency of denomination members' attending religious ceremonies in the different subsamples (percentages)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Every day	1.1	.5	2.4	42.6
Several times a week	3.3	3.3	1.3	6.0
Once a week	6.6	17.4	20.5	17.9
Once a month	4.8	11.5	13.4	2.3
Several times a year	18.9	26.5	30.0	9.5
Once a year	26.7	18.1	20.6	11.8
Never	38.5	22.7	11.9	9.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Hardly a tenth of the autochthonous sample can be considered church-goers, more than a third never attend religious ceremonies, and if we add the 18 per cent of respondents without denomination, then the proportion of respondents who are far from being religious may reach 50 per cent. Ethnic Hungarians tend to be more religious than autochthonous Hungarians are. The proportion of those who go to church at least once a week is twice as high (21%) in this sample as in the autochthonous subsample, while the proportion of atheists and the denominationless does not reach one third. 43 per cent of respondents from Muslim countries attend religious ceremonies every day, while 24 per cent do so at least once a week. Regular participation in religious ceremonies is relatively rare among the Chinese.

2. *Political interest*

Nearly two thirds of the autochthonous adult population show interest in national and local public affairs, and only 16 or 17 per cent seem to be totally indifferent. Ethnic Hungarians show greater interest in the public affairs of Hungary rather than the autochthonous, and a much lower proportion of the completely indifferent was found among them compared to the autochthonous subsample. Interest in the affairs of the native country reaches the level of interest in Hungary's public affairs.

Table 28. Interest in the public affairs of Hungary and Budapest (percentages)

		Almost every day	Regularly	Rarely	Never
BUDAPEST	Interest in Budapest politics	17.7	42.6	23.6	16.1
	Interest in Hungarian politics	18.7	42.3	21.8	17.2
ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	Interest in Budapest politics	14.2	42.9	35.5	7.4
	Interest in Hungarian politics	22.6	45.7	27.9	3.9
	Interest in homeland politics	28.0	39.3	25.8	6.9
CHINESE	Interest in Budapest politics	25.2	39.3	26.6	8.9
	Interest in Hungarian politics	24.7	36.9	27.6	10.7
	Interest in homeland politics	32.3	39.2	20.4	8.1
MIXED MUSLIM	Interest in Budapest politics	11.2	38.1	34.4	16.3
	Interest in Hungarian politics	12.0	35.9	35.6	16.5
	Interest in homeland politics	32.6	40.8	21.5	5.1

The Chinese curiously show a great interest in public affairs. 25 per cent of the Chinese sample said that they are very interested in the public affairs of Hungary and Budapest; for 32 per cent, the public affairs of China are also in the focus of interest. Muslims are not so interested in the public affairs of Hungary and Budapest; however, they really care about the events of their long-left homeland. Interest in public affairs also extends to the private sphere, since half of respondents living in Budapest often discuss public affairs with their family members and friends.


Table 29. Frequency of discussing public affairs within the private sphere (percentages)

		Almost every day	Regularly	Rarely	Never
BUDAPEST	Talk about city politics	11.1	38.3	38.5	12.1
	Talk about homeland politics	10.9	38.8	38.0	12.3
ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	Talk about city politics	11.9	22.2	52.8	13.1
	Talk about host country politics	12.6	33.6	47.0	6.8
	Talk about homeland politics	11.1	24.0	49.9	15.1
CHINESE	Talk about city politics	8.0	24.0	46.1	21.8
	Talk about host country politics	5.7	22.9	45.5	25.9
	Talk about homeland politics	8.6	36.0	36.1	19.3
MIXED MUSLIM	Talk about host country politics	5.6	27.8	48.0	18.5
	Talk about host country politics	6.2	26.8	49.6	17.4
	Talk about homeland politics	18.8	45.1	31.2	4.9

Slightly more than a tenth of autochthonous respondents never discuss public affairs with either family members or friends. Somewhat fewer respondents among ethnic Hungarians exclude public affairs from their private conversations, when it comes to Hungary. The affairs of Hungary and the homeland are more frequently mentioned in discussions with friends and family members. Despite the finding that a high proportion of the Chinese are interested in various public affairs, it seems that they rarely discuss them. 22 per cent never discuss the public affairs of Budapest, 26 per cent never discuss the affairs of Hungary, and 19 per cent never discuss the affairs of China, respectively. Although their interest in public affairs is lower than that of the Chinese, Muslims do not exclude public affairs from their private conversations, but they prefer to talk about their homeland.


Interest in public affairs and the level of being informed are closely related. Consequently, almost a fourth of autochthonous respondents show no sign of activity in relation to public affairs (they are not interested in and do not discuss public affairs, and they do not feel as if they were informed). The counterpoint is the 40 per cent who demonstrate high interest in politics, often discuss such topics with their family members and friends, and consider themselves to be well-informed. The correlation between being informed and being interested is also strong among ethnic Hungarians.

Figure 5. Levels of political interest in the public affairs of Budapest within the different subsamples (percentages)




Autochthonous respondents show the same levels of affinity with national public affairs and the events of the capital. However, ethnic Hungarians are less interested in the public affairs of Budapest. These affairs have the least importance for Muslims: 43 per cent are not interested, do not feel that they are informed, and do not discuss such affairs either. This proportion is only 26 per cent among the Chinese. However, it should be noted that the Chinese have the lowest proportion (17%) of those who are not only interested in the public affairs of Budapest, but also consider themselves informed, and habitually discuss such affairs.

Figure 6. Levels of political interest in the public affairs of Hungary within the different subsamples (percentages)



Interest in the public affairs of Hungary is not weaker among ethnic Hungarians than among members of the autochthonous subsample. Muslims are the most indifferent towards these affairs: 44 per cent are not interested, do not feel that they are informed, and do not discuss such affairs either. This proportion is only 32 per cent among the Chinese.

Figure 7. Levels of political interest in the public affairs of respondents' native countries within the different subsamples (percentages)



Ethnic Hungarians show notable interest in the public affairs of their native country; hardly a fourth do not try to remain informed about the events in their homeland. Muslims seem to be the most sensitive to the public affairs of their native country: 48

per cent are interested in such affairs, feel that they are well-informed about them, and regularly discuss related issues. The corresponding proportion is 32 per cent among the Chinese. It is important to note that those autochthonous respondents who do not consider themselves well-informed about local or national public affairs believe that they are underinformed because they are not interested, rather than assuming that politics is too complex. It proves that political interest is hardly influenced by respondents' feeling that politics is a field in which they are not competent.

Table 30. Correlation between political interest in the public affairs of Budapest and views about politics' being incomprehensible (means on a 1-5 scale)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Not interested, not talking, not informed	3.25	2.75	4.44	3.00
Mixed	3.09	2.31	3.87	2.28
Interested, talking, informed	2.84	2.33	3.63	2.48
Total	3.03	2.45	3.97	2.64
ETA squared	0.016	0.17	0.045	0.29

On the one hand, ethnic Hungarians are much less likely to consider politics to be too complex than autochthonous respondents in general, on the other hand, they are more likely to show the tendency that the more complicated they consider politics, the less they care about it, whether it comes to national affairs or those of Budapest. The Chinese behave just like native autochthonous respondents: for them too, interest in public affairs and the complexity of politics are not linked. However, Muslims are similar to ethnic Hungarians in this respect: if they are interested, then they do not consider politics to be complicated.

Table 31. Correlation between interest in national affairs and views about the complexity of politics (means on a 1-5 scale)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Not interested, not talking, not informed	3.24	2.96	4.44	3.00
Mixed	3.06	2.41	3.80	2.30
Interested, talking, informed	2.88	2.21	3.66	2.42
Total	3.03	2.47	3.97	2.64
ETA squared	0.012	0.24	0.055	0.29

For ethnic Hungarians, interest in the affairs of the country of origin is entirely independent of whether respondents consider politics to be complicated or easy to understand. Because interest in the native country is determined rather by whether migrants want to detach themselves from their homeland forever or consider their stay in the host country to be temporary only. For the Chinese, as well as for Muslims, here again the correlation discussed above prevails.

Table 32. Correlation between political interest in the native country and views about the complexity of politics (means on a 1-5 scale)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Not interested, not talking, not informed	2.43	4.29	3.20
Mixed	2.51	3.98	2.46
Interested, talking, informed	2.45	3.79	2.55
Total	2.47	3.97	2.64
ETA squared	0.03	0.017	0.23

3. *Political trust*

Distributions for the questions which serve to measure political trust directly were the following:

Table 33. Distribution of answers to the question ‘Political parties are interested in our votes only rather than our opinions’ in the different subsamples (percentages and means on a 1-5 scale)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Totally disagree	3.9	5.7	3.4	5.8
2	5.2	8.1	3.3	15.1
3	15.8	24.5	29.3	20.5
4	27.9	30.5	12.8	25.8
Totally agree	47.2	31.1	51.1	32.8
Mean scores	4.1	3.7	4.1	3.6

Compared to autochthonous respondents, positive orientations towards political parties are more common among ethnic Hungarians. In contrast, more than half of the Chinese respondents have negative views of Hungarian political parties, and 51 per cent think that parties are interested in getting votes rather than people’s opinions. Like ethnic Hungarians, Muslims are more likely to trust political parties.

Table 34. Distribution of answers to the question ‘People like me can also influence the course of politics’ in the different subsamples (percentages and means on a 1-5 scale)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Totally disagree	31.6	26.1	51.3	12.4
2	24.8	27.3	23.2	27.6
3	25.5	22.5	9.1	35.1
4	11.5	17.0	4.0	17.4
Totally agree	6.7	7.1	12.4	7.5
Mean scores	2.4	2.5	2.0	2.8

For ethnic Hungarians, however, trust in politics is not higher than it is among autochthonous respondents.⁵ They also think that ordinary people can hardly influence politics. Of the groups included in the survey, the Chinese are the least confident in their capacity to have an impact on the course of politics; more than half of the sample thinks that they have no effect on politics at all. Muslims have a relatively stronger belief in ordinary people being able to influence politics.

Table 35. Distribution of answers to the question ‘Civil servants in Budapest care about bureaucratic provisions only’ in the different subsamples (percentages and means on a 1-5 scale)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Totally disagree	4.7	2.7	7.8	.4
2	11.2	10.2	7.2	6.0
3	37.4	30.9	33.2	41.8
4	25.5	29.6	16.8	27.7
Totally agree	21.2	26.6	34.9	24.0
Mean scores	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.7

As to trust in politicians and civil servants, there is a much narrower difference between autochthonous respondents and ethnic Hungarians. Both groups have little confidence in people who embody power. The Chinese think similarly, while Muslims have the highest distrust of authorities.

Table 36. Distribution of answers to the question ‘Members of Parliament do not care about people like me’ in the different subsamples (percentages and means on a 1-5 scale)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Totally disagree	3.6	2.3	5.3	7.2
2	6.8	7.7	9.0	13.0
3	24.3	27.8	21.6	39.9
4	22.7	31.3	14.7	19.9
Totally agree	42.7	30.9	49.4	19.9
Mean scores	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.3

Levels of trust in political actors and various institutions are rather low. Trust in institutions was measured on an 11-points scale, where levels of trust higher than the median (5.5) were rarely found. The mean scores for trust in various agents were the following:

⁵ The difference is not significant.

Table 37. Levels of trust in political institutions and actors in the different subsamples (means on an 0-10 scale)

	BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Trust municipal civil servants	4.99	3.85	5.82	6.12
Trust municipal government	4.20	2.54	5.02	5.68
Trust schools and teachers	6.64	6.31	7.14	7.93
Trust municipal assembly	4.43	3.52	4.80	5.84
Trust regional parliament	4.59	3.90	4.39	5.32
Trust the police	4.87	5.28	6.41	5.70
Trust church in host society	3.23	2.48	5.60	4.65
Trust legal system	4.38	4.55	6.34	6.62
Trust Hungary's Parliament	3.77	3.62	5.12	5.16
Trust institutions of the European Union	5.56	5.24	7.27	5.48

Autochthonous respondents have the highest trust in educational institutions, and think that Hungary's National Assembly is the least trustworthy. Compared to autochthonous respondents living in the capital, who cannot be said to be full of trust either, ethnic Hungarians have less confidence in all public institutions, except for churches and the legal system. The Chinese have the lowest level (4.4 average) of trust in local authorities and the highest level (7.1) of trust in educational institutions. It is by all means notable that, of the groups included in the survey, the Chinese living in Budapest have the highest (7.3) confidence in the institutions of the European Union. Muslims have the lowest confidence in religious communities and grant the highest trust to educational institutions.

4. *Political participation*

Central and Eastern Europe lacks the traditions for people to use the means of enforcing democratic rights. As a result, 84 per cent of respondents from Budapest have never done anything to lobby or press for their own or public interests. The remaining 16 per cent most often used the opportunities to sign petitions or turn to government officials in charge. Ethnic Hungarians have stronger civil courage: one third have made use of their democratic rights in their own interests or those of the public. Particularly, they tend to sign petitions and participate in demonstrations more frequently. The Chinese and immigrants from Muslim countries virtually never use means of political action.

Table 38. Opportunities to exercise democratic rights exploited by respondents (numbers of cases and percentages)

	BUDAPEST		ETHNIC HUNGARIAN		CHINESE		MIXED MUSLIM	
	No. of cases	% of total respondents	No. of cases	% of total respondents	No. of cases	% of total respondents	No. of cases	% of total respondents
Contacted a politician	10	1.7	11	3.7	4	1.6	3	1.2
Contacted a government official	29	4.9	15	5.2	1	0.4	4	1.6
Worked for a political party	6	.9	10	3.4	1	0.4	2	.8
Worked for an action group	5	.9	7	2.6	1	0.4	3	1.2
Badge, sticker, poster	16	2.7	16	5.5	0	0	3	1.2
Signed petition	55	9.1	48	16.8	2	0.8	4	1.4
Public demonstration	20	3.3	53	18.3	0	0	2	.8
Product boycott	20	3.4	23	7.9	0	0	0	
Buy for political reasons	6	1.0	9	3.0	0	0	2	.8
Donated money	11	1.8	8	2.7	1	0.4	2	.8
Strike	1	.2	14	4.9	1	0.4	0	
Contacted media	6	1.0	7	2.4	1	0.4	6	2.0
Contacted solicitor	5	.9	9	3.2	1	0.4	2	.8

In the autochthonous subsample the rare cases of lobbying for interests served the interest of respondents themselves or their families. This category groups almost 50 per cent of the cases. Actions in the interest of the whole population of Hungary occurred with a similar frequency, while attempts to realize the interest of autochthonous respondents or the entire humanity accounted for only a few per cents. Ethnic Hungarians acted in their own personal interests and the public interests of Hungary or their native country with almost the same frequency (29, 27 and 23% of cases,

respectively). Respondents in the autochthonous subsample act much more frequently in the interest of humanity as a whole. In contrast, the public affairs of Budapest do not raise the interest of ethnic Hungarians. For the Chinese and Muslim migrant groups, attempts to realize interests were so rare that they cannot be grouped by whom they favoured.

79 per cent of the autochthonous subsample said that they voted in the 2006 general elections, although actual voter turnout in Budapest was only 70 per cent. The recollection of past voting behaviour also slightly distorts party preferences: 52 per cent recalled that they voted for the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), while real votes were only 43 per cent. In the case of the Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) respondents replied in accordance with actual results, with 34 per cent voting for Fidesz. For the Alliance of Free Democrats (SzDSz) and the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), 7 and 4 per cent respectively of respondents remembered voting for these two parties, while the actual shares of votes were 12 and 5 per cent, respectively. Although it is not unusual for this type of research, the most remarkable figure is that a third of those who claimed they did go to the polls could not recall which party they voted for.

In turn, 74 per cent of autochthonous respondents said they had participated in the latest local elections (in the Autumn of 2006), which grossly exceeds actual voter turnout (56%).⁶ Willingness to vote in the elections always decreases between two elections; accordingly, 59 per cent of autochthonous respondents replied with a definite 'yes' to the question whether they would vote in the locals elections if they were held the following weekend. (Nevertheless, this proportion is still higher than the actual voter turnout in 2006.) In contrast, 23 per cent of autochthonous respondents were sure that they would not participate in the local elections, 7 per cent were undecided, and 12 per cent did not reveal their intentions.

Regardless of voting intention, respondents could also express their party sympathy. The avoidance of politics is clearly indicated by the result that 21 per cent of respondents are not attracted to any party, while 37 per cent did not give a meaningful answer. Those with meaningful answers would have voted for MSzP and Fidesz in a ratio of 2:3. None of the other parties reached the 5 per cent threshold share. The left-right scale reflecting autochthonous respondents' political orientation shows that the average can be located in the centre, since respondents had a mean score of 5.3 on the 11-degree scale.

Hardly 20 per cent of ethnic Hungarians voted in the latest general elections in Hungary. More than two thirds were not eligible to vote at that time, while only 8 per cent said that they did not vote, although they were eligible. Half of the 55 ethnic Hungarians who did vote told that they voted for Fidesz, and more than a third did not name the party of their choice. Voter turnout in the local elections was somewhat higher: 71 respondents voted, two thirds were not eligible, and 10 per cent did not go to the polls. The distribution of the 71 voters in the local elections by party preferences is very similar to the findings for the general elections: almost half voted for Fidesz, while a fifth did not give a meaningful answer. As to willingness to vote in the future, three fourths of ethnic Hungarians say that they would vote if a (hypothetical) local election was held on the following Sunday. The strong sympathy to Fidesz within this sample is


⁶ Since most candidates in the Hungarian local elections are usually not delegated by parties but are independent candidates, it is not reasonable to examine party preferences in this call.

also reflected in the result that 70 per cent of those who did name the most attractive party chose Fidesz. This proportion is much higher than the mean value for the autochthonous group.

Of all the Chinese included in the sample, only 4 respondents voted in the last general elections, and 3 respondents voted in the last local elections. Therefore their answers cannot be analyzed meaningfully. However, 19 per cent of the Chinese sample indicated that they would go to vote if they were entitled; and almost half would vote for the Hungarian Socialist Party.

Finally, three fourths of Muslims had no right to vote at the time of the latest elections. Two thirds of the 62 respondents who were eligible did go to vote, and three fourths voted for the governing parties.

Figure 8. Distribution of respondents along the left-right scale in the different subsamples (percentages)



This figure not only shows that most autochthonous respondents are attracted to the centre, but it also points to the existence of a group on the extreme right. Ethnic Hungarians clearly tend to define themselves as right-wing. Like autochthonous respondents, the majority of the Chinese and Muslims located themselves in the centre, and extremes are not sizeable in these groups.

5. Organizational involvement

Only 8 per cent of autochthonous respondents, 18 per cent of ethnic Hungarians, 2 per cent of the Chinese, and 3 per cent of Muslims say that they are currently involved in any civic organization active in Hungary. For most of the subgroups, involvement means both membership and participation in activities, but the gap between membership and active engagement is quite large for the ethnic Hungarian, precisely those with higher percentages of membership.

Table 39. Organizational involvement for the different subsamples (percentages)

Current involvement in org	<i>Respondent's group</i>			
	Autochthonous	Ethnic Hungarian	Chinese	Mixed Muslim
Involvement in any org	8.4	18.3	1.7	2.7
Any current membership	7.8	16.6	1.7	2.7
Any current activity	6.6	8.9	1.3	2.5
(N)	(599)	(290)	(249)	(284)

Consequently, the average number of civil society organisations that each of the subgroup respondents join does not even reach 1.

Table 40. Number of organizations respondents are involved in for the different subsamples

Average number of organisations...		<i>Respondent's group</i>			
		Autochthonous	Ethnic Hungarian	Chinese	Mixed Muslim
Respondent is involved in	mean	0.08	0.21	0.02	0.04
	s.d	0.28	0.49	0.15	0.23
Respondent is a current member	mean	0.08	0.18	0.02	0.04
	s.d	0.27	0.44	0.15	0.23
Respondent has a current activity	mean	0.07	0.10	0.01	0.03
	s.d	0.25	0.36	0.14	0.23

The low organisational activity is not offset by any intense involvement in migrants' or ethnic organisations. And, again, ethnic Hungarians are the most likely to join any of these.

Table 41. Involvement in immigrant and ethnic organizations (percentages)

Involvement in...	<i>Respondent's group</i>			
	Autochthonous	Ethnic Hungarian	Chinese	Mixed Muslim
any immigrant organisation	---	1.5	0.2	0.9
any organisations of the respondent's own ethnic group	---	1.5	0.2	0.9

N		(290)	(249)	(284)
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When we look in detail which organisations people join, autochthonous respondents most often mentioned membership in trade unions or sports clubs. Ethnic Hungarians are most often attracted by sports clubs and cultural associations. Organisational membership is extremely rare among the Chinese and Muslims. If they do join some organization, the Chinese prefer to do sports, while Muslims are active in cultural associations.

Table 42. Organizational involvement for the different subsamples (numbers and percentages)

	BUDAPEST		ETHNIC HUNGARIAN		CHINESE		MIXED MUSLIM	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Sports organization	9	13.4	14	23.0	7	70.0	0	0.0
Cultural organization	5	7.5	12	19.7	1	10.0	5	50.0
Political party	3	4.5	3	4.9	0	0.0	0	0.0
Trade union	23	34.3	7	11.5	0	0.0	0	0.0
Professional organization	5	7.5	4	6.6	0	0.0	0	0.0
Humanitarian aid organization	1	1.5	1	1.6	0	0.0	1	10.0
Environmental protection	2	3.0	2	3.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
Human rights or peace organization	1	1.5	1	1.6	0	0.0	0	0.0
Religious organization	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	10.0	0	0.0
Immigrants' organization	--	--	0	0.0	1	10.0	2	20.0
Ethnic group organization	--	--	4	6.6	0	0.0	2	20.0
Anti-racism organization	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Educational organization	3	4.5	1	1.6	0	0.0	0	0.0
Youth organization	4	6.0	4	6.6	0	0.0	0	0.0
Organization for the retired	2	3.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Women's organization	1	1.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Neighbour organization	2	3.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Other	6	9.0	8	13.1	0	0.0	0	0.0
Total	67	100.0	61	100.0	10	100.0	10	100.0

6. Perception of political opportunity structures

The difficulties of migrant existence are reflected clearly by the series of questions where both members of mainstream society and migrant groups can describe how they see the situation of migrant groups living in Hungary. The sometimes sharp differences between perceptions of the majority and minorities indicate a tension. Migrants are much more likely to agree with the statements which refer to the difficult situation of immigrants, and they are much less likely to agree with the statements which imply that migrants can easily manage in Hungary.

Table 43. Judgments on the situation of immigrants and attitudes towards immigrants in the different subsamples (means on a 0-10 scale, 10=fully agree)

		BUDAPEST	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Think that it is hard for immigrants	Immigrants face too many difficulties in obtaining legal status	5.44	7.84	7.74	8.11
	Getting a job is difficult for immigrants	3.98	5.56	7.1	6.84
	Immigrants have great difficulties in getting access to public health	4.10	5.85	6.18	4.33
Think that it is easy for immigrants	Getting nationality is easy	4.22	2.10	2.21	1.98
	Local government does a lot to improve the lives of immigrant residents	5.41	2.16	4.68	2.37
	Foreigners can easily bring their families	7.97	5.16	5.1	2.84
	It is fairly easy for immigrant residents to make their voice heard by the local government	4.80	2.29	5.44	3.06
Negative / critical attitudes towards immigration	We have too many immigrants already	6.97	3.49	3.75	4.70
	Hungary should implement stricter measures against illegal immigration	8.41	6.32	8.27	5.91
See the majority as xenophobic	Cultural and religious traditions of immigrants are not respected	4.35	5.38	6.1	2.13
	Society has a very negative attitude towards immigrants	7.33	6.54	5.51	4.53

Evidently, migrants are less xenophobic than citizens of the host country. Ethnic Hungarians are much more sensitive to whether their culture is accepted in Hungary, and thus they tend to think that their distinctive qualities are less respected in the host country. At the same time they consider mainstream society to be less prejudiced than assumed by autochthonous respondents, who themselves are members of that mainstream society. Of all the groups included in the survey, the Chinese are the most likely to think that the mainstream society does not appreciate the culture and customs of immigrants (6.1 average) and that it is hard for an immigrant to get a job (7.1). Nevertheless, they are the most likely to have a positive opinion about local authorities. Interestingly, the Chinese would act against illegal immigration almost as sternly as the autochthonous respondents. Citizens from Muslim countries have the most problems with obtaining legal status (8.1 scores), job opportunities (6.8), and possibilities of


family reunification (2.8). Nevertheless, they expressed a clearly positive opinion about tolerance on the part of mainstream society (2.1).

7. *Self-identification and values*

The integration of immigrants is greatly influenced by their degree of attachment to the host country, their residence and neighbourhood, and other countries.

Autochthonous respondents tend to be attached most to Hungarians and Hungary, but they also have a strong sense of belonging to the city of Budapest and the whole of Europe. They consider their attachment to people of the same religion to be the weakest, but they also have a weaker-than-average attachment to neighbours, people with the same occupation, and Central Europeans, although the latter three were given more than 6 points (on a scale with a median of 5.5).

Figure 9. Degrees of attachment to different places and populations (0-10 scale means)




Ethnic Hungarians have the strongest attachment to their own group, i.e. Hungarians who were born in other countries but now live in Hungary. The second strongest consideration is their attachment to Hungary, but to a lower degree than that of autochthonous respondents. Integration of a lesser degree can be detected for almost all other types of attachment, only the sense of belonging to people with the same occupation and religion reaches the degree found for autochthonous respondents. Ethnic Hungarians are also rather loosely linked to their native countries, and have weak ties with native Hungarians and their neighbours, which clearly indicates the difficulties of migrant existence.

It is an important indicator of attachment to the origin country how close an attachment respondents feel they have with people who remained in their homeland. Interestingly, the Chinese are most likely to be attached to other Chinese (8.6 scores), China (8.4), and Budapest (7.4). Of all the immigrant groups included in the survey, they feel the


strongest attachment with Hungary (7.3), but the weakest with native Hungarians (3). Muslims are most likely to feel attached to their native countries (8.3 scores), and curiously, attachment to their own ethnic/national groups is far weaker (6.8) than the previous value. It should be emphasized that the degree of their attachment to other Muslims is almost the same as the degree of attachment to their own ethnic/national groups. Like the Chinese, Muslims have stronger ties with Budapest than Hungary. Members of the Muslim sample have the strongest attachment to their homeland (8.3), and far weaker but still strong attachment to Muslims living in Hungary (6.8). The degrees of their attachment to Hungary, Budapest and Hungarians are all indicated by scores above 6.

Figure 10. Keeping contact with people who live in respondent’s original country among ethnic Hungarians (percentages)




Thanks to geographical proximity, ethnic Hungarians often return to their homeland and call their folks back there very frequently, but use the Internet and send letters or postcards less frequently. Financial aid to relatives is also less frequent, which, in large part, is due to the fact that a considerable proportion of the ethnic Hungarians included in the sample are students.

Figure 11. Keeping contacts with people who live in respondent's mother country among the Chinese (percentages)



The Chinese return to their homeland once a year in the highest proportion (41%). For them, the most popular channel for keeping contacts seems to be the telephone: 56 per cent of the sample calls 'home' at least once a month. Of the three groups included in the survey, the Chinese send remittances to relatives and friends living in their homeland in the highest proportion: 52 per cent send some money to China at more or less regular intervals.


Figure 12. Keeping contacts with people who live in respondent's mother country in the Arab/Turkish sample (percentages)



78 per cent of Muslims visit their homeland at least once a year, most of them (46%) once a year. 61 per cent call relatives and friends living in their homeland several times a month. Muslims are less likely to provide financial aid to relatives and friends who remained in their native country; 29 per cent said that they sent money 'home' at regular intervals.

The strength of autochthonous respondents' attachment to Hungary and Hungarians is also supported by the finding that they have a very moderate desire to move to another country. Two thirds of respondents said they would not change countries, and only 17 per cent indicated that they were keen on moving to another country if it improved their living conditions. As to the migration potential, autochthonous respondents are followed by immigrants from Muslim countries: 27 would leave Hungary if they could have better living conditions elsewhere. For ethnic Hungarians, the intention to migrate is much stronger. Only 15 per cent consider their stay in Hungary to be permanent, while almost half contemplate trying their luck in another country. The strongest migration potential was measured for the Chinese: more than half of their sample would move to another country in the hope of a better life, and only 6 per cent told that they would never leave Hungary.

Figure 13. Migration potential in the different samples (percentages)



It is an important question how migrants define their national or ethnic identity. The question concerning identity had a strict restraint, since it excluded multiple identification, allowing the respondent to choose one alternative only. Two thirds of ethnic Hungarians defined themselves as Hungarians living outside their mother country, and only one third selected the 'Hungarian' option. (The proportion of other responses is negligible.) Only 3 respondents of the interviewed Chinese and 8 interviewees of Muslims identified themselves as Hungarians, while the rest chose to belong to the ethnic groups of their native countries.

It is an essential dimension of self-identification whether immigrants are able to trust in members of their co-ethnic and host groups. Ethnic Hungarians are less likely to consider native Hungarians to be trustworthy, the average level of trust in that group being lower than the potential midpoint of the scale. In comparison, ethnic Hungarians have, with some reserve, much more trust in members of their own native groups. The same applies to Chinese and Muslim migrants, with the addition that Muslims have a particularly strong trust in both native Hungarians and members of their own groups.

Table 44. Levels of trust in members of the host country and respondents' native groups for the different subsamples (means on a 0-10 scale)

	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Trust in native Hungarians	5.37	5.72	6.68
Trust in members of their own native groups	6.76	6.32	7.21

8. Discrimination and attitudes towards ethnic groups

9 per cent of autochthonous respondents said that they had suffered some form of discrimination in the past year. The most frequent reason for discrimination is age, while origin-based discrimination occurs quite often, and in half as many cases respondents mentioned colour, gender and disability as the bases of discrimination. A third of ethnic Hungarians reported cases of discrimination, while 39 per cent of the Chinese and 31 per cent of Muslims said they had suffered discrimination too.

Table 45. Proportions of discrimination-stricken respondents by possible cause of discrimination for the different subsamples (percentages)

Cause of discrimination assumed by respondent:	AUTOCHTHONOUS	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
Colour or race	1.5	1.7	25.9	17.4
Nationality or origin	2.9	24.4	43.6	23.0
Religion	0	1.4	5.1	20.7
Language	-	10.3	18.9	13.8
Age	4.8	2.7	4.4	7.2
Gender	1.1	2.1	0.5	1.1
Sexuality	0	0.7	0.2	0.5
Disability	1.6	1.0	7.4	0
Migration status	-	16.2	3.8	3.2

A meagre 3 per cent of the autochthonous subsample mentioned that they suffered discrimination because of their origin. They most frequently experienced discrimination in job-seeking. Nearly a fourth of ethnic Hungarians suffered discrimination due to their origin. The main agent of discrimination is the immigration authority, but these respondents also face much discrimination in job-seeking, at their workplace, or at school. The Chinese group includes the highest proportions of respondents who reported discrimination based on origin (44%), colour (26%), and native language (19%). They usually have to suffer origin-based discrimination at public places (e.g. in the street, public transport, restaurants, and shops). Muslim respondents mentioned discrimination most frequently in relation to origin (23%), religion (21%), and colour (17%). Muslims usually face origin-based discrimination when they seek jobs and at their workplace.

Table 46. Typical settings for origin-based discrimination within the different subsamples; number of instances among respondents who suffered discrimination due to their origin (N)

	AUTOCHTHONOUS	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
School	6	28	17	12
Work	9	28	32	38
Health care system	2	24	21	15
Immigration office	1	34	27	17
Police	7	9	26	10
Church			4	5
Looking for a job	14	30	13	47
Restaurants and bars	7	9	34	20
Street	5	9	51	21
Neighbourhood	2	8	14	9
Shops	4	5	33	19
Public transport	3	6	38	27
Total involved	17	71	88	65

The Bogardus scale, which measures social distance between various minority groups and citizens of the host country, can also be very useful in measuring the tolerance of dissimilarity. For the autochthonous subsample, representing citizens of the host country, perceived social distances from ethnic Hungarians, the Chinese, and the Arab/Turkish population was measured (Table 47).⁷

Table 47. Social acceptance of Ethnic Hungarians, Chinese and Arab/Turkish immigrants by the autochthonous respondents (percentages)

Would accept as	ETHNIC HUNGARIAN	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
–close kin by marriage	75	38	33
–neighbours	10	22	22
–colleagues	3	9	8
–city residents	2	6	6
–country’s citizens	1	2	2
<i>Consider them personae non gratae</i>	8	23	29

Evidently, autochthonous respondents feel ethnic Hungarians closest to themselves, since their average position is defined between family members and neighbours on the Bogardus scale. Aloofness in relation to the Chinese is somewhat stronger, they are usually rejected as close kin. And a still greater social distance is defined from Arab/Turkish immigrants. A somewhat surprising fact is that 8 per cent of

⁷ In Table 47, the results are presented as a cumulative Bogardus scale, by which agreement with the most demanding type of relation (from close kin by marriage, top to bottom) assumes agreement with the less demanding relations. Hence, 75 per cent of autochthonous respondents would accept Ethnic Hungarians in any type of relation, 10 per cent would accept them as neighbours and those below that category but not as close kin by marriage, etc. Those who refuse to accept the specific immigrant group in all forms of relations appear in the category of ‘consider them personae non gratae’.

autochthonous respondents feel that ethnic Hungarians are unwelcome, nearly a fourth are not happy to see Chinese people in Hungary at all, and almost a third consider immigrants of Arab/Turkish origin to be *personae non gratae*.

As in so many other surveys, it can be found that, compared to members of mainstream society, groups of migrants are much more inclusive in relation to other minorities. Virtually all ethnic Hungarians would accept native Hungarians in their families, but they also perceive less distance from the Chinese and Muslims (Table 48).

Table 48. Social acceptance of native Hungarians, Chinese and Arab/Turkish immigrants by ethnic Hungarian respondents (percentages)

Accept as	NATIVE HUNGARIANS	CHINESE	MIXED MUSLIM
–close kin by marriage	97	45	47
–neighbours	2	40	36
–colleagues		5	6
–city residents		5	6
–country’s citizens	1	1	1
<i>Personae non gratae</i>		4	4

In turn, 56 per cent of the Chinese would also accept Hungarians as a family member,⁸ and further 41 per cent would accept Hungarians as neighbours at the most. In this respect, the Chinese are much more open to Hungarians than vice versa. In contrast, the Chinese perceive a rather great distance from Muslims. Only 16 per cent would accept Muslims as family members, and 20 per cent would even keep them away from the country. However, this aloofness is still weaker than native Hungarians’ aversion to Muslims (Table 49).

Table 49. Social acceptance of native and ethnic Hungarians and Arab/Turkish people by Chinese respondents (percentages)

Accept as	Native and Ethnic Hungarians	Immigrants from Muslim countries
–close kin by marriage	56	16
–neighbours	41	49
–colleagues	3	8
–city residents		8
–country’s citizens		
<i>Personae non gratae</i>		20

Finally, 55 per cent of Muslim immigrants – mostly of Arab and Turkish origin – would accept Hungarians as family members; consequently, Muslims seem to be more open towards Hungarians than vice versa. The Muslim immigrants and the Chinese mutually keep distance from each other; 23 per cent of Muslims living in Budapest would accept

⁸ For the Chinese and the Mixed-Muslim groups, feelings towards native and ethnic Hungarians was asked jointly as a single category, as it might be difficult for them to make a substantially different judgement between both groups.

a Chinese as a family member, while 11 per cent would even expel them from Hungary (Table 50).

Table 50. Social acceptance of native and ethnic Hungarians and Chinese people by the Arab/Turkish respondents (percentages)

Accept as	Native and ethnic Hungarians	Chinese
–close kin by marriage	55	23
–neighbours	44	26
–colleagues	1	18
–city residents		5
–country’s citizens		17
<i>Personae non gratae</i>		11

Part II. Explanatory analyses

1. Explaining political interest

Table 51. Explanatory model of political interest for ethnic Hungarians

	SES ⁹ variables		Social capital ¹⁰		Discrimination ¹¹	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	.072	.214	.076	.191	.071	.227
Age	6.706	.120	6.735	.120	7.808	.076
Age-squared	6.558	.128	6.590	.128	7.663	.082
Education level	.128	.028	.121	.039	.129	.031
Language (to host country) ¹²	X	X	X	X	X	X
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ¹³	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			.038	.514	-.035	.886
Participation			-.022	.712	-.030	.616
Involvement in ethnic association			.109	.063	.093	.117
Self-perception of discrimination					.080	.741
Bogardus (distance from the Chinese)					.139	.084
Bogardus (distance from Muslims)					-.181	.025
Adjusted R-squared	4%		4%		5%	

For ethnic Hungarians, political interest is strengthened by a higher level of education. The picture does not change even if the cluster for the social capital variable is also included in explanatory variables; only education has some positive effect on political interest. When the discrimination cluster is incorporated, the effect of education remains, and the effect of perceived social distance from Muslims also shows. The more ethnic Hungarians tend to accept Muslims, the more they are likely to be interested in politics.

⁹ The model is significant, but greater-than-1 beta values indicate that it cannot be interpreted.

¹⁰ The model is significant, but unreliable, which is also indicated by certain betas having an absolute value greater than 1.

¹¹ The model is significant, but unreliable, which is also indicated by certain betas having an absolute value greater than 1.

¹² Except for 8 respondents, all members of the ethnic Hungarian sample speak fluent Hungarian as if it was their mother tongue.

¹³ There are no second-generation migrants among ethnic Hungarians.

Table 52. Explanatory model of political interest for the Chinese sample

	SES ¹⁴ variables		Social capital ¹⁵		Discrimination	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	-.164	.012	-.161	.014	-.189	.007
Age	-.161	.956	-.707	.814	-4.036	.272
Age-squared	-.183	.950	-.732	.807	-4.078	.268
Education level	-.025	.704	-.023	.723	-.042	.562
Language (to host country)	.144	.028	.148	.025	.099	.180
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ¹⁶	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			-.056	.404	-.029	.963
Participation			-.021	.743	-.039	.572
Involvement in ethnic association ¹⁷	X	X	X	X	X	X
Self-perception of discrimination					.038	.952
Bogardus (distance from Muslims)					.174	.014
Adjusted R-squared	4%		2%		8%	

For the Chinese sample, only the third model is significant, and it seems that men, who perceive a great social distance from Muslims, tend to be more interested in politics.

¹⁴ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.068.

¹⁵ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.137.

¹⁶ All respondents in the Chinese sample are first-generation migrants.

¹⁷ Only one respondent of the Chinese sample was involved in such an organization.

Table 53. Explanatory model of political interest for the Muslim sample

	SES variables		Social capital		Discrimination	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	.034	.541	.024	.665	.051	.432
Age	.595	.072	.500	.130	.585	.083
Age-squared	-.208	.530	-.137	.677	-.208	.534
Education level	.065	.258	.051	.369	.063	.286
Language (to host country)	.134	.019	.140	.014	.146	.012
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ¹⁸	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			.100	.079	-.205	.686
Participation ¹⁹			.090	.097	.066	.226
Involvement in ethnic association ²⁰			X	X	X	X
Self-perception of discrimination					.290	.565
Bogardus (distance from the Chinese)					-.027	.698
Adjusted R-squared	19%		20%		19%	

The first model shows that the more Muslim migrants can speak the Hungarian language, the more they tend to be interested in politics. The variables of the social capital cluster did not contribute to an increase in the explanatory power of the model, since none of them was found to be significant. Similarly, the variables of the discrimination cluster have no effect on political interest.

¹⁸ All respondents in the Muslim sample are first-generation migrants.

¹⁹ The number of participants is only 2.

²⁰ Respondents involved in ethnic organizations are identical with those who were considered active participants, therefore this independent variable was not incorporated into the regression model due to function-like multicollinearity.

2. Explaining political trust

Table 54. Explanatory model of political trust for ethnic Hungarians

	SES variables ²¹		Social capital ²²		Discrimination ²³	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	.169	.004	.170	.004	.174	.003
Age	6.892	.120	6.696	.133	6.793	.125
Age-squared	6.844	.123	6.646	.136	6.736	.128
Education level	.105	.075	.100	.092	.076	.198
Language (to host country) ²⁴	X	X	X	X	X	X
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ²⁵	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			-.073	.212	-.042	.860
Participation			.066	.268	.038	.519
Involvement in ethnic association			-.018	.756	-.024	.681
Self-perception of discrimination					-.043	.855
Bogardus (distance from the Chinese)					-.082	.301
Bogardus (distance from Muslims)					.168	.034
Adjusted R-squared	4%		4%		5%	

In the sample of ethnic Hungarians the degree of political trust is influenced by gender only. Women tend to have higher trust. The picture does not change even if the cluster of social capital variables is included in explanatory variables. Again, in the third model, including the discrimination cluster, women are characterized with higher levels of trust, which is also confirmed by the social distance perceived from Muslims.

²¹ The model is significant, but unreliable, which is also indicated by certain betas having an absolute value greater than 1.

²² The model is significant, but unreliable, which is also indicated by certain betas having an absolute value greater than 1.

²³ The model is significant, but unreliable, which is also indicated by certain betas having an absolute value greater than 1.

²⁴ Except for 8 respondents, all members of the ethnic Hungarian sample speak fluent Hungarian as if it was their mother tongue.

²⁵ There are no second-generation migrants among ethnic Hungarians.

Table 55. Explanatory model of political trust for the Chinese sample

	SES variables		Social capital		Discrimination	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	.070	.310	.078	.260	.062	.420
Age	1.647	.000	1.630	.001	1.337	.018
Age-squared	-1.510	.001	-1.510	.002	-1.265	.022
Education level	.104	.132	.096	.163	.127	.105
Language (to host country)	.159	.022	.157	.024	.085	.300
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ²⁶	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			-.029	.691	.678	.419
Participation			.154	.060	.126	.101
Involvement in ethnic association ²⁷			X	X	X	X
Self-perception of discrimination					-.758	.371
Bogardus (distance from Muslims)					-.014	.854
Adjusted R-squared	8%		7%		7%	

In the Chinese sample political trust rises with increasing age, and a good command of the Hungarian language also favours the development of such trust. The social capital cluster has no additional explanatory power in this respect. The variables of the discrimination cluster do not have a significant effect on political trust either; however, due to interference, their inclusion suppresses the influence of having a good command of Hungarian.

²⁶ All respondents in the Chinese sample are first-generation migrants.

²⁷ Only one respondent of the Chinese sample was involved in such an organization.

Table 56. Explanatory model of political trust for the Muslim sample

	SES variables		Social capital		Discrimination	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	.158	.009	.160	.010	.080	.245
Age	.785	.026	.779	.028	.769	.034
Age-squared	-.488	.166	-.482	.175	-.495	.168
Education level	.097	.113	.097	.118	.072	.255
Language (to host country)	.035	.562	.035	.564	-.008	.903
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ²⁸	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			-.003	.955	-.154	.791
Participation ²⁹			.012	.833	-.004	.948
Involvement in ethnic association ³⁰			X	X	X	X
Self-perception of discrimination					.133	.816
Bogardus (distance from the Chinese)					.171	.024
Adjusted R-squared	15%		14%		15%	

In the Muslim sample elderly women have stronger political trust. The effect of independent variables measuring social capital is not significant. The inclusion of the discrimination cluster restructures the model: in the Muslim sample political trust rises with old age only, and respondents who perceive a relatively big social distance from the Chinese also view politics with a relatively higher trust.

²⁸ All respondents in the Chinese sample are first-generation migrants.

²⁹ The number of participants is only 2.

³⁰ Respondents involved in ethnic organizations are identical with those who were considered active participants, therefore this independent variable was not incorporated into the regression model due to function-like multicollinearity.

3. Explaining political participation

Table 57. Explanatory model of political participation for ethnic Hungarians³¹

	SES variables		Social capital		Discrimination	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	-.100	.087	-.074	.202	-.071	.214
Age	2.775	.520	3.328	.433	4.004	.344
Age-squared	2.724	.528	3.284	.439	3.960	.349
Education level	.148	.012	.134	.020	.166	.004
Language (to host country) ³²	X	X	X	X	X	X
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ³³	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			.012	.831	.155	.155
Participation			.175	.003	.168	.168
Involvement in ethnic association			.109	.060	.058	.058
Self-perception of discrimination					-.138	.552
Bogardus (distance from the Chinese)					.312	.000
Bogardus (distance from Muslims)					-.246	.002
Adjusted R-squared	4%		7%			

Political participation within the group of ethnic Hungarians is influenced by education: the higher levels respondents completed, the more they are able to enforce their democratic rights. Incorporating variables of the social capital cluster increases the explanatory power of the model; again, higher levels of education are accompanied by more intense activity, which is further increased by involvement in civic organizations. The inclusion of the discrimination cluster increases the positive effect of education, and the explanatory power of variables of the social capital cluster disappears, while perceived social distance from minority groups has a significant role. The effect of variables is by no means symmetrical, since the big social distance perceived from the Chinese favours political participation, while perceived social distance from Muslims has the opposite effect.

³¹ Betas having an absolute value greater than 1 in the models indicate that these models cannot be interpreted.

³² Except for 8 respondents, all members of the ethnic Hungarian sample speak fluent Hungarian as if it was their mother tongue.

³³ There are no second-generation migrants within the sample of ethnic Hungarians.

Only 9 respondents of the Chinese sample reported that they could enforce their democratic rights in some form. There is no point in using the regression model in their sample. A similar situation resulted for Muslims: only 5 of them exercised their democratic rights, so here again, there is no point in constructing an explanatory model.

Table 58. Explanatory model of vote intention for the sample of ethnic Hungarians

	SES variables ³⁴		Social capital ³⁵		Discrimination ³⁶	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	.103	.087	.105	.086	.102	.100
Age	2.312	.642	2.547	.610	1.763	.730
Age-squared	2.328	.639	2.564	.608	1.778	.727
Education level	-.017	.775	-.012	.852	-.020	.756
Language (to host country) ³⁷	x	x	x	x	x	x
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ³⁸	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			.035	.571	.483	.055
Participation			.001	.981	-.025	.688
Involvement in ethnic association			-.042	.497	-.024	.695
Self-perception of discrimination					-.463	.067
Bogardus (distance from the Chinese)					-.014	.859
Bogardus (distance from Muslims)					-.060	.452
Adjusted R-squared	0		0		0	

For the sample of ethnic Hungarians, the degree of vote intention cannot be explained through a regression model.

³⁴ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.511.

³⁵ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.771.

³⁶ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.609.

³⁷ All members of the ethnic Hungarian sample speak fluent Hungarian as if it was their mother tongue.

³⁸ There are no second-generation migrants within the sample of ethnic Hungarians.

Table 59. Explanatory model of vote intention for the Chinese sample

	SES variables ³⁹		Social capital ⁴⁰		Discrimination ⁴¹	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	-.114	.170	-.114	.172	-.168	.062
Age	.286	.500	.239	.582	.229	.633
Age-squared	-.442	.299	-.400	.357	-.451	.338
Education level	.093	.267	.099	.251	.100	.281
Language (to host country)	.047	.562	.052	.526	-.053	.553
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ⁴²	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			-.050	.555	-.709	.419
Participation			.059	.620	.101	.429
Involvement in ethnic association			.006	.959	-.011	.931
Self-perception of discrimination					.662	.453
Bogardus (distance from Muslims)					-.137	.112
Adjusted R-squared	0		0		0	

None of the variables has proved to be applicable in explaining vote intention for the Chinese sample.

³⁹ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.085.

⁴⁰ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.225.

⁴¹ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.065.

⁴² There are no second-generation migrants within the Chinese sample.

Table 60. Explanatory model of vote intention for the Muslim sample

	SES variables ⁴³		Social capital ⁴⁴		Discrimination ⁴⁵	
	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign	Beta	Level of sign
Gender	-.048	.440	-.033	.600	-.041	.557
Age	.545	.131	.542	.135	.456	.215
Age-squared	-.626	.084	-.609	.094	-.550	.133
Education level	.091	.149	.094	.139	.085	.192
Language (to host country)	-.124	.047	-.127	.042	-.134	.035
1st or 2nd generation (for migrant) ⁴⁶	X	X	X	X	X	X
Membership in association			-.078	.216	.637	.245
Participation ⁴⁷			X	X	X	X
Involvement in ethnic association			.055	.364	.123	.041
Self-perception of discrimination					-.716	.189
Bogardus (distance from the Chinese)					.039	.614
Adjusted R-squared	0		0		0	

None of the models is significant in vote intention for the Muslim sample.

⁴³ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.144.

⁴⁴ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.152.

⁴⁵ The model is not significant, the level of significance being 0.068.

⁴⁶ There are no second-generation migrants within the Muslim sample.

⁴⁷ Respondents involved in ethnic organizations are identical with those who were considered active participants, therefore this independent variable was not incorporated into the regression model due to function-like multicollinearity.

Conclusion

The most important conclusions of the survey are the following:

- 1 Three radically different ethnic groups were analyzed. It is specific to ethnic Hungarians that they can speak fluent Hungarian as if it was their mother tongue. The distinct feature of the Muslim sample is that their migration to Hungary began relatively early, before the regime change took place in the country, and thus they equally carry the characteristics of integration and segregation. The Chinese clearly immigrated to Hungary after the regime change, and they form a closed community.
- 2 Political interest is organized in different ways in the different migrant groups. Ethnic Hungarians show a relatively great interest in the affairs of both the host country and their homeland. Chinese have a rather moderate interest in this respect, while Muslims are interested primarily in the public affairs of their mother countries.
- 3 Political distrust is the strongest among the Chinese, they are followed by Muslims, and ethnic Hungarians seem to have the highest level of positive political orientations.
- 4 Participation in political actions is not characteristic of any immigrant group. All minority groups exploited very few opportunities to exercise their democratic rights. A very low percentage of our samples had voting rights; willingness to vote in the future is the weakest for the Chinese and the strongest for ethnic Hungarians.
- 5 Membership in various organizations is very rare for the migrant groups included in the survey.
- 6 All migrant groups consider the situation of immigrants to Hungary difficult. For the Chinese, mainstream society seems to be intolerant, while it is tolerant for Muslims.
- 7 Members of the migrant groups have the strongest attachment to their own migrant groups, but they also have strong ties with their mother countries. The Chinese are the least attached to Hungary and native Hungarians.
- 8 Most instances of discrimination were reported by the Chinese and, in slightly fewer cases, Muslims, but ethnic Hungarians have also suffered disadvantages due to their origin. Migrant groups tend to be mutually aloof, if their perception of social distance is tested, but they also keep distance from native Hungarians. The latter is not characteristic of ethnic Hungarians.
- 9 The explanatory models constructed along the lines of central directives more or less failed to grasp the properties of migrant groups living in Hungary. Consequently, most of the models are not significant, or even when they are, they cannot be interpreted.

CITY REPORT: LONDON⁴⁸

Introduction

1200 face to face interviews were carried out for the population survey between September 2007 - January 2008 in the four North London boroughs Camden, Hackney, Haringey and Islington. The fieldwork was subcontracted to Ethnic Focus, a polling institute, which specialises in research with ethnic minorities. The survey was initially piloted with 15 respondents and amended for clarity. The British team took part in a training event with interviewers to explain the key concepts and the rationale behind the design of the questionnaire.

The British version of the questionnaire incorporates the standard *Localmultidem* questionnaire, to be used in the 6 countries, plus additional questions for the British case. The numbering follows the format 0_Nat, 1_Sex etc. in the British version and the numbering from the original *Localmultidem* questionnaire are cited in brackets.

The breakdown of the individual survey population is as follows: Indian 296, Black Caribbean 290, Bangladeshi 300, White British 300 and Mixed Ethnicity 14.

PART I: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES

2. Socio-demographic characteristics

Table 1: Sample composition by gender (n=1200)

	White British	Indian	Black-Caribbean	Bangladeshi	Mixed ethnicity
Men	55.7	65.2	41.4	50	57.1
Women	44.3	34.8	58.6	50	42.9
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 2: Sample composition by age (n=1014)

Age	White British	Indian	Black-Caribbean	Bangladeshi	Mixed ethnicity	TOTAL by age
15-22	19.3	21.4	11.9	23.5	14.3	18.9
23-29	24.4	31.8	24.2	23.5	7.1	25.2
30-44	31.6	31.3	50.0	32.4	71.4	36.9
45-59	16.0	12.0	11.1	15.3	7.1	13.7
60+	8.7	3.6	2.8	5.3	0	5.2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100

⁴⁸ This report has been produced by Ranji Devadason, a member of the Bristol University British LOCALMULTIDEM team.

Table 3: Ethnicity by birthplace (n = 1200)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi	Mixed ethnicity	ALL
Britain	99.7	28.8	84.5	54.3	100	67.3
The Caribbean	0	0	15.5	0	0	3.8
India	0	70.2	0	0	0	11.4
Bangladesh	0	0	0	45.7	0	17.3
Other country:	0		0	0	0	0.3
Kenya		0.7				
Tanzania		0.3				
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 4: Ethnicity by citizenship

	White British (n=300)	Indian (n=288)	Black- Caribbean (n=288)	Bangladeshi (n=297)	Mixed ethnicity (n=14)
British	100	50.3	96.5	85.2	100
Other	0	49.7	3.5	85.2	0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Table 5: Arrival in Britain (no. of migrants = 359)

	Indian (n=193)	Black- Caribbean (n=39)	Bangladeshi (n= 127)
1950s	0.5	5.1	1.6
1960s	3.1	17.9	11.8
1970s	6.2	23.1	22.8
1980s	4.7	12.8	29.1
1990s	8.3	23.1	12.6
2000+	77.2	17.9	22.0
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table 6: No. of years in London (n=1160)

	White British (n=289)	Indian (n=284)	Black- Caribbean (n=279)	Bangladeshi (n= 294)
1 year or less	3.1	7.4	0.7	0.3
Between 2 and 5 years	5.5	14.8	1.1	4.1
Between 6 and 10 years	2.1	4.9	5.0	6.8
More than 10 years	89.3	72.9	93.2	88.8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 7: Legal status of migrants (n=394)

	Indian (n=211)	Black- Caribbean (n=45)	Bangladeshi (n= 137)
Short-term visa of 5 years or less	60.7	8.9	11.7
Long-term visa/right to remain for more than 5 years	27.0	55.6	63.5
Renovating expired permit	1.4	4.4	6.6
Never had a permit	1.4	6.7	1.5
Other	1.9	2.2	0
Refused	7.6	22.2	16.8
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table 8: Highest level of education (Q54; 65_Educ)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi	ALL
Did not complete primary	0.7	0	1.2	3.9	1.4
Primary	5.3	6.2	5.8	11.3	7.1
Basic secondary	21.5	5.5	38.8	20.8	21.3
Upper secondary	10.9	11.1	20.5	16.9	14.7
Post secondary, non-tertiary	8.8	0.3	8.5	3.9	5.3
First stage tertiary	2.5	4.2	3.9	5.3	4.1
Higher Education degree, tertiary	25.3	41.9	17.8	27.5	28.4
Postgraduate degree	25.0	30.8	3.5	10.6	17.7
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Table 9: Employment status (Q55; 66_EmpStat)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi	ALL
In paid work	66.7	71.3	62.3	50.5	62.9
In education	11.9	11.3	7.4	15.3	11.4
Unemployed & job-seeking	7.5	3.1	8.5	8.4	6.8
Unemployed (not job-seeking)	1.4	3.4	4.2	2.8	2.9
Permanently sick or disabled	2.7	0.3	2.8	2.8	2.1
Retired	6.4	3.1	2.1	2.8	3.6
Community or military service	0	0	0.7	0	0.2

Housework or childcare etc.	3.4	7.2	11.3	17.4	9.8
Other	0	0.3	0.7	0	0.3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Table 10: Religious affiliation

	White British	Indian	Black-Caribbean	Bangladeshi	ALL
Roman Catholic	34.1	0.7	11.4	0	11.4
Protestant	18.8	0	33.9	0	13.2
Newer Christian movements	1.0	0	20.5	0	5.3
Christian – no denomination	12.1	4.1	18.0	0	8.5
Jehovah's Witnesses	0.7	0	3.8	0.3	1.2
Hinduism	0	61.7	0	1.7	15.6
Judaism	1.7	0	0	0	0.4
Islam	1.3	28.4	3.1	97.7	32.7
Sikhism	0	4.1	0	0	1.0
Buddhist	0.3	0	0	0	0.1
Atheist/agnostic	29.3	0.7	7.6	0.3	9.8
Other	0.7	0.3	1.7	0	0.8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Table 11: Religious attendance

	White British	Indian	Black-Caribbean	Bangladeshi	ALL
Every day	1.0	5.3	1.9	13.3	5.9
Several times a week	1.0	5.7	3.4	6.0	4.2
Once a week	10.2	35.1	17.6	20.3	21.5
Once a month	7.8	18.1	10.9	9.4	11.8
Several times a year	26.8	18.1	24.3	17.8	21.3
Once a year	22.0	9.6	26.6	11.2	17.0
Never	31.2	8.1	15.3	22.0	18.3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

3. Political interest

Table 12: Interest in politics

		White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Very interested	London	13.2	11.7	3.5	3.8
	Britain	16.9	12.2	3.5	5.4
	Homeland		16.8	3.9	6.4
Fairly interested	London	28.8	24.7	34.2	1.8
	Britain	32.7	25.2	32.2	38.9
	Homeland		27.7	25.8	34.2
Not very interested	London	34.3	35.1	38.8	46.1
	Britain	30.1	34.4	41.2	38.5
	Homeland		32.2	43.5	42.2
Not interested at all	London	23.7	28.5	23.5	18.3
	Britain	20.3	28.2	23.1	17.2
	Homeland		23.3	26.8	17.2

Table 13: Talk about politics: local, British and homeland

		White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Almost every day	Local politics	6.4	3.7	2.8	4.1
	British politics	7.7	3.1	2.1	3.7
	Homeland politics	na	7.9	1.4	5.7
Regularly	Local politics	24.4	23.5	28.7	22.3
	British politics	27.0	26.2	30.0	32.1
	Homeland politics	na	26.8	22.2	27.4
Rarely	Local politics	40.5	42.2	50.5	56.8
	British politics	40.3	41.8	51.4	48.3
	Homeland politics	na	42.3	55.9	52.7
Never	Local politics	28.8	30.6	18.0	16.9
	British politics	25.0	28.9	16.6	15.9
	Homeland politics	na	23.0	20.5	14.2

Table 14: Knowledge of public affairs locally, nationally and in the country of origin

		White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Very well informed	London	13.8	10.2	4.9	7.4
	Britain	12.9	8.5	4.2	6.4
	Homeland	na	14.1	2.8	7.4
Reasonably informed	London	40.7	42.0	38.0	34.7
	Britain	41.4	44.0	38.2	43.1
	Homeland	na	41.9	27.9	39.5
Only a bit informed	London	33.3	30.7	44.9	43.4
	Britain	35.3	30.0	43.1	37.7
	Homeland	na	28.5	48.4	41.9
Not at all informed	London	12.1	17.1	12.2	14.5
	Britain	10.5	17.4	14.6	12.8
	Homeland	na	15.5	20.9	11.1

Table 15: Reading the newspaper to find out about recent developments in public affairs locally, nationally and in the country of origin

		White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Almost every day	London	24.0	18.2	16.9	10.0
	Britain	23.7	18.6	15.5	10.7
	Homeland	na	17.2	1.7	6.3
Regularly	London	41.0	36.8	37.9	27.3
	Britain	45.3	36.8	32.5	33.0
	Homeland	na	33.8	15.5	27.0
Rarely	London	27.3	36.1	31.7	41.5
	Britain	23.7	34.5	37.2	37.3
	Homeland	na	34.8	51.7	40.8
Never	London	7.7	8.9	13.5	21.2
	Britain	7.3	10.1	14.8	19.0
	Homeland	na	14.2	31.1	25.9

4. Political trust

Table 16: Levels of trust in political institutions (mean score on a 0-10 scale) (Q36; 56_InstTr)

	White British	Indian	Black-Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Trust of the council / civil servants	6.12	6.14	4.64	5.98
Trust of the Mayor and GLA	6.30	6.30	4.32	5.92
Trust of schools and teachers	7.11	6.56	6.09	7.13
Trust of the London Assembly	6.12	5.76	4.12	5.73
Trust of the Police	6.77	6.58	4.37	5.28
Trust of the Church of England	5.93	6.04	4.49	5.34
Trust of the British Government	5.91	5.97	3.92	4.85
Trust of the legal system	5.96	6.10	4.11	5.25
Trust of the British Parliament	5.91	5.85	3.83	5.10
Trust of the European Union	5.68	5.52	3.64	4.55

5. Political participation

Table 17: Engaged in the following activity to improve society (Q24_1; 46.1)

	White British		Indian		Black-Caribbean		Bangladeshi		TOTAL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A. Contacted a politician	10	3.3	11	3.7	6	2.1	4	1.3	32	2.7
B. Contacted a government official	8	2.7	11	3.7	3	1.0	3	1.0	25	2.1
C. Worked in a political party	4	1.3	1	0.3	0	0	1	0.3	5	0.4
D. Worked in a political action group	1	0.3	2	0.7	0	0	0.3	1	5	0.4
E. Worn or displayed a badge or sticker	9	3.0	6	2.0	12	4.1	21	7.0	50	4.2
F. Signed a petition	21	7.0	8	2.7	12	4.1	16	5.3	59	4.9
G. Taken part in a public demonstration	5	1.7	5	1.7	2	0.7	9	3.0	22	1.8
H. Boycotted certain products	13	4.3	1	0.3	15	5.2	7	2.3	36	3.0
I. Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons	12	4.0	0	0	2	0.7	2	0.7	16	1.3
J. Donated money to political organisation or group	4	1.3	3	1.0	4	1.4	2	0.7	13	1.1
K. Taken part in a strike	1	0.3	0	0	2	0.7	2	0.7	3	0.3
L. Contacted the media	4	1.3	4	1.4	1	0.3	0	0	9	0.8
M. Contacted a solicitor or judicial body for non-personal reasons	1	0.3	3	1.0	2	0.7	2	0.7	8	0.7

Table 18: Voting behaviour (Q25, 27, 29; 47_NatVote, 49_LocVote, 51_OSVote)

		White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi	TOTAL
National	Yes	48.0	36.6	31.4	40.9	39.1
	No, but eligible	48.4	53.8	60.1	47.8	52.6
	Not eligible	3.7	9.7	8.5	11.3	8.2
Local	Yes	40.9	36.4	23.5	30.2	32.8
	No, but eligible	53.3	53.9	73.0	59.4	59.9
	Not eligible	5.8	9.6	3.6	10.3	7.3
Homeland	Yes	14.3	12.2	4.8	4.3	7.2
	No, but eligible	85.7	58.5	58.2	43.6	53.5
	Not eligible	0	29.3	37.1	52.1	39.3

Table 19: Political party voted for in the last General Election (Q26; 48_NatParty)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Labour	20.6	13.9	17.8	16.7
Liberal Democrat	4.5	2.5	3.7	6.8
Conservative	15.0	1.3	3.4	2.3
Independent	0	0.8	0	0.4
Green	0.4	0	0.4	0.8
Respect	0.4	0	0	4.2
Missing values/Did not vote	59.1	81.5	74.7	68.8
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 20: Political party voted for in the last local elections (Q28; 50_LocParty)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Labour	16.0	15.3	12.1	10.1
Liberal Democrat	4.9	2.1	2.5	2.3
Conservative	12.2	1.3	2.9	2.3
Independent	0	0.8	0	0.4
Green	0.7	0	0.4	0.4
Respect	1.0	0	0	1.2
Missing values/Did not vote	65.2	80.5	82.1	83.3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

Table 21: Intention to vote for the City Elections (London Assembly) if there was an election next week (Q31; 53_CityVote)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi	TOTAL
Yes	46.7	50.4	31.0	36.8	41.2
No	32.3	18.0	46.2	32.6	32.4
Don't know	21.0	31.6	22.8	30.6	26.4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Table 22: Political party which the respondent would be inclined to vote for (regardless of whether they intended to vote or not) (Q32; 54_CityParty)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Labour	9.0	5.1	12.8	10.3
Liberal Democrat	2.0	1.4	2.8	2.3
Conservative	7.4	0.3	3.4	1.0
Independent	0.0	0	0	0
Green	0.3	0	0	0.3
Respect	0.3	0	0	1.0
Missing values/Refused	81.0	93.2	81.0	85.0
TOTAL	100	100	100	100

6. Organisational Involvement

Table 23: Membership of different types of organisations and associations (Q17_1; 40_Assoc1)

	White British		Indian		Black-Caribbean		Bangladeshi		ALL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A. Sports club or outdoors activities club	33		24		26		38		121	
B. Organisation for cultural activities	7		7		6		6		26	
C. Political party	3		3		1		1		8	
D. Trade Union	3		0		1		1		5	
E. Business or professional association	7		2		4		6		13	
F. Organisation for charity aid	5		0		6		3		14	
G. Organisation for animal/environmental protection	2		2		1		0		5	
H. Human rights or peace organisation	2		0		0		2		4	
I. Religious or faith organisation	8		4		29		12		53	
J. General minorities' or migrants' organisation	0		0		1		4		5	
K. Specific [ethnic group] organisation	0		0		0		9		9	
L. Anti-racism organisation	1		0		0		2		3	
M. Educational organisation (e.g. PTA)	0		0		7		1		6	
N. Youth organisation	0		0		6		0		6	
O. Organisation for the retired/elderly	4		0		1		1		6	
P. Women's organisation	0		0		2		4		6	
Q. Residents, housing or neighbourhood association	4		1		3		2		10	
R. Other organisation	7		3		2		0		12	

7. Perception of Political Opportunity Structures

Table 24: Agreement or disagreement with the following statements regarding migrants' access to opportunities in Britain (mean score on a scale of 1-10, where 0 = strongly disagree and 10 = strongly agree) (Q37; 89BritImm)

		White British	Indian	Black-Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Think it is hard for migrants	People who want to come to Britain face too many difficulties to obtain residence or a work permit	5.8	6.3	5.9	6.5
	Getting a job in Britain is difficult for migrants	5.2	5.9	5.3	6.0
	Migrants and minorities have great difficulty accessing public health	4.6	5.1	5.2	5.3
Think it is easy for migrants	Getting British nationality is very easy	5.7	4.8	5.0	4.4
	Migrants can easily bring their families once they have settled	6.2	5.5	6.1	5.0
	The local govt. does a lot to improve the lives of ethnic minority residents in London	6.4	5.9	5.2	5.3
	It is fairly easy for immigrants to make their voices heard by local government.	6.1	5.6	5.1	4.7
Anti-immigration	We already have too many immigrants in Britain and their nos. should be reduced	6.6	6.2	6.4	5.4
	Britain should implement stronger measures to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country	7.2	7.1	6.7	6.0
Think the majority society is xenophobic	British society has a very negative attitude towards ethnic minorities	3.7	4.1	5.6	4.9
	The cultural and religious traditions of migrants and ethnic minorities are not respected in Britain	3.7	4.4	4.9	5.1

8. Self-identification and values

Table 25: Attachment to different people and places (mean scores on a scale of 1-10) (Q13; 26_SelfID)

		White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
People	with the same religion	5.9	6.9	6.1	7.1
	of the same ethnic group	na	6.6	7.3	6.8
	English people	7.3	5.4	6.1	4.9
	British people	7.0	5.2	6.0	4.9
Places	Your neighbourhood	6.5	5.4	6.4	5.9
	Your London borough	6.5	5.5	6.4	5.7
	London	6.8	5.4	6.1	4.9
	Country of origin	na	5.6	7.3	6.4

Table 26: Agreement with the statement “In many ways I think of myself as British”

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Definitely agree	71.8	35.4	38.5	20.2
Tend to agree	20.2	22.9	38.2	32.2
Tend to disagree	4.5	10.4	14.9	27.1
Definitely disagree	3.5	31.3	8.3	20.5
TOTAL	100	100	99.9	100

Table 27: Agreement with the statement “In many ways I think of myself as [ethnic group]”

	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
Definitely agree	67.8	53.1	43.4
Tend to agree	22.0	35.3	42.3
Tend to disagree	6.1	7.0	11.5
Definitely disagree	4.1	4.6	2.8
TOTAL	100	100	100

Table 28: ‘Would you say most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ (Mean scores on a scale of 1 to 10, when 0 = low trust and 10 = high trust) (Q34; 7_Trust); And what about [Respondent’s ethnic group] would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with them? Q35; 8_EthTr)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi	ALL
Social trust, in general	5.6	5.3	4.8	4.6	5.1
Trust of <u>own</u> ethnic group		6.1	5.1	5.4	5.6

9. Discrimination and attitudes towards other ethnic groups

Table 29: Experience of personal discrimination because of nationality, ethnicity or religion in the last 12 months (Q15; 38_Disc)

	White British	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi	ALL
Yes	12.1	30.7	31.7	28.2	25.6
No	87.9	69.3	68.3	71.8	74.4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

Table 30: Environments in which ethnic discrimination was experienced (Q16; 39_EmpDisc)

	White British		Indian		Black- Caribbean		Bangladeshi		TOTAL asked	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
At school, college or university	10	27.8	25	27.8	15	18.5	16	21.6	285	100
At work	11	31.4	48	53.3	29	36.3	31	41.9	283	100
When looking for a job or at a job interview	8	22.2	20	23.0	45	54.2	23	31.1	284	100
In the health service	7	19.4	9	10.0	9	11.3	7	9.7	282	100
Applying for social housing	3	8.3	0	0	14	17.1	7	9.7	282	100
By social services or the local authority	2	5.6	3	3.4	13	16.5	4	5.6	277	100
By the police	7	19.4	10	11.2	45	51.7	12	16.4	289	100
When practicing your religion	2	5.6	12	13.5	7	8.9	5	6.7	283	100
On public transport	7	19.4	22	24.4	24	30.4	11	14.9	283	100
In restaurants, pubs, bars or discos	8	22.2	16	18.0	21	26.3	10	13.9	281	100
In shops	7	19.4	11	22.2	27	34.2	4	5.4	283	100
On the street	1	2.8	13	14.4	16	20.0	12	16.4	283	100
By neighbours	12	33.3	45	50.0	28	35.4	30	40.5	283	100

Table 31: Inter-ethnic relations: acceptance of ethnic minority groups in different contexts by the ethnic majority (Q38_1-Q38_4; 90.1-90.4_EthRel)

	Indian	Black- Caribbean	Bangladeshi
As citizens of the country	92.0	90.7	91.7
As residents of London	91.3	90.7	91.3
As colleagues at work	90.3	90.0	90.3
As neighbours on your street	91.0	89.3	90.7
As close kin by marriage	75.3	77.7	73.7

CITY REPORT: LYON⁴⁹

Structure of Report Contents:

Introduction

Part I: Descriptive Analyses

Part II: Explanatory Analyses

C. Conclusions

⁴⁹ This report has been produced by Manlio Cinalli, the coordinator of the French LOCALMULTIDEM team.

Introduction

In France the population survey targeted the three groups of “Algerians”, “Tunisians”, and “Moroccans” as part of a broader category of “Maghrebian” origin population. Migrants from the Maghreb and their descendents are at the core of questions of “ethnicity” in France, at the least to the extent to which France acknowledges that. Thus, Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans can either be taken each as distinct groups or as parts of a same comprehensive category of “Maghrebians”. The final total sample includes 1,106 individuals (705 interviews across the three groups + 401 interviews with a control group where no Maghrebian was included). Specific quotas have been elaborated on the base of gender, age and status, drawing especially upon data from our Work-package 2 of this project and official statistics by INSEE. The survey has targeted not only Lyon itself, but also important parts of ‘banlieue lyonnaise’, that is, other ‘villes’ which are part of the ‘communauté urbaine’ of Lyon but are administratively distinct from the ‘ville’ of Lyon (in particular, Vaulx-en-Valin). This was necessary to broaden the analytical horizons of research, since recent developments in France show that the ‘banlieues’ are in fact the most sensitive places where scholars should indeed focus their attention.

The survey was administrated by TNS Sofrès, a leading polling institute at the national (and international) level. Sofrès conducted of interviews between January and April 2008, following a meticulous work of quotas elaboration that had been completed by the end of 2007. Interviews proved to be very difficult to realise due to a low rate of penetration in certain areas, and in particular, due to a significant number of respondents unwilling to take part to the survey or simply dropping the interview before its end.

SELECTION OF GROUPS

In the French census, immigrants are identified through their nationality since the Constitution forbids to make or to use statistics with reference to ethnicity. In the census, however, a crucial distinction is made according to the nationality acquirement between a) people getting nationality since their birth and b) others, foreign born or from foreign parents (for whom we have their ‘nationality’ information), who need to request a naturalisation process. This is why the preparation of the survey also drew upon data from Work-package 2 and other well-known estimates in major scholarly work (in particular, by Tribalat). Algerians are undoubtedly the largest group in all selected towns, as this was rightly reflected in the final sample. Tunisians and Moroccans also stood as very numerous groups, while allowing for a comprehensive multi-level comparison across cultural and geographical differences.

Table 1 Size of the foreigner populations from the first five countries

	LYON	VENISSIEUX	VAULX
Population size of main municipality	445, 274	47,919	39,128
(if applicable, population size of subunits or additional municipalities)	n.a	n.a.	n.a.
% of population foreign nationality (absolute numbers)	8% 35,583	14,5% 8,095	20,8% 8,144
5 largest nationality groups (size)	Algeria 10,389 Portugal 4,263 Tunisia	Algeria 2,909 Tunisia 1,461 Portugal	Algeria 2,865 Tunisia 923 Portugal

	3,922	597	809
	Morocco	Turkey	Morocco
	2,270	562	631
	Italy	Morocco	Turkey
	2,054	511	615

Source: recensement INSEE 1999

Table 1 refers to different “*villes*”, since the latter are politically and administratively autonomous units in France. Citizens from each area elect their assembly, the council, which in turn selects the mayor (usually the leader of the most voted list or coalition). The specificity of the French approach to ethnicity issues prevents actors to deal directly with specific matter of ‘ethnicities’ and then specific policies (notably in the institutional field). However, some key points are included in areas project (“*le contract de ville*”), which correspond to a urban renewal program, particularly for areas with high rate of foreign populations, poverty and discrimination. That is, the “*villes*” have a crucial role to detect issues to put forward although important powers are kept at the national and regional level.

Table 2 sums up our final samples across groups, including specific gender distributions. It should be noticed that the populations considered in table 2 are of a different nature when compared to data in table 1. As it has been said, official statistics rely on the aggregate of foreign residents whereas our sample includes not only migrants who are foreign residents but also their descendents, who are full French citizens and therefore not targeted by previous analysis on nationality.

Table 2 Size of groups in the sample and relevant gender distribution

respondent's group		Frequency	Percent
French	male	190	47.4
	female	211	52.6
	Total	401	100.0
Moroccan	male	51	44.7
	female	63	55.3
	Total	114	100.0
Algerian	male	197	42.7
	female	264	57.3
	Total	461	100.0
Tunisian	male	65	50.0
	female	65	50.0
	Total	130	100.0

FIELDWORK

Interviewees were submitted a 30-35 minutes telephone questionnaire. The French control group was made up of 401 French individuals, excluding people of Maghrebian origins. The questionnaire included a number of items concerning different kinds of political activities, organizational memberships of the interviewees, as well as various socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Several questions were specifically constructed to obtain information on peculiar characteristics of migrants and their descendents. However, things were less smooth than expected. In particular, the French team was much slower than other partners of the consortium in delivering this

part of the project for a number of reasons that need to be specified. In particular, Sofrès could start the conduction of interviews only at the very beginning of January 2008, following a meticulous work of quota elaboration that had to be completed in December 2007. Things did not look problematic at that time: Sofrès said that interviews would be completed in circa 4 weeks of work so as to deliver the whole data set coded in an SPSS file between late January and early February 2008. Yet, Sofrès has been unable to stand by this plan. Interviews have proved to be very difficult to conduct due to a low rate of penetration in certain areas, and in particular, due to a significant number of respondents unwilling to take part to the survey or simply dropping the interview before its end.

What is more, ethnicity is a very sensitive issue in French society and politics and this is something that should be considered to understand these difficulties. It is sufficient to mention the sparking of new riots, or indeed the heated debates surrounding the contentious bill to introduce DNA tests, just at the eve of the population survey. As a team of this project, we were also operating during a nation-wide quarrel about the opportunity to introduce “ethnic statistics” (a quarrel which is still on at the time of writing of this report). In addition, Sofrès work has been slowed down by the running of the electoral campaign in view of administrative elections. Indeed, high dropping rates of interviewees may also be put in the context of the high number of surveys conducted in Lyon by different polling institutes to know more about specific electoral preferences.

Part I: Descriptive analyses

1. Socio-demographic characteristics

Table 3 shows that the age composition of the three observed groups is younger in comparison to the French one. Whereas the average age is 37 years old for Algerians, and 35 for both Tunisians and Moroccans, it is 45 years old for the control group.

Table 3 Age by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
Mean	36.972	35.154	35.298	45.149
SD	13.376	13.886	15.564	18.064
N	461	130	114	401

Table 4 shows the distribution of age groups. The majority of Maghrebians in each group are between 16 and 35 years old, with higher percentages of people being in the youngest age classes compared to the control group. In fact, the major part of the control group’s population is included under the two oldest cohorts, that is, people over 36 years old.

Table 4 Age classes by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
	%	%	%	%
16-25	24.5	30.8	40.4	15.7
26-35	26.2	30.8	17.5	21.9
36-45	25.2	16.2	17.5	17.0
46-55	15.0	13.1	12.3	13.7

56-65	5.9	5.4	7.0	14.2
65+	3.3	3.8	5.3	17.5

Table 5 shows that most Maghrebians were indeed born in France, consistently with the fact that France is a country of longstanding migration compared to other countries that were part of the LOCALMULTIDEM research project, such as Italy and Spain. This is particularly true for the most established group that was selected, namely, the Algerians.

Table 5 Country of birth by group

	Born in France	Born outside France
	%	%
Algerians	70.7	29.3
Moroccans	45.6	54.4
Tunisians	52.3	47.7

Consistently with data about the birth in France, table 6 shows that an overwhelming majority of interviewed Maghrebians who were not born in France have been living in Lyon for more than 10 years.

Table 6 Years lived in Lyon by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans
	%	%	%
<5	14.6	13.7	25.2
6-10	13.7	12.9	17.8
More than 10 years	71.7	73.4	57.0

Table 7 presents some data on the citizenship held by respondent Maghrebians. Consistently with a civic conception of citizenship in which the rule of *jus soli* prevails in defining the conditions for the acquisition of the French citizenship, most Maghrebians in Lyon hold the French citizenship. Algerians show the highest level of Maghrebians holding the French citizenship, but variation is only minimal when the focus is then put on Tunisians and Moroccans.

Table 7 First citizenship hold by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans
	%	%	%
France	80.5	79.2	78.1
Algeria	19.5	-	-
Morocco	-	-	21.9
Tunisia	-	20.8	-

Table 8 shows the distribution by religion. The distribution of the three Maghrebian groups is fairly similar, with the exception of the more religiously diverse Moroccans, with 6% of them being members of the Roman Catholic church and 8% Jewish. Compared to the Control Group, all three observed migrant groups show much lower rates of atheist/agnostic members.

Table 8 Religion by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
	%	%	%	%
Protestant	-	0.8	-	2.2

Roman Catholic	3.9	5.4	6.1	57.6
Jewish	1.1	3.1	7.9	0.2
Islam	70.1	73.8	61.4	2.0
atheist/agnostic	21.0	12.3	22.8	34.9
Other	3.9	4.6	1.8	3.0

Table 9 shows that Maghrebians tend to attend religious services more often than the control group, though this difference is overall contained. At the same time, Tunisians seem to attend the religious places more often than other groups since around 5% of them do attend places of worship every day.

Table 9 Religion attendance by group (percentages)

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
every day	2.4	4.6	0.9	0.5
several times a week	3.0	1.5	3.5	1.2
once a week	13.4	16.2	14.9	7.0
once a month	3.3	3.1	6.1	3.0
several times a year	10.6	10.0	13.2	13.0
once a year	9.1	10.8	8.8	12.7
never	57.7	53.1	52.6	62.3
don't Know	0.2	0.8	-	-
refuses to answer	0.2	-	-	0.2

Following previous findings in terms of country of birth and nationality, Table 10 shows that the vast majority of the three observed groups speak French as their native language. This is as high as 76.1% in the case of Algerians.

Table 10 Maghrebians' native language by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans
	%	%	%
French	76.1	67.7	64.9
Arabic	20.0	31.5	30.7
Berber	0.9	-	4.4
Other	3.0	0.8	-

Table 11 presents results on the levels of education held by each group, and we see that the four groups show relatively different distributions. In particular, levels of education are higher for Moroccans than for other Maghrebians, especially when focusing on figures referring to post-secondary and second stage of tertiary education.

Table 11 Maghrebians' highest level of education achieved by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
	%	%	%	%
Not completed primary education	9.8	11.5	6.1	2.7
Primary education or first stage of basic education	5.0	6.2	5.3	5.5
Lower level secondary education or second stage of basic education	26.9	22.3	12.3	20.9
Upper secondary education	4.3	4.6	6.1	7.7
Post secondary, non-tertiary education	24.9	23.1	26.3	15.5
First stage of tertiary education	11.9	18.5	14.0	13.0
Second stage of tertiary education	16.7	13.8	28.9	34.7
Other	0.4		0.9	-

Lastly, table 12 shows the situation of interviewed migrants in the 7 days preceding the interview. High employment rates are common across the three groups. In general, there are many similarities across the Maghrebians and the control group, with the noticeable exception of the category of ‘retired’, and the greater impact of unemployment in the three Maghrebi groups than in the control group.

Table 12 Maghrebians’ situation in the last 7 days by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
	%	%	%	%
in paid work (or away temporarily)	54.4	54.6	48.2	51.1
in education, (not paid for by employer)	11.9	10.8	22.8	10.2
unemployed and actively looking for a job	10.8	13.8	7.9	5.5
unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job	.9	2.3	3.5	2.5
permanently sick or disabled	4.1	6.2	1.8	1.2
retired	6.7	4.6	7.0	25.2
in community or compulsory military service	-	-	-	-
doing housework (housewife), looking after children or other persons	10.8	7.7	8.8	3.2
(other)	.2	-	-	1.0

2. Political attitudes

In this section we present the descriptive statistics regarding four indicators of political attitudes: political interest, discussion of politics, level of information about politics and readership of newspapers. All indicators reflect the political attitudes which Maghrebians have towards the politics of Lyon, France, as well as their country of origin.

With respect to political interest presented in table 13, all Maghrebian groups tend to be more interested in French politics than in the politics of their countries of origin. Moreover, levels of political interests toward Lyon are very high across all groups, thus reflecting trends that are similar to those for the control group. Moroccans and Algerians show higher levels of interests towards their homeland politics than Tunisians do.

Table 13 Interest in politics by group (percentages)

	Algerians			Tunisians			Moroccans			Control Group	
	Lyon politics	French politics	Algerian politics	Lyon politics	French politics	Tunisian politics	Lyon politics	French politics	Moroccan politics	Lyon politics	French politics
Very interested	19.3	33.0	10.4	16.9	31.5	8.5	21.1	36.0	9.6	18.7	32.7
Fairly interested	29.3	32.5	23.4	24.6	40.0	19.2	30.7	39.5	23.7	35.4	41.9
Not very interested	26.5	18.4	33.2	34.6	17.7	22.3	26.3	19.3	34.2	27.9	18.5
Not at all interested	24.5	16.1	33.0	23.1	10.8	50.0	21.9	5.3	32.5	17.5	7.0
DK	0.4	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-

Table 14 presents results on talk about politics. Across the three groups, we find relatively similar levels of political discussion, and the most important dimension is the territorial level of politics that those discussions refer to. As we see, political discussion about French politics is very common and widespread, and it is much more intense than about the local politics of Lyon or the politics of the country of ascendency. Once again there are only minor differences between the Maghrebians and the control group, and amongst the different groups themselves. All three groups tend to talk much more about French and Lyon politics than their homeland politics.

Table 14 Talk about politics by group (percentages)

	Algerians			Tunisians			Moroccans			Control Group	
	Lyon politics	French politics	Algerian politics	Lyon politics	French politics	Tunisian politics	Lyon politics	French politics	Moroccan politics	Lyon politics	French politics
Almost every day	7.6	19.7	5.6	6.2	16.9	2.3	3.5	21.9	1.8	8.5	21.7
Regularly	28.6	45.6	17.6	25.4	49.2	13.8	34.2	47.4	14.0	29.4	47.4
Rarely	40.3	25.2	46.2	48.5	29.2	43.1	43.0	28.1	57.9	40.9	24.2
Never	23.2	9.5	30.6	20.0	3.8	40.8	19.3	2.6	26.3	21.2	6.7
DK	0.2		-		0.8						

Table 15 also shows that migrants' levels of information tend to be lower than those of the control group only with respect to Lyonnaise politics. In line with previous findings, there are no drastic differences between the Maghrebians and the control group, as well as across the groups themselves. Maghrebians are more informed about French politics than about homeland politics.

Table 15 Level of information about politics by group (percentages)

	Algerians			Tunisians			Moroccans			Control Group	
	Lyon politics	French politics	Algerian politics	Lyon politics	French politics	Tunisian politics	Lyon politics	French politics	Moroccan politics	Lyon politics	French politics
Very well informed	10.8	16.7	5.0	6.9	23.8	3.8	6.1	19.3	3.5	13.7	20.9
Reasonably informed	35.4	43.0	15.6	31.5	40.8	15.4	35.1	49.1	20.2	46.6	53.1
Only a bit informed	40.3	31.0	40.1	43.1	24.6	36.2	38.6	20.2	37.7	31.7	19.7
Not at all informed	12.4	8.9	38.8	18.5	10.0	43.8	18.4	8.8	38.6	7.7	6.2
DK	1.1	0.4	0.4		0.8	0.8	1.8	2.6		0.2	-

Table 16 shows that Maghrebians tend to read news on French politics more than those of their countries of origin. At the same time, they tend to read newspapers to a similar extent than the control group. Moroccans seem to be more interested than Algerians and Tunisians in following political events that are specific to Lyon.

Table 16 Reading of newspapers by group (percentages)

	Algerians			Tunisians			Moroccans			Control Group	
	Lyon politics	French politics	Algerian politics	Lyon politics	French politics	Tunisian politics	Lyon politics	French politics	Moroccan politics	Lyon politics	French politics
Almost every day	16.5	30.2	5.6	16.9	36.2	1.5	12.3	31.6	5.3	17.0	37.7
Regularly	23.6	30.4	12.1	16.9	30.0	12.3	34.2	36.8	11.4	32.4	35.2
Rarely	31.7	23.4	35.6	30.0	20.0	30.0	29.8	24.6	42.1	30.2	17.2
Never	28.2	16.1	46.6	35.4	13.8	56.2	23.7	7.0	41.2	20.4	10.0
DK	-	-	-	.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

3. Political trust

With respect to levels of political trust which Maghrebians have towards different French institutions, table 17 shows that, in average, Moroccans tend to have a slightly higher level of trust than Tunisians and Algerians. The important information, however, is that once again levels of trust are comparable between different groups on the one hand, and the control group on the other hand.

Table 17 Political trust by group (0 =I do not trust at all to 10 =I totally trust)

	Algerians		Tunisians		Moroccans		Control Group	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Civil servants	5.66	2.743	5.37	2.682	6.05	2.315	6.04	2.193
City government	5.96	2.632	5.23	2.714	6.12	2.299	6.04	2.123
Schools and teachers in Lyon	7.17	2.303	6.56	2.412	7.10	2.390	6.94	1.840
The city assembly	5.65	2.646	5.40	2.174	5.91	2.348	5.84	2.164
The police	5.18	3.062	4.48	3.061	5.51	2.844	5.87	2.293
Church	5.18	3.088	5.51	2.711	5.00	3.290	4.39	2.827
French government	4.20	2.904	4.04	2.871	4.06	2.718	4.19	2.598
The legal system	5.47	2.937	5.06	2.808	5.41	2.616	5.21	2.413
French Parliament	4.80	2.789	4.70	2.838	4.98	2.678	4.88	2.330
The Institutions of the European Union	4.97	2.693	4.45	2.623	5.38	2.656	5.14	2.210

4. Political participation

Table 18, on political participation, shows that the levels of Maghrebians' political participation are similar to those of the control group. In fact, there are also items for which the control group shows lower levels of political activism. In particular, Moroccans stand out for working in political parties and political action groups, displaying signs of political affiliation, and taking part in strikes.

Table 18 Political participation: political actions by group

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
Contacted a politician	11.1	7.7	9.6	18.2
Contacted a government or local government official	11.7	12.3	12.3	20.9
Worked in a political party	1.5	2.6	5.3	4.0
Worked in a political action group (for. Ex. Attac)	2.0	1.5	6.1	3.7
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	8.9	4.6	13.2	11.0
Signed a petition	43.0	33.8	40.4	52.9
Taken part in a public demonstration	25.4	24.6	26.3	28.2
Boycotted certain products	23.4	23.1	18.4	38.7
Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons	9.3	10.0	8.8	18.5
Donated money to a political group or group	12.8	12.3	6.1	16.0
Taken part in a strike	22.3	12.3	25.4	21.7
Contacted the media	5.9	6.2	8.8	10.2
Contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons	5.9	5.4	5.3	7.7
N	300	300	300	300

With respect to voting, over three quarters of Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians were eligible to vote in the previous national elections. This result is consistent with a civic conception of citizenship, which opens up voting opportunities for “second generations” and for first generations going through easy naturalization processes. Yet, all three groups claim to have turned out to vote in greater proportions than the control group (for those who were indeed eligible), something that does not match the standard knowledge about the lower turnout rates of Maghrebi-origin citizens in France.

Table 19 Turnout in the last national elections (percentages)

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
Yes	51.4	48.5	53.5	59.6
no, but eligible to vote	26.9	29.2	22.8	31.4
no, not eligible	19.5	20.8	21.9	-
Can't remember	2.2	1.5	1.8	9.0
Refusal	-	-	-	-

Maghrebians' voting behaviour in their countries of origin was investigated only for those having the nationality from Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia. Percentages of voting engagement in the homelands tends to be marginal when the overall populations are taken into consideration, especially because postal or consular voting is often not allowed.

5. Organizational involvement

Table 20 shows that Maghrebians' organizational involvement tends to be substantially lower than that of the control group. Even an analysis of the engagement within religious organizations offers no exception, since Maghrebians show substantially less involvement than the control group. The only clear exception refers to women organizations, within which Maghrebians emerge much more active than the control group.

Table 20 Organizational involvement by group, percentage.

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans	Control Group
	%	%	%	%
sport clubs	21.9	23.8	22.8	22.9
cultural organisations	8.7	10.0	13.2	16.5
political parties	4.1	3.8	3.5	6.2
trade unions	8.7	8.5	9.6	12.2
professional organisations	2.2	2.3	0.0	3.7
human rights organisations	11.9	11.5	11.4	14.7
environmental organisations	1.7	2.3	0.0	6.0
peace organisations	2.6	1.5	1.8	2.7
religious organisations	3.9	7.7	7.0	7.5
immigrants organisations	2.0	0.8	1.8	2.0
ethnic organisations	0.7	1.5	0.0	0.2
anti racism organisations	3.3	4.6	3.5	0.7
educational organisations	8.7	9.2	8.8	10.2
youth organisations	5.2	5.4	6.1	4.5

organisations for retired	0.9	1.5	0.9	6.0
women organisations	2.0	1.5	0.9	1.2
neighbour organisations	7.6	5.4	3.5	9.7
other organisations	2.6	3.8	4.4	5.7

6. Self-identification & values

Table 21 shows the results about the attachment to several types of people and places, focusing on feelings of belongingness to the ‘French people’ amongst Maghrebians. Given our previous similar findings across different groups, this time a comparison with a sub-group of Muslim believers is included so as to test whether religion, rather than ethnicity, is more central to potential obstacles in terms of self-identification. Results show that the great majority of people of Maghrebian origin define themselves as French people. A massive proportion of them feel either or attached to French people, as is the case in the control group. It should be noticed that the Muslim subgroup does not differ from broader Maghrebian group (and hence, the control group). When asked to choose amongst groups, a large majority of Maghrebians identify themselves as French, regardless of their religion. It is worthy noting that the option of answering ‘other’ was used by a quite significant proportion of respondents, perhaps with the intention to refuse such a choice and put forward their double belonging to the French group and to country of origin.

Table 21 Self-identification: Maghrebians vs Muslims

	All Maghrebians		Muslims		Control group
Closeness/ attachment to ‘French people’	81		82		80
‘French people’ as a prevalent identity	59] 69	49] 62	-
Hyphenated identity as a prevalent identity	10		13		-
Attachment to the ‘city’	76		78		70
Attachment to the ‘people in the <i>Grand Lyon</i> ’	61		64		52

As regards the low variability across different groups, this is proved by data in table 22.

Table 22 Self identification across groups

respondent's group		Percent
Moroccan	Host country	48.0
	ethnic group	28.0
	other	16.0
	none	6.0
	Don't know	2.0
	Total	100.0
Algerian	Host country	55.2
	ethnic group	18.2
	other	16.6
	none	8.3
	Don't know	1.7
	Total	100.0
Tunisian	Host country	45.7
	ethnic group	23.9
	other	23.9
	none	6.5
	Total	100.0

Lastly, table 23 shows that the Maghrebians position themselves on the right of main political cleavage, more right than the control group.

Table 23 Position between left (0) and right (10)

	Mean	Std. dev.
Control Group	4.18	2.628
Algerians	2.95	2.687
Moroccans	3.05	2.2729
Tunisians	3.28	2.733

7. Social trust

Table 24 shows results on respondents' social trust towards all people as well as towards people of one's own ethnic group members from the three Maghrebi-origin respondents. Maghrebians' general social trust tends to be substantially smaller than that of the control group, which is already quite low. Furthermore, the three Maghrebian groups tend overall to show higher levels of trust towards people of their own group than towards the general population.

Table 24 Maghrebians social trust (0=you need to be somewhat suspicious, 10=most people can be trusted)

	Control group		Algerians		Tunisians		Moroccans	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
All people	4.23	2.72	3.31	2.865	3.20	2.791	3.77	2.890
One's own ethnic group members	--	--	4.44	3.117	3.80	2.939	4.74	2.750

8. Feelings of discrimination & attitudes towards groups

Table 25 shows levels of feelings of discrimination against the three observed Maghrebian groups. Findings show that discrimination changes among the three groups. Less than one third of Algerians and Moroccans say they were discriminated against, but nearly half of the Tunisians felt discriminated.

Table 25 Discrimination in the last 12 months by group (percentages)

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans
Yes	30.4	48.5	31.6
No	69.2	50.8	66.7
Do not know	0.4	0.8	1.8

However, there seems to be a similar trend when looking for particular spaces where discrimination takes place. In particular, table 26 shows that work-related discrimination (both while working or while looking for a job), discrimination by police officers, as well as discrimination in a variety of “private spaces” such as shops, discos and pubs, stand out for their highest percentages across different groups.

Table 26 Place of discrimination by group (percentages)

	Algerians	Tunisians	Moroccans
A. At school/university	7.2	9.2	9.6
B. At work	16.3	20.8	15.8
C. In the health care system	5.0	6.9	4.4
D. By the immigration office	3.3	3.8	0.9
E. By the police	12.8	26.9	12.3
F. At Church	0.2	0.8	-
G. When looking for a job	18.9	26.2	18.4
H. In restaurants, bars, pubs, or discos	16.3	28	14.9
I. On the street	14.1	15.4	16.7
J. By neighbours	6.9	14.6	9.6
K. In shops	14.1	20.8	16.7
L. On public transportation	6.7	12.3	7.0

Part II: Explanatory analyses

In this section the focus is put on the interaction between a series of dependent variables and different dimensions of political integration in terms of political interest and political participation. As regards the impact of the independent variables, reference is made to SES variables, social capital, and discrimination. For each set of variables we run a regression model for the three groups. We first present the results for an attitudinal dimension of political integration, starting with the analysis of political interest in local politics. Table 27 shows the results of the logistic regression.

Table 27 Logistic regression with local political interest as dependent variable. Exp(B)

<i>SES variables</i>	
Gender (ref men)	1.099
Age	1.020**
Level of education (ref: primary education not completed)	1.531***
Language	.949
Length of stay (over 10 years)	.693*
<i>Social Capital</i>	
Membership in any association	1.337
Participation in any association	2.191***
<i>Discrimination</i>	
Self-perception of discrimination	.899
Nagelkerke R ²	.098
-2 log likelihood	918.063
Degrees of freedom	8
N	702

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

In particular, SES variables such as age, education, and length of stay, play a significant role in explaining political interest. Social capital variables distinguish between organizational membership and participation in activities promoted by organizations. This comes out to be a good distinction to make, since “participation” rather than “membership” is playing the relevant role here. Lastly, the model controls for perception of discrimination, but the latter has no significant predictive impact.

The following analyses focus on the behavioral dimension of political integration, namely political participation in its various forms and contacting activities in particular. Table 28 shows the results of the logistic regressions for the first strand of behavioral dimension, including a large variety of forms of political participation ranging from working within political parties or action groups to signing petition, donating money or protest.

Table 28 Logistic regression with political action as dependent variable. Exp(B)

<i>SES variables</i>	
Gender (ref men)	.948
Age	1.001
Level of education (ref: primary education not completed)	1.449**
Language	.777
Length of stay (over 10 years)	1.037

<i>Social Capital</i>	
Membership in any association	1.853**
Participation in any association	2.132***
<i>Discrimination</i>	
Self-perception of discrimination	.790
Nagelkerke R ²	.123
-2 log likelihood	840.322
Degrees of freedom	8
N	702

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

Once again, the level of education stands out as an essential predictor alongside with the participation in associations. Membership of association is now a relevant factor, while length of stay and age (which were significant predictor of political interest) are no longer important.

Lastly, table 29 refers to contacting activities includes activities such as contacting a politician, contacting a government or local official, contacting the media, or a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons. Once again, we observe that social capital variables have an important impact upon contacting activities. Once again, usual suspects such as “gender”, “language” and “self-perception of discrimination” do not stand out as significant predictors.

Table 29 : Logistic regression with contacting activities as dependent variable. Exp(B)

<i>SES variables</i>	
Gender (ref men)	.818
Age	1.027***
Level of education (ref: primary education not completed)	1.416*
Language	1.492
Length of stay (over 10 years)	1.009
<i>Social Capital</i>	
Membership in any association	2.027*
Participation in any association	3.806***
<i>Discrimination</i>	
Self-perception of discrimination	.722
Nagelkerke R ²	.131
-2 log likelihood	673.798
Degrees of freedom	8
N	702

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

Conclusions

This report has focused on three Maghrebien populations of Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans vis-à-vis a control group of non-Maghrebien French. The descriptive results of part 1 showed that some differences can be observed between the three groups on a series of variables. However, the key aspect here is that findings go against the general assumption that France may well face a threat in terms of “*communautarisme*” by its North African and Muslim populations. The latter are also also studied as the main component of an impoverished, and hence, potentially resentful community that leaves in segregating *banlieues* and may organise through ethnically and religious-based structures of mobilisation. In contrast with this view, this report shows that

Maghrebians in France, including Muslim believers, first and second generations, have walked a long way in terms of interiorising much of the universalistic principles of the *Republique* as well as a sense of deep loyalty to the strong sense of French national identity.

The second part of the report looks at explanatory factors of some dimensions of political integration. The main results here are especially noticeable in theoretical terms: variables of social capital seem to play a central role in the explanation of political integration, against a general agreement (particularly in scholarly works tackling French-based samples), that these variables are less important than other more individually-based predictors. In particular, an extensive associational membership, alongside with the participation in activities promoted by associations, favor not only political interest, but also activities such as political action and contacting. Amongst the more 'traditional' variables, education stands out as the most important predictor of political integration.

CITY REPORT: MADRID⁵⁰

INTRODUCTION

1. SAMPLE

The study in Madrid (Spain) has focused on three migrant-origin groups: Ecuadorian, Moroccan and a mixed group of other Andean origins (Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian).

The sample design stratified by the country of birth of the individuals, with the aim of obtaining around 300 individuals for each of four different groups, the three migrant groups already mentioned plus a control group of autochthonous population.

Individuals were selected on the basis of their country of birth, and not their nationality. Once the individuals were located for interview, the country of birth of their parents was checked. There were some room for re-assignment across groups:

- For the autochthonous group, any individual born in Spain with both parents born elsewhere than the other five countries included in the study qualified as an 'autochthonous'.
- For the autochthonous group if any of the parents had been born in any of our other five countries (Morocco, Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru), then this individual was deemed as a 2nd generation migrant and re-assigned to the corresponding group by the national origin of the parent.
- Individuals who were born in our five countries (and thus classified as migrants) but of both parents born in Spain were re-assigned to the 'autochthonous' group. This situation was very frequent for the sample of individuals born in Morocco (around 20-25% of our Moroccan sample turned out to be autochthonous population that happened to have been born in the former colonial cities of North Africa).

The original design was based on a stratified nominal random sample obtained from the local population register by the municipal statistical office. The gross sample included 2,400 named individuals – 600 per group. However, severe difficulties in fieldwork progression forced us to adapt selection methods to include various modes of respondent selection. The final distribution of the interviews was the following.

<i>Nominal sampling</i>	<i>Substitution within dwelling extracted in nominal sample</i>	<i>Random routes sampling (only autochthonous)</i>	<i>Spatial sampling (only migrants, especially Moroccan)</i>
615	125	180	272

The final distribution of interviews across groups is:

<i>Autochthonous</i>	<i>Moroccan</i>	<i>Ecuadorian</i>	<i>Other Andean origins</i>
307	298	291	277

⁵⁰ This report has been produced by Elisa Rodríguez, a member of the LOCALMULTIDEM team, under the guidance and supervision of Laura Morales, the coordinator of the Spanish team.

Fieldwork took place between January 2007 and February 2008, and was mostly organised in-house by a fieldwork network purposefully set up in Madrid for this study by the team of the University of Murcia, and coordinated by Elisa Rodríguez. All interviews were conducted face-to-face and the questionnaire was of approximately one hour of average duration. The respondents of the Moroccan group could choose to do the interview in Spanish or in Arabic.

We will start the report by analysing the sociodemographic characteristics (including age and sex, years in the city, religion, legal situation etc.) of respondents. Next we will move to political dimensions as political interest, political trust and political participation. The following chapter will be dedicated to self-identification and values. Finally, we will look into discrimination feelings and attitudes towards ethnic groups.

PART I: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES

2. SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC

In this section, we will look into the sociodemographic characteristics of the different national groups, such as gender and sex distribution, religion, educational level and main activity.

In the case of our three migrant groups, and considering their special situation, we will also comment issues concerning their arrival (like the year of arrival -- both to the country and to Madrid --, reason of arrival, etc.), their legal situation and access to Spanish nationality, as well as the language and ethnic composition of their households.

The sociodemographic characteristics already show relevant differences among groups. To assess the adequacy of our sample, we have compared the figures of the gender distribution of the population over 15 years old from the local register ("*Padrón*"). The final results obtained in our survey (see table 1) matched the original sample extracted from the local register.

Concerning the gender distribution, we find two very different types of migrant groups. On the one hand, there is a strongly masculinised group, the Moroccan one (6 out of 10 of its members are men). On the other hand, Latin American groups are mostly composed by women, although for the Ecuadorian, the gender differential is not as large as in the Moroccan case (55% and 59% of women in Ecuadorean and Andean groups, respectively). This distribution largely corresponds to the one we find in the local register data. Considering all the population, according to the register, 53% of the Ecuadorians were women, and this percentage rises to 57% for other Andean origins. The Moroccan population shows the opposite gender distribution with only 44% of women.

Table 1. Gender distribution

<i>Respondent's group</i>	<i>Sex</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>
Autochthonous	male	48.9	150
	female	51.1	157

	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	male	61.1	182
	female	38.9	116
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	male	45.0	131
	female	55.0	160
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	male	41.2	114
	female	58.8	163
	Total	100.0	277

The minimum age to be included in the study was 15 but there was no upper limit. However the amount of senior people is only noticeable in the autochthonous group: 36% of the autochthonous sample is over 60 years old, while in the migrant groups these percentages are minimal, between 1% and 5% (for the Andean group). This corresponds to an ageing autochthonous population, clearly captured in the analysis of the average age, which is close to 50 years for Spaniards.

In contrast, migrant groups are young groups, as it is reflected by their age means. In this sense, the youngest group is the Moroccan: its average is 17 years younger than the Autochthonous one.

Table 2. Means of age

Respondent's group	N	Mean	SD
Autochthonous	307	49.7	19.5
Moroccan	296	32.9	8.9
Ecuadorian	291	34.9	10.9
Other Andean origins	276	36.6	12.2

Most of the migrant population is concentrated in the group 26-35 years old. This is the case of almost a half of the Moroccan, 40% of the Ecuadorian, and a third of the Andeans.

Table 3. Age Groups

respondent's group	Age	%	n
Autochthonous	15-22	7.9	24
	23-29	10.5	32
	30-44	23.6	72
	45-59	22.3	68
	60 and more	35.7	109
	Total	100.0	305
Moroccan	15-22	9.5	28
	23-29	31.1	92
	30-44	50.7	150
	45-59	7.4	22
	60 and more	1.4	4
	Total	100.0	296
Ecuadorian	15-22	11.7	34
	23-29	23.7	69
	30-44	45.4	132
	45-59	17.2	50
	60 and more	2.1	6

	Total	100	291
Other Andean Origins	15-22	12.4	34
	23-29	17.5	48
	30-44	44.7	123
	45-59	20.4	56
	60 and more	5.1	14
	Total	100.0	275

When we analyse the year of arrival, we can confirm that migration inflows in Madrid are relatively recent. The main influx took place in the early 2000s, and – of our three groups – Moroccans and Ecuadorians are the ones with the longest time of residence, as they have been settled in Spain for 8 years on average. The Ecuadorian is also the group with the highest cohesion in terms of the time of arrival. Three out of four Ecuadorians have arrived in Spain between 1998 and 2002, and they thus show the smallest standard deviation of all groups. Andeans and Moroccans have larger contingents of recent migrants: around 14% of the Moroccans and 12% of the Andeans have been in Spain for less than 2 years. As we will explain further, the Andean case is rather complex because it mixes three different origin groups. The large proportion of new arrivals in Spain is due to Bolivians, while both Colombians and Peruvians have been settled in Spain for a longer time.

Table 4. Years since arrival to the country

respondent's group	Years since arrival to the country	%	n
Moroccan	2 years or less	13.8	41
	Between 3 and 5 years	22.5	67
	Between 6 and 10 years	42.6	127
	More than 10 years	21.1	63
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	2 years or less	1.7	5
	Between 3 and 5 years	11.0	32
	Between 6 and 10 years	75.9	221
	More than 10 years	10.7	31
	Missing	0.7	2
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	2 years or less	11.6	32
	Between 3 and 5 years	31.8	88
	Between 6 and 10 years	40.4	112
	More than 10 years	14.4	40
	Missing	1.8	5
	Total	100.0	277

Table 5. Average number of years since arrival to the country

respondent's group	N	Average	SD
Moroccan	298	7.9	6.0
Ecuadorian	289	8.0	3.7
Other Andean origins	272	7.2	5.8

We have also enquired about the year of arrival to the city. In this case, the data show that migrants arrived to Madrid slightly later than they arrived to Spain. In other words, in most cases Madrid was not the gate of entrance into Spain, although we did not intend to track the migration path and have no information on previous locations of residence. This time gap is especially pronounced for the Ecuadorian group. Ecuadorians declare an average of 8 years of living in Spain, but only 6.6 years of them where spent in Madrid.

Table 6. Years in the city

respondent's group	Years in the city	%	n
Moroccan	2 years or less	14.8	44
	Between 3 and 5 years	25.5	76
	Between 6 and 10 years	36.9	110
	More than 10 years	16.1	48
	Missing	6.7	20
	Total	100	298
Ecuadorian	2 years or less	2.7	8
	Between 3 and 5 years	30.2	88
	Between 6 and 10 years	59.5	173
	More than 10 years	6.2	18
	Missing	1.4	4
	Total	100	291
Other Andean origins	2 years or less	21.3	59
	Between 3 and 5 years	35.4	98
	Between 6 and 10 years	26.4	73
	More than 10 years	13.4	37
	Missing	3.6	10
	Total	100	277

Table 7. Average number of years in the city

respondent's group	N	Average	SD
Moroccan	277	7.2	5.5
Ecuadorian	285	6.6	2.9
Other Andean origins	263	5.9	5.3

With regard to the reason of arrival, work opportunities are by far the first mentioned. Immigration in Madrid is, thus, more about economic immigration than about anything else. Asylum seekers are marginal. Family reasons (reunification) are the second reason to be mentioned. And it is especially important in the case of Ecuadorians, where nearly a quarter of the respondents chose this answer. Educational motivations are not frequently mentioned as a reason for coming to Spain: Andeans are those who chose it the most, and it represents around 9% of the answers.

Table 8. Reason of arrival

respondent's group	Reason of arrival	%	n
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respondent's group	Reason of arrival	%	n
Moroccan	Job related/work opportunities	75.5	225
	Family reasons/ love	16.1	48
	To study	4.7	14
	Quality of life in general	2.3	7
	Other	1.0	3
	Missing / Not applicable	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Job related/work opportunities	64.6	188
	Family reasons/love	24.1	70
	To study	4.8	14
	Seeking asylum/protection	0.3	1
	Quality of life in general	2.1	6
	Other	3.8	11
	Missing / Not applicable	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Job related/work opportunities	66.4	184
	Family reasons/love	15.5	43
	To study	8.7	24
	Seeking asylum/protection	0.4	1
	Quality of life in general	3.6	10
	Other	2.9	8
	Missing / Not applicable	2.5	7
	Total	100.0	277

Regarding the legal situation, there are several aspects to take into consideration. First, the low percentages of refusal show that immigrants are ready and willing to answer this question, even if they are in an irregular or undocumented situation (not applicable cases are related to nationality, because this question did not apply for migrants that have been naturalised). Nevertheless, the relatively high rates of people who declare to be “renewing an expiring permit”, especially between Latin Americans (19% of Ecuadorians), could be concealing cases of respondents in an irregular situation who do not want to acknowledge it. Secondly, we have to point out that most of them actually have a permit. However, most of them are unstable, especially in the Moroccan case: up to 62% of them have a short-term permit of less than 5 years.

Table 9. Legal situation

respondent's group	Legal situation	%	n
Moroccan	Short-term permit of 5 or less years	62.1	185
	Long-term permit of more than 5 years	9.1	27
	Renewing my expired permit	6.7	20
	Never had any permit	9.7	29
	Other	0.7	2
	Missing / Not applicable	11.7	35
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Short-term permit of 5 or less years	43.0	125

	Long-term permit of more than 5 years	10.3	30
	Renewing my expired permit	18.6	54
	Never had any permit	2.7	8
	Other	5.8	17
	Refusal	1.0	3
	Missing / Not applicable	18.6	54
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Short-term permit of 5 or less years	34.7	96
	Long-term permit of more than 5 years	6.1	17
	Renewing my expired permit	13.4	37
	Never had any permit	18.4	51
	Other	6.1	17
	Refusal	0.4	1
	Missing / Not applicable	20.9	58
	Total	100.0	277

We find a higher rate of undocumented immigrants within the Andeans, who are also those who have most recently arrived in Spain. Nevertheless, this is a complex group, due to its composition. We are considering as ‘other Andeans’ three different origins (Peruvians, Bolivians and Colombians) whose situation in Spain is far from being similar. This is the reason why Andeans are, at the same time, the group with most illegal residents and the group with most naturalised citizens. On the one hand, Bolivians are the late-comers to Spain, and have thus the highest rates of undocumented residents (44%). On the other, Peruvians are part of an older wave of immigration to Spain – mostly in the 1980s – with high rates of naturalisation (39% of Peruvian respondents had Spanish nationality).

Naturalisation procedures, on the other hand, disadvantage Moroccans. Access to Spanish nationality is easier for Latin Americans: although Moroccans and Ecuadorians living in Madrid have a similar average number of years of residence in Spain, as we have already mentioned, the latter group includes a relatively larger number of naturalised Spanish citizens.

Table 10. Possession of Spanish nationality

respondent's group	Spanish Nationality	%	n
Moroccan	No	89.3	266
	Yes	10.7	32
	Total	100	298
Ecuadorian	No	81.8	238
	Yes	18.2	53
	Total	100	291
Other Andean origins	No	80.5	223
	yes	19.5	54
	Total	100	277

This notwithstanding, nationality is highly related to parents' country of birth, which corresponds to the relatively low percentages of naturalisation. However, this is especially relevant in the autochthonous sample, where only 2% have a nationality different from the one of the country of birth of their mothers. In other words, and considering that 100% have Spanish nationality, they are almost all Spaniards born from a Spanish mother. In the three migrant groups, the Spanish is the only important nationality besides the one from the country of origin of the parents. There are very low percentages of third nationalities.

Table 11. Respondents nationality by parents' country of birth, row percentages for each parent

Sample group	Respondent's nationality	Mother's country of birth			Father's country of birth		
Autochthonous		<i>ES</i>	-	<i>Other</i>	<i>ES</i>	-	<i>Other</i>
	ES (n=307)	98.4	-	1.6	97.7	-	2.3
	Other (n=0)	0	-	0	0	-	0
Moroccan		<i>ES</i>	<i>MA</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>ES</i>	<i>MA</i>	<i>Other</i>
	ES (n=32)	0	100	0	0	100	0
	MA (n= 266)	0	100	0	0	99.6	0.4
Ecuadorian		<i>ES</i>	<i>EC</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>ES</i>	<i>EC</i>	<i>Other</i>
	ES (n=53)	1.9	96.2	1.9	0	99.1	1.9
	EC (n= 238)	0	99.6	0.4	0	99.6	0.4
Other Andean origins		<i>ES</i>	<i>Andean (BO, CO, PE)</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>ES</i>	<i>Andean (BO, CO, PE)</i>	<i>Other</i>
	ES (n=54)	1.9	96.3	1.9	5.6	92.5	1.9
	Andean (BO, CO, PE) (n=222)	0	99.5	0.5	0	98.2	1.8
	Other (n=1)	0	0	100	0	0	100

We have already analyzed the gender and age distribution of all groups, as well as the main migratory characteristics of each one. We will now move to wider sociodemographic characteristics (religious denomination, educational level, occupation, etc). The Spanish autochthonous group will provide us with a base for comparison.

Concerning religion, although Spaniards declare to be mostly Catholic (3 out of 4 respondents), they are the most secularised group of all: it has the highest rate of agnostics and atheists (1 out of 5 respondents). Catholicism is also the main religious denomination for Latin Americans. However, Protestants are also present, as an important minority group, especially within Ecuadorians (8%).

On the other hand, Moroccans are almost unanimous in their definition as Muslim (99%). In spite of this high identification with a religious denomination they are the least practicing in terms of religious attendance: 3 out of 4 never go to the Mosque or do it only once a year, apart from celebrations (such as marriages).

Spaniards and Andeans show the highest proportion of very frequent attendants to the church: around a quarter of respondents from each group declare to go to church at least once a week. In the autochthonous case, this is again due to the age distribution of this

group, with an important contingent of older and retired people that it is not as yet present in the migrant groups. Therefore, 45% of autochthonous respondents over 65 years declare that they attend church at least once a week while young Spaniards are highly secularised (63% of respondents younger than 35 years old are agnostic or atheist). The Andean case is rather different, as the proportion of religious attendance is consistent through all the age groups (between 21% and 30%). It is larger among the elderly but this cohort is not as proportionally important as in the autochthonous case. Overall, Latin American groups count with a large majority of respondents with a consistent religious practice: around 60-65% attend religious services at least several times a year.

Table 12. Religious denomination

respondent's group	Religious denomination	%	n
Autochthonous	Protestant	0.7	2
	Roman catholic	75.9	233
	Islam	0.3	1
	Hinduism	1.0	3
	Atheist/agnostic	20.8	64
	Other	0.7	2
	Don't know	0.3	1
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	Roman catholic	0.3	1
	Jewish	0.7	2
	Islam	98.7	294
	Atheist/agnostic	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Protestant	7.6	22
	Roman catholic	83.5	243
	Islam	0.3	1
	Hinduism	0.3	1
	Atheist/agnostic	5.2	15
	Other	2.1	6
	Don't know	0.3	1
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Missing	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Protestant	6.9	19
	Roman catholic	81.9	227
	Atheist/agnostic	7.2	20
	Other	3.2	9
	Refusal	0.7	2
	Total	100.0	277

Table 13. Religious Attendance

respondent's group	Religious attendance	%	n
Autochthonous	Every day	1.3	4
	Several times a week	2.9	9
	Once a week	20.2	62
	Once a month	7.2	22
	Several times a year	15.6	48
	Once a year	7.5	23

	Never	22.1	68
	Don't know	0.7	2
	Refusal	0.7	2
	Missing/ Not applicable	21.8	67
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	Several times a week	1.0	3
	Once a week	3.4	10
	Once a month	2.7	8
	Several times a year	14.8	44
	Once a year	38.3	114
	Never	37.2	111
	Don't know	0.3	1
	Refusal	1.0	3
	Missing/ Not applicable	1.3	4
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Several times a week	2.7	8
	Once a week	15.5	45
	Once a month	19.6	57
	Several times a year	23.7	69
	Once a year	15.5	45
	Never	16.5	48
	Don't know	0.3	1
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Missing/ Not applicable	5.8	17
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Every day	0.4	1
	Several times a week	5.1	14
	Once a week	18.8	52
	Once a month	17.0	47
	Several times a year	13.7	38
	Once a year	12.3	34
	Never	24.2	67
	Don't know	1.4	4
	Missing/ Not applicable	7.2	20
	Total	100.0	277

Turning to language usage, Spanish is the first language of Latin Americans, both Ecuadorian and Andean. This means that the influence of indigenous populations is not important within Andean immigrants to Spain. Even if there are a few cases of individuals who declare a second language, 100% of them consider Spanish as their first native language. Moroccans speak mostly Arabic as their first language, although there is a minority of Berber speakers (4%).

Table 14. 1st native language

respondent's group	1st native language	%	n
Autochthonous	English	0.3	1
	Spanish	99.7	306
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	Arabic	94.3	281
	Berber	4.4	13
	French	0.7	2
	Spanish	0.7	2
	Total	100.0	298

Ecuadorian	Spanish	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Spanish	100.0	277

Respondents who declare to have a 2nd native language are more frequent among Moroccans and Andean Latin Americans than among Spaniards and Ecuadorians: more than 10% of the respondents from these origins have a second native language. In the Moroccan case, 2nd languages are more spread, with Berber and French the most important. While, for the Andeans the second declared language is mostly Quechua (7.6%). These Andeans are mostly Bolivians and in fewer cases, Peruvian. None of the Colombian respondents declares to have any other language than Spanish. The Bolivian is actually the group with a larger prevalence of indigenous languages: 21% of Bolivians consider Quechua as their 2nd native language.

Table 15. 2nd Native language

respondent's group	2nd native language	%	n
Autochthonous	Catalan	0.3	1
	English	1.3	4
	French	0.3	1
	Galician	1.0	3
	Spanish	0.3	1
	Total	3.3	10
	Total group	100.0	307
Moroccan	Amharic	0.3	1
	Arabic	2.0	6
	Berber	2.7	8
	French	4.4	13
	Spanish	1.3	4
	Total	10.7	32
	Total group	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Quechua	1.4	4
	Total Group	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Aymara	0.4	1
	Catalan	0.4	1
	English	0.4	1
	French	0.4	1
	Italian	0.7	2
	Portuguese	0.4	1
	Quechua	7.6	21
	Total	10.1	28
	Total Group	100.0	277

Percentages of respondents with a 3rd native language are truly marginal, less than 1% of each group.

Table 16. 3rd Native language

respondent's group	3 rd native language	%	n
Autochthonous	Chinese	0.3	1
	French	0.3	1
	Total	0.7	2
	Total group	100.0	307
Moroccan	Arabic	0.3	1
	Berber	0.3	1

Other Andean origins	Total	0.7	2
	Total group	100.0	298
	Aymara	0.4	1
	Total group	100.0	277

Consequently, the Moroccan group was the only one to be asked for its proficiency in Spanish. Around a quarter of the Moroccans are fluent in Spanish or speak it as their first language. On the other hand, more than 1 out of 3 Moroccans in Madrid don't speak Spanish or speak it just a little. This percentage rises for Moroccan women. When we take into account respondents' gender, we find out that almost half of the women (46%) don't speak Spanish or speak it only a little.⁵¹

Table 17. Proficiency in Spanish

respondent's group	Proficiency in Spanish	%	n
Moroccan	I don't speak it	3	9
	I speak it a little	32.9	98
	I speak it reasonably well	37.6	112
	I speak it fluently	14.8	44
	I speak it like my native language	8.7	26
	Is my native language	0.7	2
	Total	97.7	291
	Total group	100	298

The next sociodemographic characteristic we look into is the level of education. To measure it, we have two different variables in the questionnaire. The first one was an open question where respondent could declare the level of education acquired in their countries (which was not always familiar to the interviewer). We have a second variable – the one we are using for this report – where the answers were recoded into two comparable codes: one using the Spanish education scale, the other one using a standard education scale for all the countries included in the project.

Having completed primary education is the most frequent situation for all groups, including the autochthonous (due to its older average age). However, there are some differences among groups. The Andean is the better educated group among immigrants: one out of five Andeans holds a University degree. Contrarily, Moroccans show the largest percentage of illiterates and of respondents with primary studies not completed (around 18%) and a half of them only have completed primary education.

Table 18. Highest Level of Education

respondent's group	Highest level of Education	%	N
Autochthonous	Illiterate or primary not completed	17.3	53
	Primary completed	36.8	113
	Secondary completed	22.5	69
	University degree	23.1	71
	Missing	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	Illiterate or primary not completed	17.8	53
	Primary completed	49.7	148
	Secondary completed	24.2	72

⁵¹ However, some interviewers reported that Moroccan respondents tend to underestimate their proficiency in Spanish.

respondent's group	Highest level of Education	%	N
	University degree	8.1	24
	Missing	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Illiterate or primary not completed	4.1	12
	Primary completed	54.6	159
	Secondary completed	30.6	89
	University degree	10.7	31
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Illiterate or primary not completed	3.2	9
	Primary completed	35.4	98
	Secondary completed	39.7	110
	University degree	20.6	57
	Missing	1.1	3
	Total	100.0	277

Regarding occupation, data show that all immigrant groups are mostly composed of workers. 74% of the Moroccan, 82% of the Ecuadorian and 77% of the Andean are in paid work. And all of these groups have a smaller contingent of people dedicated to housework or family care than the autochthonous population. However, their unemployment rates are larger than that of the autochthonous group. Around 10% of the Moroccan and Andeans are unemployed and actively seeking a job while only 3% of the Autochthonous are in the same situation. The large amount of retirees within the Autochthonous group is related, once more, to the age composition of the groups, as migrant groups have much smaller percentages of people over 65 years old.

Table 19. Main activity in the last 7 days

respondent's group	main activity last 7 days	%	n
Autochthonous	In paid work	47.6	146
	In education (not paid by employer)	7.8	24
	Unemployed and actively looking for job	2.6	8
	Unemployed and wanting a job but not actively looking for it	2.3	7
	Permanently sick or disabled	1.6	5
	Retired	25.1	77
	Doing housework, looking after children or other persons	11.7	36
	Other	1.3	4
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	In paid work	74.2	221
	In education (not paid by employer)	2.7	8
	Unemployed and actively looking for job	9.7	29
	Unemployed and wanting a job but not actively looking for it	5.0	15
	Permanently sick or disabled	0.7	2
	Retired	1.0	3
	Doing housework, looking after children or other persons	6.7	20
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	In paid work	81.8	238
	In education (not paid by employer)	7.2	21
	Unemployed and actively looking for job	5.8	17

respondent's group	main activity last 7 days	%	n
	Unemployed and wanting a job but not actively looking for it	2.1	6
	Doing housework, looking after children or other persons	2.1	6
	Other	0.7	2
	Missing	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	In paid work	76.9	213
	In education (not paid by employer)	6.1	17
	Unemployed and actively looking for job	10.5	29
	Unemployed and wanting a job but not actively looking for it	1.8	5
	Retired	1.4	4
	Doing housework, looking after children or other persons	2.2	6
	Other	0.7	2
	Missing	0.4	1
	Total	100.0	277

Finally, to conclude this section on sociodemographic characteristics, we asked respondents about their evaluation of the ethnicity of their households. The table below only shows the valid cases (we have not asked this question to autochthonous respondents and there are also some missing cases for the migrant groups). The most endogamous group is the Moroccan, with around 93% of the individuals living only with co-ethnics. Both Latino groups show larger percentages of ethnically mixed households, though still a minority of households are mixed: around a third.

Table 20. Ethnic origin of the household

Respondent's Group	Ethnic origin of household	%	n
Moroccan	similar to respondent's	92.6	263
	Mixed	5.3	15
	different from respondent's	2.1	6
	Total	100.0	284
Ecuadorian	similar to respondent's	66.9	188
	Mixed	29.9	84
	different from respondent's	2.8	8
	don't know	0.4	1
	Total	100.0	281
Other Andean origins	similar to respondent's	65.3	175
	Mixed	32.5	87
	different from respondent's	1.9	5
	Refusal	0.4	1
	Total	100.0	268

3. POLITICAL INTEREST

In this section we will show the results from four different dimensions concerning political interest. First, we will analyze the degree of interest in politics that each group expresses using a four-point scale. Secondly, we assess respondents' evaluations of their own level of information about politics. In contrast to this subjective perception, we also analyze two more objective variables of information such as frequency of talking about politics and frequency of reading newspapers. In each case, we have separated national, local and homeland variables, in order to find out which level attracts more attention from the respondents.

The first result we have to mention is that autochthonous people are more interested in politics, both local and national, than migrants. In every case, national politics gets more attention than local. However, rates of political interest are not very high, not even among Spaniards. Half of the autochthonous population is not interested (not very or not at all) in national politics and 55% is not interested in local politics. Across the migrant groups, Andeans are the ones that seem to be more interested in Spanish politics, both local and national. Their rates of interest in national politics are close to the autochthonous (45.5%) but when we move to the local affairs, the percentage of interest drops to 38%.

Migrants have also been asked about their interest in their homeland country politics. The three groups declare a greater interest in their country of origin than in their host country politics. But again percentages of interest are not very high and none of them goes beyond 50%. Moroccans are, in general, the least interested in politics: only 30% is interested in local politics, 39% in national Spanish politics and 44% in Moroccan politics. Latin Americans are slightly more interested in their homeland politics, and around a half of each group (Ecuadorians and Andeans) declares to be interested in it.

Table 21. Interest in city politics

respondent's Group	interest in city politics	%	n
Autochthonous	very interested	15.0	46
	fairly interested	29.6	91
	not very interested	36.8	113
	not at all interested	18.6	57
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	very interested	4.7	14
	fairly interested	25.5	76
	not very interested	48.0	143
	not at all interested	19.8	59
	don't know	1.7	5
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	very interested	8.2	24
	fairly interested	22.7	66
	not very interested	46.7	136
	not at all interested	20.6	60
	don't know	1.7	5
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	very interested	9.7	27
	fairly interested	28.2	78
	not very interested	39.0	108
	not at all interested	22.7	63

	don't know	0.4	1
	Total	100.0	277

Table 22. Interest in Spanish national politics

respondent's Group	interest in host country politics	%	n
Autochthonous	very interested	16.3	50
	fairly interested	33.9	104
	not very interested	33.6	103
	not at all interested	16.3	50
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	very interested	5.0	15
	fairly interested	33.9	101
	not very interested	42.3	126
	not at all interested	16.8	50
	don't know	1.7	5
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	very interested	8.2	24
	fairly interested	32.3	94
	not very interested	41.2	120
	not at all interested	17.2	50
	don't know	0.7	2
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	very interested	14.8	41
	fairly interested	30.7	85
	not very interested	35.7	99
	not at all interested	18.4	51
	don't know	0.4	1
	Total	100.0	277

Table 23. Interest in home country politics

respondent's group	interest in homeland politics	%	n
Moroccan	very interested	9.1	27
	fairly interested	34.7	103
	not very interested	36.0	107
	not at all interested	18.5	55
	don't know	1.3	4
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	297
Ecuadorian	very interested	16.2	47
	fairly interested	33.3	97
	not very interested	33.3	97
	not at all interested	16.5	48
	don't know	0.3	1
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	very interested	18.8	52

	fairly interested	30.7	85
	not very interested	32.5	90
	not at all interested	17.7	49
	don't know	0.4	1
	Total	100.0	277

Regardless of their interest in politics, the autochthonous respondents claim to be mostly well informed (very well and reasonably) about politics, both for local and national politics (54% and 60% respectively). However, we notice an important gap between autochthonous and immigrants in their level of information. Only 31% of the Andeans, 24% of the Ecuadorians and 21% of Moroccans declare to be at least reasonably informed about city politics. Something similar happens when we focus on national politics. Their perceived levels of information are again rather low, although slightly higher: 37% of the Andeans are informed about Spanish national politics, as well as 28% of the Ecuadorian and 31% of the Moroccan.

Table 24. Level of information about city politics

respondent's group	informed about city politics	%	n
Autochthonous	Very well informed	7.2	22
	reasonably informed	46.9	144
	only a bit informed	37.8	116
	not at all informed	8.1	25
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	very well informed	2.3	7
	reasonably informed	18.5	55
	only a bit informed	66.4	198
	not at all informed	10.4	31
	don't know	2.0	6
	refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	very well informed	4.1	12
	reasonably informed	20.3	59
	only a bit informed	65.6	191
	not at all informed	8.9	26
	don't know	1.0	3
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	very well informed	4.7	13
	reasonably informed	26.4	73
	only a bit informed	60.6	168
	not at all informed	8.3	23
	Total	100.0	277

Table 25. Level of information about Spanish national politics

respondent's group	informed about host country politics	%	n
Autochthonous	very well informed	9.8	30
	reasonably informed	50.2	154
	only a bit informed	32.6	100
	not at all informed	7.5	23
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	very well informed	2.7	8
	reasonably informed	21.8	65
	only a bit informed	64.8	193
	not at all informed	8.4	25
	don't know	2.0	6
	refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	very well informed	5.5	16
	reasonably informed	22.8	66
	only a bit informed	62.8	182
	not at all informed	7.9	23
	don't know	1.0	3
	Total	100.0	290
Other Andean origins	very well informed	4.3	12
	reasonably informed	32.9	91
	only a bit informed	55.2	153
	not at all informed	7.6	21
	Total	100.0	277

Immigrant groups do not seem to be better informed about their homelands politics either. The proportion of respondents who are well or very well informed about the politics of their countries of origin are similar to or even smaller than those informed about Spanish national politics. The best informed are again the Andeans – a third of them is at least reasonably informed - and the less informed are the Moroccans – only one out of four is well informed.

Table 26. Information about ‘homeland’ politics

respondent's group	informed about homeland politics	%	N
Moroccan	very well informed	2.4	7
	reasonably informed	23.2	69
	only a bit informed	61.6	183
	not at all informed	10.8	32
	don't know	1.7	5
	refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	297
Ecuadorian	very well informed	4.5	13
	reasonably informed	22.4	65
	only a bit informed	60.7	176
	not at all informed	11.4	33
	don't know	1.0	3
	Total	100.0	290
Other Andean origins	very well informed	5.4	15

	reasonably informed	28.2	78
	only a bit informed	56.3	156
	not at all informed	10.1	28
	Total	100.0	277

From these two sets of variables measuring the perception of the subjects themselves about their interest and information, we move to two new sets of variables which try to measure more objectively these dimensions. First, we will analyze the frequency of talking about politics (as a proxy to measure the interest). Next, we will look into the frequency of reading the political sections in newspapers, as a proxy to measure the level of information.

In the case of autochthonous and Latin American groups, the proportion of respondents who talks very frequently about city politics is actually higher than the proportion of people who declared to be interested in it. The interest of the Moroccans, on the other hand, does not increase with the change of question item, and it is still rather low: only 24% of them talk about city politics at least regularly. National politics again elicits more attention from the respondents. About 56% of the autochthonous group talks about national politics almost everyday or regularly.

Table 27. Frequency of talking about city politics

respondent's Group	talk about city politics	%	N
Autochthonous	almost everyday	11.1	34
	regularly	38.6	118
	Rarely	36.9	113
	Never	13.4	41
	Total	100.0	306
Moroccan	Almost everyday	3.0	9
	Regularly	21.1	63
	Rarely	58.4	174
	Never	15.8	47
	Don't know	1.3	4
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Almost everyday	7.2	21
	Regularly	30.6	89
	Rarely	46.7	136
	Never	15.5	45
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Almost everyday	6.9	19
	Regularly	34.3	95
	Rarely	45.1	125
	Never	13.4	37
	Refusal	0.4	1
	Total	100.0	277

Table 28. Frequency of talking about Spanish national politics

respondent's Group	talk about host country politics	%	N
Autochthonous	Almost everyday	15.4	47
	Regularly	40.2	123
	Rarely	30.4	93
	Never	14.1	43
	Total	100.0	306
Moroccan	Almost everyday	3.7	11
	Regularly	25.7	76
	Rarely	54.1	160
	Never	14.9	44
	Don't know	1.4	4
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	296
Ecuadorian	Almost everyday	8.6	25
	Regularly	30.2	88
	Rarely	47.1	137
	Never	14.1	41
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Almost everyday	7.9	22
	Regularly	35.7	99
	Rarely	42.2	117
	Never	14.1	39
	Total	100.0	277

Homeland politics are not always a more frequent subject of conversation for immigrants. Only Ecuadorians declare to talk frequently about it in a larger percentage than they did about Spanish national politics (45%), while Moroccans and Andeans are more interested in talking about Spanish than about their own 'homeland' country politics.

Table 29. Frequency of talking about 'homeland' politics

Respondent's Group	Talk about homeland politics	%	N
Moroccan	Almost everyday	4.4	13
	Regularly	23.9	71
	Rarely	50.2	149
	Never	19.9	59
	Don't know	1.3	4
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	297
Ecuadorian	Almost everyday	10.3	30
	Regularly	34.7	101
	Rarely	43.6	127
	Never	11.3	33
	Total	100.0	291

Other Andean origins	Almost everyday	8.3	23
	Regularly	33.2	92
	Rarely	45.1	125
	Never	13.4	37
	Total	100.0	277

In spite of the perceived level of information not being very high in any group, the fact is that newspaper readership is quite frequent, especially in the case of Latin American groups. We know from the following question in the questionnaire that most of them choose free journals and newspapers that are distributed in the public transportation or in the street. Moroccans are the least likely to frequently read newspapers, but still around 40% of them declare to read regularly or almost everyday local or national news. On the other hand, Latin Americans are usual press readers to a larger extent than autochthonous respondents. Only around a quarter of Ecuadorians and Andeans do not read – or do it only rarely - local or national newspapers. The higher proportion of frequent reading of local press is that of the Andeans: 78% read newspapers about the city regularly or almost everyday (in contrast, the autochthonous percentage drops to 60%).

Table 30. Frequency of reading newspaper about the city

Respondent's Group	Read newspaper about city	%	N
Autochthonous	Almost every day	26.7	82
	Regularly	33.2	102
	Rarely	19.2	59
	Never	20.8	64
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	Almost every day	22.8	68
	Regularly	17.4	52
	Rarely	28.5	85
	Never	28.5	85
	Don't know	2.7	8
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Almost every day	43.3	126
	Regularly	33.0	96
	Rarely	21.3	62
	Never	2.4	7
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Almost every day	51.6	143
	Regularly	26.4	73
	Rarely	19.1	53
	Never	2.9	8
	Total	100.0	277

Table 31. Frequency of reading newspapers about Spanish public issues

Respondent's Group	Read newspaper about host country	%	N
Autochthonous	Almost every day	29.0	89
	Regularly	36.2	111
	Rarely	14.3	44
	Never	20.5	63
	Total	100.0	307
Moroccan	Almost every day	24.2	72
	Regularly	18.5	55
	Rarely	26.3	78
	Never	28.3	84
	Don't know	2.4	7
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	297
Ecuadorian	Almost every day	41.9	122
	Regularly	34.7	101
	Rarely	20.3	59
	Never	3.1	9
	Total	100.0	291
Other Andean origins	Almost every day	49.8	138
	Regularly	24.5	68
	Rarely	20.6	57
	Never	5.1	14
	Total	100.0	277

Concerning the readership of newspapers about migrants' countries of origin, we find two different situations. On the one hand, Latin Americans: around half of the Ecuadorians and Andeans read regularly or almost everyday news about their countries of origin. On the other hand, Moroccans are much less informed about their homeland: 78.5% never read about Morocco in a newspaper. This high proportion is striking when we compare it with the low rates of completely uninformed Latin Americans: only 8% of the Ecuadorians and 11% of the Andeans never read news about their homeland.

Table 32. Frequency of reading newspaper about 'homeland'

respondent's Group	Read newspaper about homeland	%	N
Moroccan	Almost every day	5.4	16
	Regularly	2.7	8
	Rarely	10.8	32
	Never	78.5	233
	don't know	2.4	7
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	297
Ecuadorian	Almost every day	23.4	68
	Regularly	34.7	101
	Rarely	33.7	98
	Never	7.9	23
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	291

Other Andean origins	Almost every day	24.9	69
	Regularly	28.2	78
	Rarely	36.1	100
	Never	10.8	30
	Total	100.0	277

4. **POLITICAL TRUST**

Political trust is measured with an eleven point scale (minimum 0 “don’t trust at all”; maximum 10 “I totally trust”). We will only show the means for each item and each group, to make comparisons and conclusions easier to summarise.

Schools and teachers are the most trusted institutions and social groups among all those mentioned; only Andeans are similarly supportive of the Spanish Government. Overall, the autochthonous group has a tendency to be more critical of political and social institutions (an average of 5.3). On the contrary, Latin Americans, especially Ecuadorians, have more positive evaluations (6.4 is the Ecuadorian average and 5.9 the Andean). Also Moroccans are more likely to express confidence in Spanish institutions than Spaniards. The least trusted institutions for autochthonous respondents are the Church (although the high standard deviation reflects the confluence of controversial points of view), the city government, and the legal system.

Table 33. Political trust (autochthonous group)

Respondent’s Group: AUTOCHTHONOUS	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Trust civil servants	5.3	2.3	301
Trust city government	4.8	2.7	302
Trust school and teachers	6.8	2.0	297
Trust city assembly	5.0	2.3	290
Trust regional parliament	5.0	2.4	292
Trust the police	6.1	2.5	306
Trust regional government	5.1	2.7	301
Trust church host society	4.3	3.2	302
Trust country government	5.2	2.6	306
Trust legal system	4.8	2.5	303
Trust country national Parliament	5.1	2.3	300
Trust institutions of the European Union	5.8	2.2	293

Regarding the Moroccans, their least trusted institutions are again the Church (which might be consistent with a non catholic group) and the Parliaments of any kind, local, regional or national. In this sense, it is important to point out that a high proportion of the Moroccans had no opinion about either the city assembly (24%) or the regional parliament (17%), and thus did not evaluate them (the low number of cases reflects this situation). Moroccans also have the highest refusal rates (not shown in the table). Among those Moroccans who do have an opinion, this group stands out for its high trust in the Government (7.5), the legal system (7.6) and even the police (7.1). It is interesting to point out, concerning the legal system, that it is much more trusted by immigrants than by autochthonous who actually rated it on average below 5.

Table 34. Political trust (Moroccan group)

Respondent's Group: MOROCCAN	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Trust civil servants	5.9	1.9	283
Trust city government	5.5	2.5	259
Trust school and teachers	7.6	2.2	272
Trust city assembly	4.7	2.7	190
Trust regional parliament	4.9	2.8	197
Trust the police	7.0	2.5	284
Trust regional government	5.1	2.8	216
Trust church host society	3.8	3.0	255
Trust country government	7.5	2.0	267
Trust legal system	7.6	2.4	259
Trust country national Parliament	4.9	2.5	215
Trust institutions of the European Union	5.4	2.4	218

As we have already mentioned, Latin Americans' average ratings are high and always over 5. However, civil servants are among their least trusted social groups (5.5). Besides schools, both Ecuadorians and Andeans give a high rating to the Spanish government (6.9). They also trust the EU institutions to a larger extent than the autochthonous (6.7 for Ecuadorians; 6.5 for Andeans). The Church is also very trusted among the Ecuadorian group (6.8). The worst scores among the Latin American groups are found for the city assembly and the regional parliament; which again are not very popular: 22% of the Andeans, and 25% of the Ecuadorians have no opinion about the city assembly or the regional parliament.

Table 35. Political trust (Ecuadorian group)

Respondent's Group: ECUADORIAN	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Trust civil servants	5.5	2.6	279
Trust city government	6.0	2.5	278
Trust school and teachers	7.1	2.4	264
Trust city assembly	5.7	2.3	223
Trust regional parliament	5.9	2.2	216
Trust the police	6.8	2.6	284
Trust regional government	6.6	2.4	260
Trust church host society	6.8	3.0	281
Trust country government	6.9	2.4	281
Trust legal system	6.3	2.7	253
Trust country national Parliament	6.0	2.4	247
Trust institutions of the European Union	6.7	2.2	227

Table 36. Political trust (Other Andean origins group)

Respondent's Group: OTHER ANDEAN ORIGINS	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Trust civil servants	5.5	2.5	263
Trust city government	5.7	2.6	256
Trust school and teachers	6.8	2.4	232

Trust city assembly	5.3	2.5	214
Trust regional parliament	5.4	2.5	216
Trust the police	6.4	2.7	271
Trust regional government	5.9	2.5	238
Trust church host society	6.0	3.2	261
Trust country government	6.9	2.5	265
Trust legal system	5.8	2.6	248
Trust country national Parliament	5.5	2.4	233
Trust institutions of the European Union	6.5	2.4	229

5. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

For most forms of political action, migrants in Madrid are substantially less likely to become engaged than the autochthonous population. The political activities that attract a larger number of Spaniards are demonstrations and petition (both around 22%).

Demonstrating is in fact one of the forms of participation where the gap between autochthonous and migrants is wider.

Among migrants, Moroccans are the least politically mobilised. Their participation rates in most activities are minimal, with the only exception of donating money, in which they are more engaged than the rest.

There are no significant differences in the level of engagement of both Latin American groups. The only important gap between them that we find is the likelihood to contact a government official, which is higher in the Andean group (7.2%). Latin Americans' patterns are more similar to that of autochthonous in contacting politicians and government officials, displaying badges, stickers or posters; contacting media; and in donating money. However, they are less likely to become engaged in party activities, less inclined to join demonstrations and are not as keen to sign petitions.

Table 37. Types of political participation

% yes	Respondent's group			
In the last 12 months...	Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean origins
Contacted a politician	4.9	0.7	2.1	1.8
Contacted government official	10.7	1.7	3.1	7.2
Worked for political party	2.6	0	0.3	1.8
Worked for action group	4.2	0	1.4	2.9
Badge, sticker, poster	7.2	0	5.2	4.7
Signed petition	22.1	1.3	11.7	11.2
Public demonstration	22.5	2.4	9.3	7.9
Product boycott	11.1	0.3	2.4	5.1
Bought for political reasons	13.0	0	5.5	6.5
Donated money	3.3	3.7	2.4	2.5
Strike	6.2	0.3	2.4	1.8
Contacted media	3.3	0	2.7	2.9
Contacted solicitor	2.9	1.0	2.4	3.6

In Spain, non-nationals who are non-EU nationals are not entitled to vote or run as candidates in any election. Thus, the only access to voting rights is through the acquisition of citizenship. For this reason, our capacity to assess the ‘effective’ turnout of the migrant groups is very limited, as most of them (between 88% and 94%, depending on the group) are not eligible to vote as yet.

Table 38. Turnout in Spanish national elections

	<i>Respondent's group</i>			
	Spanish	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean
Local elections 2003: turnout report, % over eligible voters (N)	84 (289)	47 (17)	31 (16)	61 (31)
Local elections 2003: % not eligible	5.9	94.3	94.5	88.8
Regional elections 2003: turnout report, % over eligible voters (N)	81 (288)	47 (19)	31 (16)	55 (33)
Regional elections 2003: % not eligible	6.2	93.6	94.5	88.1
National elections 2004: turnout report, % over eligible voters (N)	87 (291)	53 (17)	41 (17)	66 (32)
National elections 2004: % not eligible	5.2	94.3	94.1	88.4

Latin Americans’ mobilisation is higher in national elections than in regional and local elections. Ecuadorians are less inclined to turn out than Andeans in all types of elections, but it is in homeland elections where Andean migrants show that they are more eager to use their voting rights: 39% voted in their homelands’ last elections. The Moroccan case is more complicated. The low participation does not only reflect a low voting mobilisation, but very importantly the fact that Moroccans are not allowed to vote out of Morocco. They are eligible in fact (and that is why the option is selected by 87% of the respondents), but they are obliged to go back to their country to use that right, which results in a very low percentage of people actually voting (2%).

Table 39. Vote in last homeland national elections

Respondent's group	Voted in last homeland election	%	n
Moroccan	Yes	2.4	7
	No, but eligible to vote	87.2	258
	No, not eligible	10.1	30
	Can't remember	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	296
Ecuadorian	Yes	26.6	77
	No, but eligible to vote	57.4	166
	No, not eligible	14.9	43
	Can't remember	0.3	1
	Refusal	0.7	2
	Total	100.0	289
Other Andean origins	Yes	39.0	108
	No, but eligible to vote	45.8	127
	No, not eligible	14.1	39
	Can't remember	0.4	1
	Refusal	0.7	2
	Total	100.0	277

Analysing migrants' vote is not possible with such a reduced number of cases. However, we include the table of vote choice in the last national and local elections for information purposes (while warning about the limits imposed by the number of cases). Latin Americans are more prone to give their vote to PP (centre-right party) than Spaniards. The Andean case contrasts a bit, because in the question of vote intention they preferred the Socialist party, so this may be due to the small number of cases of people that actually voted or maybe mobilisation patterns differ once migrants acquire the Spanish nationality.

Table 40. Vote for party in last Spanish national elections (only voters)

respondent's group	party voted for in last national election	%	n
Autochthonous	PP (centre-right)	28.0	71
	PSOE (socialists)	44.5	113
	IU (left)	10.2	26
	Other	3.6	9
	Can't remember	0.4	1
	Refusal	13.4	34
	Total	100.0	254
Moroccan	PP (centre-right)	10.0	1
	PSOE (socialists)	70.0	7
	Refusal	20.0	2
	Total	100.0	10
Ecuadorian	PP (centre-right)	28.6	2
	PSOE (socialists)	14.3	1
	Other	14.3	1
	Can't remember	28.6	2
	Refusal	14.3	1
	Total	100.0	7
Other Andean origins	PP (centre-right)	34.8	8
	PSOE (socialists)	34.8	8
	IU (left)	4.3	1
	Can't remember	4.3	1
	Refusal	21.7	5
	Total	100.0	23

Table 41. Vote for party in last Spanish local elections (only voters)

respondent's group	party voted for last local election	%	n
Autochthonous	PP (centre-right)	30.4	73
	PSOE (socialists)	41.7	100
	IU (left)	11.2	27
	Other	2.1	5
	Don't remember	0.4	1
	Refusal	14.2	34

	Total	100.0	240
Moroccan	PSOE (socialists)	66.7	6
	Other	11.1	1
	Refusal	22.2	2
	Total	100.0	9
Ecuadorian	PP (centre-right)	40.0	2
	PSOE (socialists)	20.0	1
	Don't remember	40.0	2
	Total	100.0	5
Other Andean origins	PP (centre-right)	30.0	6
	PSOE (socialists)	35.0	7
	IU (left)	10.0	2
	Don't remember	5.0	1
	Refusal	20.0	4
	Total	100.0	20

Given the small number of migrants that are already naturalised in our three groups, an alternative way to approach turnout gaps is to analyse vote intention, although it is known that in many cases social desirability is likely to be operating with this kind of question. This might be the case of Moroccans that seem to be highly mobilised. But still, we can confirm some of the preliminary patterns: Ecuadorians are again the least inclined to vote.

Table 42. Turnout intention in Spanish local elections if eligible to vote

respondent's group	Vote intention in local election	%	N
Autochthonous	Yes	84.3	257
	No	11.5	35
	don't know	3.9	12
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	305
Moroccan	Yes	81.2	242
	No	11.1	33
	don't know	6.7	20
	Refusal	1.0	3
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Yes	75.9	220
	No	14.5	42
	don't know	9.0	26
	Refusal	0.7	2
	Total	100.0	290
Other Andean origins	Yes	77.8	214
	No	14.9	41
	don't know	6.2	17
	Refusal	1.1	3
	Total	100.0	275

Table 43. Turnout intention in Spanish regional elections if eligible to vote

respondent's group	Vote intention in regional election	%	N
Autochthonous	Yes	84.9	259
	No	10.8	33
	don't know	3.9	12
	Refusal	0.3	1
	Total	100.0	305
Moroccan	Yes	82.2	245
	No	11.1	33
	don't know	5.4	16
	Refusal	1.3	4
	Total	100.0	298
Ecuadorian	Yes	76.5	221
	No	14.2	41
	don't know	8.7	25
	Refusal	0.7	2
	Total	100.0	289
Other Andean origins	Yes	78.8	215
	No	13.6	37
	don't know	7.0	19
	Refusal	0.7	2
	Total	100.0	273

In Madrid, the Socialists seem to be especially successful in attracting the preferences of the Moroccan group and – to a smaller degree – of the Andean, but Ecuadorians' intentions largely mirror those of the native Spaniards. Only the Moroccan group shows any substantially differential partisan attachment as compared to the autochthonous Spaniards in Madrid.

However, there are two major differences between autochthonous and migrants. The first one is the higher proportion of people who have not decided their vote in all migrants groups, especially in the Andean. The second difference is the very low impact of the minor left wing party (IU) among the migrant groups, who rarely named it.

The results for the regional elections are very similar and don't fundamentally change the conclusions about partisan allegiance of our four groups.

Table 44. Party would vote in Spanish local elections if eligible to vote

respondent's group	vote intention for party in local election	%	N
Autochthonous	PP (centre-right)	31.4	93
	PSOE (socialist)	34.5	102
	IU (left)	9.4	28
	Other	2.7	8
	Don't know	2.7	8
	Refusal	19.3	57

	Total	100.0	296
Moroccan	PP (centre-right)	7.2	20
	PSOE (socialist)	59.9	167
	IU (left)	1.1	3
	Other	3.2	9
	Don't know	8.2	23
	Refusal	20.4	57
	Total	100.0	279
Ecuadorian	PP (centre-right)	35.4	97
	PSOE (socialist)	36.5	100
	IU (left)	2.2	6
	Other	4.0	11
	Don't know	9.5	26
	Refusal	12.4	34
	Total	100.0	274
Other Andean origins	PP (centre-right)	22.8	59
	PSOE (socialist)	44.4	115
	IU (left)	3.1	8
	Other	4.6	12
	Don't know	17.0	44
	Refusal	8.1	21
	Total	100.0	259

Table 45. Party would vote in Spanish regional elections if eligible to vote

respondent's group	vote intention for party in regional election	%	N
Autochthonous	PP (centre-right)	31.5	93
	PSOE (socialist)	34.2	101
	IU (left)	9.8	29
	Other	2.4	7
	Don't know	2.4	7
	Refusal	19.7	58
	Total	100.0	295
Moroccan	PP (centre-right)	8.2	23
	PSOE (socialist)	59.5	166
	IU (left)	1.1	3
	Other	2.5	7
	Don't know	7.9	22
	Refusal	20.8	58
	Total	100.0	279
Ecuadorian	PP (centre-right)	39.5	107
	PSOE (socialist)	33.2	90
	IU (left)	2.2	6
	Other	3.7	10
	Don't know	9.6	26
	Refusal	11.8	32
	Total	100.0	271
Other Andean origins	PP (centre-right)	25.5	66

	PSOE (socialist)	40.2	104
	IU (left)	3.1	8
	Other	4.2	11
	Don't know	18.9	49
	Refusal	8.1	21
	Total	100.0	259

6. ORGANISATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The organizational involvement measure combines the results of two different variables; current membership in any organisation, and participation in the activities of any organisation in the last 12 months, as there is no need to be a member to participate in an association. We will also analyse the results distinguishing between these two variables.

In general terms, migrants are less involved in any kind of organisation than the autochthonous population. Nevertheless, there are two important precisions to make. The first one is the rate of organisational involvement of the Andean group, which is similar to the Autochthonous (41%). The second one is the special case of Moroccans who show a very low rate: 94% are not involved in any organization. Ecuadorians are closer to the situation of the Andeans than to the Moroccans. Around a third of the Ecuadorians are involved in at least one organisation.

The analysis of the average number of organisations respondent's are involved in shows similar results. Autochthonous and Andean groups have thus the highest average.

However, the percentage of Autochthonous people who currently participates in the activities of an organisation drops compared to the rates of involvement and membership, whereas in the Latin American groups the situation is different. Although their rates of current membership compared to their overall involvement are lower than those of Spaniards, their rates of current activity are actually higher (36% for Andeans, 29% for Ecuadorians). This can be related to the fact that some of the associations they are involved in are more informal organisations, where the membership (and thus, paying a fee) is not so important.

Table 46. Current involvement in any organisation

Current involvement in org	<i>Respondent's group</i>			
	Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean origins
Involvement in any org	41	6.4	33.3	58.8
Any current membership	36.8	5.0	26.5	33.6
Any current activity	33.9	5.7	28.9	36.1
(N)	(307)	(298)	(291)	(277)

Table 47. Average number of organisations respondent is involved in

Average number of organisations...	<i>Respondent's group</i>
------------------------------------	---------------------------

		Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean origins
Respondent is involved in	mean	0.7	0.1	0.5	0.6
	s.d	1.1	0.4	0.8	0.9
Respondent is a current member	mean	0.7	0.1	0.5	0.6
	s.d	1.4	0.4	1.4	1.1
Respondent has a current activity	mean	0.6	0.1	0.5	0.6
	s.d	1.2	0.4	1.5	1.2

We have considered three specific characteristics of the organisations people are involved in: the immigrant composition, the ethnic composition, and the political engagement of the organisations.

Latin Americans are the most involved in migrant and ethnic organisations. A quarter of the Andean and more than 1 out of 5 Ecuadorians are involved in a ‘migrant’ organisation, that is, one in which more than 50% of the members are immigrants, whatever the activity and objectives of the organisation are (sports, cultural, women, professional...). In most cases, (around 72% in each group) these organisations are in fact ‘ethnic’ organisations (more than 50% of the members are respondents’ co-ethnics). That means that only between 6% and 7% of the Latin Americans are actually involved in mixed migrants organisations, or at least, in organisations where their co-nationals are not the majority. This percentage is even smaller in the case of Moroccans. Their involvement rate is again very low – only 5% are involved in migrant organisations - but mixing with other migrants is very rare (only 21% of those involved in a migrant organisation are involved in one which is not mostly composed by Moroccans). On the whole, only 1% of the Moroccans in Madrid are engaged in a mixed-migrants organisation.

It is important to note that the migrant and ethnic organisations we are talking in this section are different from the ones we will comment on next. As we have said, we are now taking into account any kind of organisation that fulfils the requirement of having 50% of migrants or co-ethnic members while the immigrant and ethnic organisations we report on in table 49 are actually specific organisations that only deal with immigrant or ethnic group issues. The involvement in this kind of organisations is much more reduced in all groups, but this does not mean that there is no immigrant or ethnic interaction, as we are now showing.

Involvement in politically-oriented organisations is very rare among immigrants, with percentages that drop from the involvement in migrant organisations. However, a non negligible 15% of the Andeans are involved in at least one organisation of this sort, which represents only a little less than the engagement in ethnic organisations. Spaniards, on the other hand, are more involved in organisations that take stands in public issues than in organisations where migrants are a majority. 17% of them declare to be involved in at least one politically oriented organisation.

Table 48. Involvement in migrant, ethnic and politically oriented organisations

Involvement in...	Respondent's group			
	Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean

				origins
any immigrant organisation	3.6	4.7	22.0	24.5
any organisations of the respondent's own ethnic group	-	3.7	16.2	17.7
any politically oriented org	17.3	1.7	9.6	15.5
N	(307)	(298)	(291)	(277)

To conclude this section on organizational involvement we show the involvement rates for each type of association.

Table 49. Involvement in each type of organisation, percentages

Involvement (member or participates) in...	<i>Respondent's group</i>			
	Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean origin
Sports organisation	11.1	1.3	13.7	8.3
Cultural organisation	2.9	0.7	1.4	4.7
Political party	3.3	0	0.3	1.8
Trade union	9.4	0.3	2.7	3.6
Professional organisation	2.0	0	1.7	1.1
Humanitarian aid organisation	18.2	1.3	7.6	10.8
Environmental org	2.9	0	1.4	1.8
Human rights or peace org	1.6	0	0.7	1.8
Religious org	4.2	0.3	5.8	9.4
Immigrants' org	0	1.0	1.0	4.0
Ethnic org	-	2.0	1.7	7.2
Anti racism org	0	0	0	0.4
Educational org	3.3	0.7	4.1	4.7
Youth org	1.3	0	1.0	1.1
Organisation for retired	3.9	0	0	0
Women org	0.3	0.7	1.0	0.4
Neighbour org	2.9	0	0.7	0.7
Other org	2.6	0.3	1.0	0.7
N	(307)	(298)	(291)	(277)

In general, both Latin American groups show associational preferences that are rather similar to those of the autochthonous population, although usually in a smaller proportions. Sports and humanitarian organisations are thus the ones with the highest rates of engagement. Nevertheless, they show relatively high percentages of involvement in religious organisations (6% Ecuadorians, 9% Andeans). On the contrary, Moroccans do not have any special leaning for religious associations (only 0.3%).

The highest rate of engagement for the Autochthonous group is the involvement in humanitarian organisations (18%). Ecuadorians prefer sports organisations (14%), while Andeans have more spread interests: 10% are involved in humanitarian aid organisations, 9% are involved in religious organisations and 8% in sports organisations. Moroccans are very weakly engaged in any type of organisations, but they also are the most involved in sports and humanitarian organisations (1.3%).

7. PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES

To measure the perceptions of political opportunity structures we have asked respondents to express their degree of agreement with a set of statements. The scale goes from 0 (totally disagree) to 10 (totally agree). We show the mean values obtained for each group.

Latin Americans have in most of the items a worse perception than Moroccans. They have a very strong perception of difficulties in the migrant process and are not satisfied with the Spanish structures. They agree, to a very large extent, thus with all the statements that point to the difficult situation of immigrants in Spain.

On the one hand, they consider that immigrants face too many difficulties to obtain legal status (this statement has the largest agreement among Ecuadorians with an average value of 9.3, and of 9 among the other Andeans), and that getting a job is difficult for immigrants. On the other hand, they strongly disagree with the items that assert that getting nationality is easy and that foreigners can easily bring their families. However they tend to trust the activity of the local government in terms of improving immigrants' life conditions (5.6 Ecuadorians, 5.1 Andeans).

Moroccans are also critical with some of the opportunity structures they face. They agree more than any other group with the item that asserts that the cultural and religious traditions of immigrants are not respected. Moroccans and the mixed group of Andeans are also the ones that agree the most with the statement concerning the very negative attitude of society towards immigrants (5.5.)

**Table 50. Perception of political opportunity structures
(0=completely disagree, 10=completely agree)**

Perceptions of political opportunity structures		<i>Respondent's group</i>			
		Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean origins
Immigrants face too many difficulties to obtain legal status	Mean	6.1	7.2	9.3	9.0
	Std. Deviation	3.1	2.9	1.5	2.1
	N	279	293	289	272
Getting nationality is easy	Mean	4.6	3.4	2.3	2.5
	Std. Deviation	3.1	3.4	2.9	3.3
	N	265	291	283	264
We have already too many immigrants	Mean	6.0	2.7	3.8	3.6
	Std. Deviation	3.1	3.0	3.8	3.8
	N	297	287	267	266
Foreigners can easily bring their families	Mean	6.1	4.9	2.9	3.8
	Std. Deviation	3.0	3.4	3.4	3.8
	N	271	287	287	267
Getting a job is difficult for immigrants	Mean	4.4	5.8	6.6	6.0
	Std. Deviation	3.0	2.8	3.2	3.5
	N	296	291	289	274
Immigrants have great difficulties to get access to public health	Mean	2.1	1.2	3.8	3.2
	Std. Deviation	2.4	2.5	3.7	3.8
	N	281	296	290	269
Spain should implement stronger measures against illegal immigration	Mean	7.1	5.9	4.8	4.9
	Std. Deviation	3.1	3.2	3.9	4.0
	N	297	261	269	258
Cultural and religious traditions of immigrants are not respected	Mean	3.3	5.6	4.4	3.9
	Std. Deviation	2.9	3.1	3.7	3.8
	N	284	269	267	260
Local government does a lot to improve immigrant residents' life	Mean	5.8	4.5	5.6	5.1
	Std. Deviation	2.8	2.8	3.5	3.5
	N	272	246	272	256
It is fairly easy for immigrant residents to make their voice heard to the local government	Mean	4.9	3.5	3.0	2.9
	Std. Deviation	3.1	2.8	3.2	3.3
	N	267	240	267	253
Spanish society has a very negative attitude towards immigrants	Mean	4.3	5.5	5.2	5.5
	Std. Deviation	2.9	2.8	3.3	3.5
	N	296	284	277	268

8. SELF IDENTIFICATION AND VALUES

Attachment is measured in an eleven point scale from 0 (no attachment at all) to 10 (very strong attachment). In the table below we show the mean values of each item. The Spanish autochthonous group has not been asked about the attachment to their own group (as we already ask for attachment to host country people, that is, Spaniards) or the attachment to homeland country (Spain).

Table 51. Attachment to different groups of people

Attachment to...		respondent's group			
		Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean origins
People of same religion	Mean	6.4	8.5	6.6	6.3
	Std. Deviation	3.1	1.9	2.7	2.7
	N	293	283	272	256
Spaniards	Mean	8.3	7.1	6.6	6.5
	Std. Deviation	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.3
	N	305	294	279	264
Your neighbourhood	Mean	7.5	7.2	6.7	6.3
	Std. Deviation	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.5
	N	304	292	285	268
People of your same gender	Mean	7.8	6.6	7.7	7.2
	Std. Deviation	1.9	2.2	1.8	2.1
	N	302	293	287	276
People from Madrid (madrileños)	Mean	7.7	7.1	6.7	6.7
	Std. Deviation	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.0
	N	307	289	278	266
Madrid	Mean	8.2	7.8	7.5	7.3
	Std. Deviation	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.0
	N	306	294	288	268
People of your same age	Mean	7.9	6.4	7.7	7.2
	Std. Deviation	1.8	2.6	1.8	2.1
	N	306	291	286	275
People of same ethnic group (Moroccans / Ecuadorians / Bolivians / Colombians / Peruvians, adapted to respondent's origin)	Mean	-	7.9	8.1	7.8
	Std. Deviation	-	2.2	2.0	2.2
	N	-	294	288	277
People of your same social class	Mean	6.6	5.0	5.8	5.7
	Std. Deviation	2.8	2.9	3.5	3.3
	N	292	266	239	210
European people	Mean	7.1	5.1	5.2	5.5
	Std. Deviation	2.1	3.0	3.0	2.9
	N	298	258	246	222
Homeland country (Morocco / Ecuador / Bolivia / Colombia / Peru, adapted to respondent's	Mean	-	9.3	9.0	8.6
	Std. Deviation	-	1.6	1.5	1.6

Attachment to...		respondent's group			
		Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean origins
origin)	N	-	294	286	275

First, it is important to point out that the city and the country of origin are the two main sources of attachment for both migrants and autochthonous. In the case of the three migrant groups, the identification to their countries of origin is higher than the identification to their co-nationals.

It is noticeable that the group that feels closer to the Spanish population (either at the national, the regional or the local level - neighbourhood) is the Moroccan, while the Latin Americans (less disadvantaged and culturally and linguistically linked to Spain) are less identified with the host country, in its different dimensions.

The Moroccan is the group most attached to their co-religionaries, around 2 points over the rest of the groups. Among Latin Americans, Ecuadorians are more attached to religion than autochthonous Spaniards but Andeans are indistinguishable from the latter.

The weaker identity references are social class and the European people, the former especially among immigrants. In this sense, class identity mobilises less sentiments in all groups even than gender and age.

A non negligible proportion of the three migrant groups – 34% of the Moroccan, 16% of the Ecuadorian and 19% of the mixed Andeans - gave the same score in the attachment scale to Spanish people and to their co-ethnics.

However, when these respondents are asked to choose to identify themselves whether as Spaniards or as Moroccans/ Ecuadorians/ Bolivians/ Colombians/ Peruvians, most of them lean for their ethnic group: 89% of the Moroccans, 77% of the Ecuadorians and 75% of the Andeans.

The question of self identification is thus only asked to those who gave the same score to their co-ethnics and to Spaniards.

Table 52. Self identification

respondent's group	Self identification	%	N
Moroccan	Autochthonous	4,5	5
	Ethnic group	89,1	98
	Other	4,5	5
	Don't know	1,8	2
	Total	100,0	110
Ecuadorian	Autochthonous	12,8	6
	Ethnic group	76,6	36
	Other	10,6	5
	Total	100,0	47
Other Andean origins	Autochthonous	11,5	6
	Ethnic group	75,0	39
	Other	9,6	5
	None	1,9	1
	Don't know	1,9	1

	Total	100,0	52
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Moving to political identities, we also explored respondents' ideological leanings. The left-right scale was measured with an 11 points scale ranging from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right). The Autochthonous mean value is centred although slightly leaning to the left. It is important to point out that the response rate is very high for the Autochthonous group, with less than 2% of respondents with no position or opinion (don't know). Latin Americans have also centred positions but they are more leaning to the right than Spaniards, especially Ecuadorians. Finally, Moroccans are the most left-leaning group, with a mean value of 1.5. They are also the group with a higher percentages of don't knows.

Table 53. Left-right scale

respondent's group	Mean	Std. Deviation	% of no position (DK)	N
Autochthonous	4.4	2.3	1.6	286
Moroccan	1.5	2.9	12.8	207
Ecuadorian	5.1	2.0	9.3	255
Other Andean origins	4.9	2,2	5.1	257

Regarding social trust, we have used a scale from 0 (you can't be trusted or you can't be too careful) to 10 (most people can be trusted). The autochthonous and the Moroccan population have the highest levels of generalised trust, around a point above the central point of the scale. Ecuadorians show levels considerably lower, that do not even reach 5.

The case of the Moroccans is especially interesting, since they are the only group to show less trust in their compatriots than in the general population. And it is not a minor difference, but there is almost one point between the two scores.

Table 54. Social trust

Respondent's group	Social trust	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Autochthonous	most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	5,7	1,9	305
Moroccan	most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	5,9	2,2	284
	most Moroccan people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	5,2	2,3	284
Ecuadorian	most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	4,8	2,7	286
	most Ecuadorian people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	5,0	2,8	283
Other Andean origins	most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful	5,0	2,7	271
	most (Bolivian / Colombian / Peruvian) people can be trusted or you can't be too	5,0	2,7	270

	careful			
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9. DISCRIMINATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS ETHNIC GROUPS

Finally, we have included a number of items regarding inter-group relations and feelings of discrimination.

On the one hand, we have also asked respondents' about their feelings of discrimination concerning eight different aspects: colour and race, nationality and origin, religion, language, age, gender, sexuality, disability and accent or region. Next, we asked if they have personally experienced any discrimination in the last 12 months. This question was only asked to respondents who declared to feel discriminated because of their nationality or origin, and to these respondents we also asked where such discrimination happened.

In Madrid, 40% of the Latin Americans feel discriminated for any reason, while only 23% of the Moroccans perceive any discrimination. They seem to be less sensitive to discrimination, in any of its forms. Concerning the reason of discrimination, the most important for all three groups is the nationality or origin. In other words, they feel discriminated because of their condition of immigrants. This factor of discrimination is mentioned by between 20 and 35% of the respondents in each group. Feeling discriminated due to ones' nationality or origin is followed by the race and the colour, especially among the Latin American groups: 13% of the Ecuadorians named it as a reason of discrimination, as well as 16% of the Andeans. However, interestingly enough, this percentage drops to 4% in the Moroccan group.

For the Moroccans it is their religion and not race what emerges as the second main reason of the perceived discrimination (5%). Finally, it is relevant to point out that around 11-12% of the Latin Americans feel discriminated due to their accent. They rarely say to be discriminated because of the language (3-4%), as Spanish is their main mother tongue (as we have showed in the sociodemographic chapter). Nevertheless, their accent - which is different from the Spaniard's accent -, is linked to their foreign origin and it is perceived as a cause for discrimination. Moroccans, in spite of not being native Spanish speakers, do not feel that either the language or the accent is a reason for discrimination.

Table 55. Feelings of discrimination for any reason

Discrimination reason	respondent's group			
	Autochthonous	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andean origins
Colour or race	1.3	3.7	13.4	16.1
Nationality or origin	1.3	19.8	35.4	31.0
Religion	2.0	4.7	2.1	3.7
Language	1.0	2.7	2.7	4.4
Age	3.3	0.3	2.4	3.6
Gender	3.6	0.3	2.4	1.8
Sexuality	1.3	0.0	1.4	0.7
Disability	0.7	0.0	0.7	1.8

Accent or region	1.0	0.7	11.0	11.7
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If we focus on the subset of respondents who declared to feel discriminated for their nationality or origin, we confirm that these feelings of discrimination relate to recent personal experiences, especially for Moroccans. 86% of them have felt discriminated because of their origin within the previous 12 months. This was also the case for 69% of the Andeans, but for a much more reduced number of Ecuadorians (56%). Autochthonous are not in the table, as the question did not apply to them.

Table 56. Has experienced discrimination due to nationality or origin in the last 12 months

respondent's group	% felt discriminated due to nationality or origin in the last 12 months	n
Moroccan	86.4	51
Ecuadorian	56.3	58
Other Andean origins	69.0	58

Finally, when we asked the subset of people who felt discriminated for their nationality origin in the last 12 months about the context where they felt such discrimination, we provided them with a list of 12 possible environments and respondents could mention all of those where they had experienced discrimination. Overall, the workplace (in its two variants of actual place of work and the search for a job) is the context where immigrants are more often perceiving discrimination. On the other hand, the church, schools or universities are the places where migrants have felt discriminated the least.

Table 57. Discrimination environment

Discrimination environment %	Respondent's group		
	Moroccan	Ecuadorian	Other Andeans
School or University	0	22.2	22.7
Work	28	43.9	59.6
Health care system	2.0	34.5	31.6
Immigration office	4.0	32.8	28.1
Police	18	43.1	26.3
Church	2.0	7.4	5.5
Looking for a job	22.0	33.9	41.1
Restaurants and bars	8.0	29.3	22.8
Street	40.0	48.3	33.9
Neighbourhood	14.0	33.9	29.8
Shops	8.0	22.8	19.3
Public transportation	10.0	40.4	29.8
N (felt discrimination in the last 12 months)	51	58	58

Ecuadorians felt discriminated mostly in two kinds of environments. The first one is the work environment: 44% declare to have been discriminated at work, and 34% have been discriminated when looking for a job. The second environment is less specific; they feel discrimination from the city in a larger sense: 48% have felt discriminated in the street, 34% in their neighbourhoods, and 40% in public transportation. It is also interesting to point out that Ecuadorians are the group that feels more deeply discrimination from the police: 43% as opposed to 26% of the other Andeans, and only 18% of the Moroccans.

The mixed group of other Andean origins follow the same patterns of Ecuadorians, but they emphasize discrimination at the workplace: 60% of them declare to have suffered from discrimination at work, and 41% when looking for a job.

Finally, there are two measures of attitudes towards ethnic groups in the questionnaire. First, we have a question only for the autochthonous group. We ask Spaniards if they will accept three different groups of migrants (Moroccans, Ecuadorians and other Latin Americans) as close kin by marriage, as neighbours, as job colleagues, as residents in the city and as Spanish citizens. Second, we have proceeded similarly with the migrant groups, asking them if they would accept Spaniards as close kin, as neighbours and as job colleagues.

The best accepted group by Spaniards is the general Latin American group, followed by Ecuadorians and, finally, Moroccans who get lower rates of acceptance. In general, migrants from any group are better admitted as job colleagues and city residents than as neighbours and citizens. The item that has the lowest average value, as well as a higher variation between groups, is the acceptance of immigrants in one's own family. In this sense, almost a third of the Spaniards would not accept Moroccans as close kin by marriage; 16% would not accept Ecuadorians, and 15% would not accept other Latin Americans. In the rest of the items, the acceptance rates of Latin Americans are above 90%. Moroccans are accepted by less than 90% of the Spaniards in two more items: as neighbours (88% would accept them) and as Spanish citizens (89%).

Table 58. Autochthonous acceptance of different migrant groups

	<i>Autochthonous acceptance of...</i>		
	Ecuadorians	Moroccans	Other Latin Americans
as close kin by marriage	83.5	69.0	84.8
as neighbours	93.1	88.5	94.1
as job colleagues	95.4	91.5	96.4
as city residents	95.8	90.9	96.1
as country citizens	94.1	88.9	94.4
N	(307)	(307)	(307)

The other side of the coin is the acceptance of Spaniards by the three migrant groups. This is relatively higher, but with some important nuances. Andeans are the most prone to a favourable attitude towards Spaniards: more than 95% would accept them as neighbours or job colleagues, while the acceptance as close kin is slightly lower but still over 90%. Ecuadorians also show a high acceptance of Spaniards as neighbours and job

colleagues, but not so much as part of their families (the percentage drops until almost 85%). Finally, Moroccans are in a particular situation: they are close to the Latin Americans percentages in terms of acceptance of Spaniards as neighbours or job colleagues; nevertheless, when it comes to the family the percentages are very much reduced: only 36% of the Moroccans would accept to have a Spaniard as a close kin by marriage.

Table 59. Migrant groups acceptance of Spaniards

respondent's group	Acceptance of Spaniards as...			N
	close kin by marriage	neighbours	job colleagues	
Moroccan	36.1	99.3	99.3	(297)
Ecuadorian	87.2	95.9	94.8	(291)
Other Andean origins	91.0	97.1	97.5	(277)

PART II: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES

In this second part we look in more detail into three main indicators of political integration, two of them related to political orientations, and one behavioural: the interest in local or national Spanish politics, the degree of confidence in the local and national legislative and executive branches of government, and participation in non-electoral politics. For all of the multivariate models, we have included the autochthonous Spanish respondents as the reference (control) group, so that we can assess on the one hand whether the three groups of immigrants are indeed any different to the autochthonous population while, on the other hand, we analyse what factors contribute to better understand what individuals are more integrated in the political sphere.

We first focus on exploring with multivariate analyses respondents' interest in local or national politics. For all those individuals who said they were quite or very interested in either local or national Spanish politics, we assign them a value of 1. Hence, all those respondents who were little or not at all interested in both local and national Spanish politics get a value of 0. And we model this dependent variable with a multivariate logistic regression (Table 60).

The results show that the initial gap in political interest between the autochthonous Spaniards and the immigrant groups – only significant for Moroccans and Ecuadorians – substantially diminishes it to statistical insignificance once we control for the socio-economic differences of the various groups. In particular, the level of education and the number of years of residence in the country are important elements that contribute to explain the gap between the autochthonous and the migrants. Further to this, we see that

some forms of social capital have a positive impact in the interest in politics individuals develop. Membership in associations – but not active engagement in them – and being more trusting towards other people are positively related to developing an interest in politics. Feelings of discrimination due to one's origin or nationality have no significant impact on political interest. And neither does having naturalised as a Spaniard nor acquiring a more fluent command of Spanish for non-native speakers.

Table 60: Logistic regression, interest in local or national Spanish politics as the dependent variable (unstandardised logistic coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Immigrants (ref.= autochthonous)				
Moroccan	-0.48**	-0.20	-0.10	-0.12
Ecuadorian	-0.37*	-0.16	-0.11	-0.13
Other Andean origin	-0.27	-0.27	-0.26	-0.29
SES variables				
Men		0.37**	0.39**	0.39**
Level of education		1.39***	1.25***	1.26***
Age		0.03	0.03	0.03
Age squared		0.00	0.00	0.00
Years since arrival (for immigrants)		0.03*	0.03**	0.03*
Spanish nationality (for immigrants)		0.16	0.9	0.08
2nd generation		1.75	1.74	1.76
Fluent in Spanish (for Moroccans)		0.08	0.09	0.10
Married		-0.35*	-0.36**	-0.36**
Social Capital				
Membership in any association			0.71**	0.72**
Participation in any association			-0.11	-0.12
Social trust			0.70**	0.70**
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination				0.12
Constant	0.16	-1.80**	-2.38***	-2.39***
Nagelkerke R2	0.01	0.10	0.13	0.13
-2 log likelihood	1542.64	1464.51	1440.87	1440.45
Degrees of freedom	3	12	15	16
N	1122	1122	1122	1122

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

These results are very important in terms of policy-making, as our study would suggest that rather than providing the nationality, it is the traditional recourse to increasing the formal education of less resourceful groups what will contribute to make them more aware and interested in public affairs.

In Table 61 we find the results of an OLS regression on political confidence, which is an average index of the scores that respondents gave in four items that measured their trust in local and national legislatures and executives, thus summarising the overall political confidence in the main elective governmental bodies in Spain. As the original items were constructed as 0 to 10 scales – where 0 meant no confidence at all and 10 full confidence – our overall indicator has the same range.

Table 61: OLS regression, confidence in local and national legislative and executive branches of government, (standardised beta coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Immigrants (ref.= autochthonous)				
Moroccan	0.19***	0.19**	0.17*	0.18**
Ecuadorian	0.24***	0.23***	0.25***	0.27***
Other Andean origin	0.20***	0.20***	0.21***	0.24***
SES variables				
Men		-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.08**
Level of education		-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.09**
Age		-0.07	-0.05	-0.05
Age squared		0.19	0.18	0.17
Years since arrival (for immigrants)		-0.01	-0.01	0.00
Spanish nationality (for immigrants)		-0.09	-0.10*	-0.10*
2nd generation		-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Fluent in Spanish (for Moroccans)		0.00	0.02	0.01
Married		0.05	0.05	0.05
Social Capital				
Membership in any association			0.04	0.04
Participation in any association			-0.07	-0.06
Social trust			0.22***	0.22***
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination				-0.09***
Constant (unstandardised coefficient)	5.06***	5.44***	4.36***	4.42***
Adjusted R2	0.04	0.08	0.12	0.13
F statistic model (sig.)	18.76 (0.000)	8.59 (0.000)	11.35 (0.000)	11.37 (0.000)
Degrees of freedom	3	12	15	16
N	1121	1121	1121	1121

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

In this case, the findings are substantially different to those on political interest. On the one hand, all three immigrant groups are significantly different from the autochthonous population in their orientations to Spanish political institutions: they are noticeably more trusting of them. And this more positive evaluation is not substantially altered once we control for any of the main socio-economic variables nor when we take into consideration levels of social capital or of perceived discrimination. As it seems, immigrants are just more confident on the functioning of governmental institutions. Interestingly enough, educational levels have in this case just the opposite impact than for political interest, and rather than fostering political confidence, greater educational achievement seems to lead to producing more critical and alienated citizens. The same negative impact comes with naturalisation for immigrants. Indeed, it seems that in general all indicators that are related to having spent more time in the country or having more resources to become more informed about politics lead to more critical stances by citizens. Though, still, immigrants remain less critical overall.

On the other hand, only generalised social trust seems to be related to political confidence, as organisational engagement has no impact at all. And feeling discriminated against has a clearly negative impact on political confidence.

Finally, Table 62 analyses a behavioural indicator of political integration: participation in non-electoral political action. The dependent variable is a dummy (0-1) indicator that adopts the value of 1 when the respondent has participated in the previous 12 months in any form of political action out of a list of 13 different forms of action (described in Table 37).

Table 62: Logistic regression, participation in any form of political action in previous 12 months (unstandardised logistic coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Immigrants (ref.= autochthonous)				
Moroccan	-2.84***	-2.52***	-2.41***	-2.44***
Ecuadorian	-0.76***	-0.50	-0.60	-0.65*
Other Andean origin	-0.90***	-0.84**	-1.03***	-1.08***
SES variables				
Men		0.02	0.03	0.03
Level of education		1.31***	1.02***	1.03***
Age		0.02	0.02	0.02
Age squared		0.00	0.00	0.00
Years since arrival (for immigrants)		0.02	0.03*	0.03*
Spanish nationality (for immigrants)		0.62*	0.55*	0.55*
2nd generation		1.08	0.97	1.01
Fluent in Spanish (for Moroccans)		0.08	-0.10	0.08
Married		-0.28	-0.25	-0.26
Social Capital				
Membership in any association			0.61*	0.63*
Participation in any association			0.76**	0.74**
Social trust			-0.08	-0.07
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination				0.28
Constant	-0.44***	-1.73	-1.81	-1.86*
Nagelkerke R2	0.16	0.23	0.29	0.30
-2 log likelihood	1070.24	1010.45	950.26	948.98
Degrees of freedom	3	12	15	16
N	1130	1130	1130	1130

* $p \leq 0.05$, ** $p \leq 0.01$, *** $p \leq 0.001$

The results of this last model also substantially differ from those related to the previous indicators of political integration, hence underlining the fact that these are different dimensions of political integration that are not necessarily explained by the same factors.

In the case of political action, all migrant groups are significantly less likely to participate in politics than autochthonous Spaniards, and the gap is especially pronounced for the Moroccans. Furthermore, this gap does not substantially diminish once socio-economic or social capital factors are taken into account. It is, hence, a pervasive gap that makes immigrants less inclined to use their political rights to express their concerns and opinions.

As with political interest, educational attainment is positively related to this form of political integration. And immigrants who have been for longer in Spain or who have acquired the Spanish nationality are more likely to engage in some form of political action. Equally, organisational engagement – both in its passive and active versions – fosters political participation through non-electoral means, while generalised social trust seems to have no impact at all. And, contrary to what we could expect, feeling discriminated against does not prompt individuals to engage in politics to redress their grievances.

In summary, our three models provide three relatively different stories of the processes of political integration and the gaps between autochthonous and immigrant groups in Madrid.⁵² The gaps in political interest are related to socio-economic disadvantage alone, the gaps in political confidence and political action are pervasive but they are in opposing directions: immigrants are more confident than autochthonous Spaniards, but are less inclined to act politically. Education is crucially important for all three forms of political integration, but while higher formal educational attainment fosters political interest and action, it makes citizens more critical of their main governmental institutions. Having spent more time in Spain contributes to immigrants' developing a greater interest in Spanish politics and being more inclined to participate, but it has no significant impact on political confidence. Becoming a Spanish national has contradictory effects on political integration: it makes political action more likely but it also makes immigrants more critical with Spanish governmental institutions. Social capital is important – albeit in different ways – for all three indicators of political integration: organisational membership and trust foster political interest, only social trust is related to political confidence, and only organisational involvement fosters political participation. Hence, different forms of social capital has different 'productive' uses when it comes to contributing to political integration. Finally, perceptions or experience of being discriminated against only has an impact in citizens' political confidence, and it does not prompt them into political action.

A last word about the fit of the models is necessary: our results indicate that the set of variables we have considered in these analyses are much better able to account for political participation than for the two attitudinal dimensions of political integration. Hence, in the future, our multivariate models will have to be specifically tailored to the different dependent variables.

CONCLUSIONS

The study in Madrid has focused on three migrant-origin groups: Ecuadorian (291 individuals), Moroccan (298 individuals) and a mixed group of other Andean origins (Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian – 277 individuals) to which we added a control group of autochthonous population (307 individuals).

⁵² Separate models for each of the dependent variables by each of the ethnic groups (ie. 12 different models) indicate that our results in the three tables are generally applicable to all of them in their broad lines. However, there are more systematic departures when it comes to the impact of gender – more commonly significant for the immigrant groups than for the autochthonous group – and age – frequently significant for the immigrant groups and not for the autochthonous group.

We have started this report by analysing the sociodemographic characteristics of our respondents. In this regard, we have already found differences between the migrants and the autochthonous group, but also across the migrant groups. Immigrants are on average significantly younger than the autochthonous group, and the proportion of senior people is only noticeable among Spaniards.

The gender distribution within the migrant groups follows two different patterns: the Moroccan group is a strongly masculinised group (6 out of 10 of its members are men) while Latin American groups are mostly composed by women.

Concerning the year and reason of arrival, there are two aspects to underline. First, migration inflows in Madrid proved to be relatively recent and the main influx took place in the early 2000s. In addition, in most cases Madrid was not the gate of entrance into Spain. Second, immigration in Madrid is mostly for economic reasons (between two and three thirds of the respondents, depending on the group). Occupation data follow the same pattern showing that all immigrant groups are mostly composed of workers.

Regarding the legal situation, most of the respondents have a permit, although it is a rather unstable one (a short-term permit of 5 years or less) in most of the cases. Bolivians, the late-comers to the country, have the higher rates of undocumented residents. Furthermore, naturalisation rates are low and only important among Peruvians. Consequently, nationality is highly related to parents' country of birth.

Religion splits the sample in two main groups: Latin American and Spaniards are mainly Catholics; Moroccans are almost unanimous in their definition as Muslim. However, Moroccans are the least practicing in terms of religious attendance.

We have also found some differences in terms of levels of education: the Andean is the best educated group among immigrants, while Moroccans show the largest percentage of illiterates and of respondents with primary studies not completed.

The second section of the report concerned political interest. Although rates of political interest are not very high, in general terms autochthonous people are more interested in politics than migrants. Furthermore, the three migrant groups (and especially Latin Americans) declare a greater interest in their country of origin than in their host country politics. However, except for the Moroccans, the proportion of respondents who talks very frequently about politics is actually higher than the proportion of people who declared to be interested in it.

The autochthonous' level of information is also higher, and immigrant groups do not seem to be better informed about their homelands politics either. In spite of this low perceived level of information, the fact is that newspaper readership is quite frequent, especially in the case of Latin American groups who are also well informed about their country of origin.

The third section analysed confidence in political institutions. Schools and teachers are the most trusted institutions and social groups among all those mentioned. Overall, the autochthonous group has a tendency to be more critical of political and social

institutions. On the contrary, immigrants have more positive evaluations. We shall highlight their higher ratings of the Spanish government and the legal system, and, in the case of Latin Americans, also to the Church.

From political confidence, we moved into political participation. For most forms of political action, migrants in Madrid are substantially less likely to become engaged than the autochthonous population. This gap is especially wide in participation forms such as demonstrating or petitioning. Among migrants, Moroccans, whose participation rates in most activities are minimal, are the least politically mobilised.

Analysing vote and turnout happens to be rather difficult considering the low amount of naturalised citizens: in Spain only nationals (or EU nationals in local elections) are entitled to vote. An alternative way to approach turnout gaps is to analyse vote intention, in spite of the social desirability bias which is likely to be operating. But still, we can confirm some of the preliminary patterns and Ecuadorians are the least inclined to vote.

In the fifth section we analysed organisational involvement. Migrants are less involved in any kind of organisation than the autochthonous population, except for the Andean group whose rate of organisational involvement is similar to the autochthonous. Moroccans are a quite special case as hardly any of them is involved in any organization. Those migrants that are involved usually choose organisations that are largely composed by other immigrants or co-nationals and only very rarely politically-oriented organisations.

Concerning the perception of political opportunity structures, we highlighted that migrants have in general terms very strong perception of difficulties in the migrant process and are not satisfied with the opportunities for integration that Spanish structures afford them. In this sense, and in contrast to what could be expected, Latin Americans have an even worse perception of these opportunities than Moroccans.

When measuring attachment and values, it is important to point out that the city and the country of origin are the two main sources of attachment for both migrants and autochthonous. It is noticeable that the group that feels closer to the Spanish population (either at the national, the regional or the local level) is the Moroccan. The Moroccan is also the group most attached to their co-religionaries. Regarding social trust, the autochthonous and the Moroccan population have the highest levels of generalised trust. Moroccans are in addition the only group to show less trust in their compatriots than in the general population.

Finally, in the last descriptive section we included a number of items regarding feelings of discrimination and inter-group relations. Latin Americans are more sensitive to discrimination than Moroccans. In any case, the most important reason for discrimination is their nationality or origin. Furthermore, these feelings of discrimination mostly relate to recent personal experiences. The workplace is the context where immigrants more often perceive discrimination. When it comes to inter-group acceptance, Moroccans get the lowest rates among autochthonous. However this distance works in both directions, as only a third of the Moroccans would accept to have a Spaniard as a close kin by marriage.

The multivariate analyses have, in turn, shown that the gaps between autochthonous Spaniards and the three immigrant groups largely differ depending on the indicator of political integration we are considering, and that the aspects that foster or hinder political integration for migrants equally vary depending on the form of integration we are analysing. But, in general, our results highlight the importance of educational attainment and of social capital factors.

CITY REPORT: MILAN⁵³

Introduction

SELECTION OF ETHNIC GROUPS

The population survey in Italy was carried out between November 2006 and April 2007 in the Municipality of Milan. We chose Milan because, after Rome, it is the second city in Italy counting the biggest foreign population⁵⁴. We focused on the inner city, the Municipality of Milan. According to 2001 census data, most migrants concentrate in the city area rather than in the proximities and the closest suburbs (ISTAT, 2005, p. 193-194). Within the foreign population, we selected three major groups: Filipinos, Egyptians and Ecuadorians which, as Table 1 shows, represent more than 35% of all foreigners residing in the city. Most of the foreign population in Milan is represented by Asian migrants who are the most numerous aggregate counting 34.4% of all foreigners. Filipinos, by themselves, make up almost half of all Asians who are present in the city (ISTAT, 2005, p. 194). Filipinos and Egyptians have been for more than 10 years among the most numerous groups in Milan. Ecuadorians are instead a group of a more recent wave of migration to Italy reaching a considerable number only in the last few years.

Table 1 Size of the population of the first five foreign countries (except European Economic Area countries)

	a.v.	% over the total resident foreign population	% over the total resident population
Philippines	26,633	16.36	2.05
Egypt	20,979	12.89	1.62
Peru	13,775	8.46	1.06
China	13,095	8.05	1.01
Ecuador	12,339	7.58	0.95
Total foreigners	162,782	100	12.55
Total residents	1,297,431	-	100

Source: statistical division – Municipality of Milan, Population Register, 31 Dec. 2005

SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURES

The survey was conducted at the individual level using data derived from a population survey undertaken from November 2006 to April 2007 on a random sample of 900 migrants (300 Filipinos, 300 Egyptians and 300 Ecuadorians) and 300 individuals constituting the control group of autochthonous Italians.

The migrant sample includes all migrants of Filipino, Egyptian and Ecuadorian origin independently of their country of birth. It includes all typologies of migrants, first and second generations, regardless of their legal status. Specifically, the population is made up of the legal component (with a residence or not) as well as the illegal component. Selected individuals had to be present in Milan for at least 6 months before the interview and to be at least 15 years old. The sample was selected through a method

⁵³ This report has been produced by Katia Pilati, a member of the Italian LOCALMULTIDEM team.

⁵⁴ In Italy migrants still largely overlap with the foreign population.

called ‘by centres of aggregation’ (Blangiardo G. , 1999; 1996)⁵⁵. The representativeness of the sample is made up of two levels. According to this sampling method, the first level requires a definition of a certain number of local environments distributed throughout the territory. The first level of representativeness requires that each local sample is representative of the sub-universe from which it is drawn. The second level of representativeness refers to the entirety of the statistical units sampled in the various territorial environments. This set of statistical units is aggregated into a single sample. The universe of migrants who are present at the time of the survey is made up of a list of H statistical units, each of which represents a set of contacts with some centres or places of gathering located on the territory (institutions, entertainment, care services, meetings and so on).

The selection technique for each of the N sample units is divided in two levels:

1. random and independent selection of one of the k centres (with probability uniformly equal to 1/k);
2. within the centre, random and independent selection of one of the H_j subjects attending the drawn centre (each drawn with probability constantly equal to 1/H_j), j=1,2,3,...k.

COMPARISON OF DATA COLLECTED FROM AVAILABLE STATISTICAL SOURCES AND OUR SAMPLE

Table 2 Comparison of gender distributions⁵⁶

	Source of data: Statistics division- Municipality of Milan, 31st Dec. 2005 *			Sample		
	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
M	42.80	77.07	41.41	40.0	81.0	41.7
F	57.20	22.93	58.59	60.0	19.0	58.3
Total	26,633	20,979	12,339	300	300	300

*foreigners by official statistics= only resident foreigners

Table 2 compares data available from the official statistics of the Municipality of Milan and data available from our sample. Although the populations considered in table 2 are of a different nature since official statistics rely on the aggregate of foreign residents whereas our sample includes not only migrants who are foreign residents but also the illegal and less stable component of migrants, we can nonetheless observe that gender distributions are close one another.

FIELDWORK

Interviewed migrants were submitted a 30-35 minutes face-to-face structured questionnaire in Italian or in the language of origin of the respondents. The Italian control group was made up of 300 individuals of Italian origin born in Italy holding the Italian citizenship who were submitted the same questionnaire by CATI. The control group included individuals of at least 15 years old who had to be present in Milan for at least 6 months before the interviews.

⁵⁵ All information about the sampling procedure has been drawn from Blangiardo (1999; 1996).

⁵⁶ The gender distribution of the official statistics refers to the whole foreign resident population whereas the gender distribution of our sample only includes migrants at least 15 years old.

The questionnaire included a number of items concerning different kinds of political activities, organizational memberships of the respondents, as well as various socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Several questions were specifically constructed to obtain information on peculiar characteristics of migrants, specifically the year of arrival, the language proficiency, the registration at the Population Registers, etc.⁵⁷.

Part I: Descriptive analyses

1. Socio-demographic characteristics

Table 4 shows that gender distributions across groups highly differ. Whereas Filipinos and Ecuadorians show a prevailing female composition, Egyptians overwhelmingly are male. The feminization of Filipino and Ecuadorian ethnic groups is partly due to the Italian labour market structure, which provides working opportunities for women migrants in the domestic service sector and, as official statistics show, Filipino and Ecuadorian women mostly occupy these (2001 census data). On their side, Egyptian migration flows seem to show a more traditional pattern of migration in which migrant male workers still tend to have their families in their countries of origin.

Table 4 Gender by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
	%	%	%	%
M	40.0	81.0	41.7	46.7
F	60.0	19.0	58.3	53.3
N	300	300	300	300

The age composition of the three observed migrant groups shows that all three groups are, in average, very young subpopulations in comparison to autochthonous Italians (table 5). Whereas the average age in 2007 is 37 years old for Filipinos, 34 for Egyptians and 36 for Ecuadorians, it is 50 years old for autochthonous Italians.

Table 5 Year of birth by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
Mean	1970.195	1973.461	1971.153	1957.03
SD	11.46694	9.631698	10.4188	17.05379
N	298	297	295	300

The distribution of age classes in table 6 further shows that most migrants are between 30 and 44 years old with higher percentages of people being in the youngest age classes compared to autochthonous Italians whose highest proportion is part of the oldest age band including people over 60 years old.

⁵⁷ Weights have been calculated by ISMU as follows: after weighting by the centers of aggregation, data have been weighted on gender and age according to the distribution of ORIM 2006 (www.ismu.org).

Table 6 Age classes by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
	%	%	%	%
15-22	12.1	11.4	11.2	6.0
23-29	16.7	35.7	18.3	7.7
30-44	50.3	43.3	50.3	30.3
45-59	18.7	15.0	19.7	22.3
60+	4.33	0	0.7	34.7
Obs N	300	300	300	300

Table 7 shows that most migrants were not born in Italy, consistently with the fact that Italy is a country of recent immigration compared to other countries in Europe such as Great Britain or France. This also holds true for the most established groups such as Filipinos and Egyptians. Filipinos and Egyptians indeed arrived before most Ecuadorians who were almost all born in Ecuador. Yet, 95% of Filipinos and 94.7% of Egyptians were also born in their respective countries of origin.

Table 7 Country of birth by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
	%	%	%	%
Italy	5.0	5.0	-	100
Philippines	95.0	-	-	-
Egypt	-	94.7	-	-
Ecuador	-	-	99.3	-
Saudi Arabia	-	0.3	-	-
Missing	-	-	0.7	-
N	300	300	300	300

Table 8 shows that Filipinos and Egyptians are indeed the 2 most settled groups among the studied ones, since no Ecuadorian arrived before 1985. With respect to the year of arrival, most respondents arrived after 1995. More specifically, among first generation migrants, 55% of Filipinos arrived after 1995, 72 % of Egyptians arrived after 1995 and 88.8% of Ecuadorians after 1995.

Table 8 Year of arrival by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
Before or in 1980	2.7	5.7	-
1981-1985	3.4	4.7	-
1986-1990	11.3	7.3	2.3
1991-1995	12.3	6.3	5.3
1996-2000	22.7	18.0	48.7
After 2000	32.3	54.0	40.7
N	254	288	291

Consistently with the recent arrival to Italy, most respondents have been living in Milan for less than 10 years. Specifically, 51.3% of Filipinos, 67% of Egyptians and almost all

Ecuadorians have been living in Milan for fewer than 10 years (table 9). Only a very small percentage, that includes Filipinos and Egyptians' second generations, have been living almost all their life in Milan but percentages are only around 3% for both groups.

Table 9 How many years have been living in Milan by group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	Autochthonous Italians
	%	%	%	%
<5	24.3	45.7	46.0	1.7
6-10	27.0	21.3	47.0	3.3
11-20	36.0	17.0	5.3	10.7
21-30	6.7	7.0	0	10.3
31-40	0	1.3	0	14.7
41-50	0	0	0	14.3
51-60	0	0	0	7.3
61+	2.7	4.3	1.7	5.3
Almost all life	3.4	3.1	0	32.0
N	293	288	295	299

Table 10 presents some data on the citizenship held by respondents. Consistently with an ethnic conception of citizenship in which the rule of *jus sanguinis* prevails in defining the conditions for the acquisition of the Italian citizenship, most migrants in Milan still hold only the citizenship of their country of origin. Egyptians are the group with more migrants with the Italian citizenship (11.3%), whereas both Filipinos and Ecuadorians count with more than 95% of individuals still holding only a foreign citizenship.

Table 10 First citizenship held by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
Italy	3.3	11.3	2.3
Philippines	96.3	-	-
Egypt	-	88.0	-
Ecuador	-	-	97.3
Spain	-	0.3	-
Missing	0.3	0.3	0.3
N	300	300	300

Consistently with the low levels of Italian citizenship acquisition, table 11 shows that there are only a few people holding double citizenship and, consistently with figures in table 10 most people holding double citizenship have an Egyptian origin among whom the percentage of Italian citizenship is indeed the highest as previously shown.

Table 11 Second citizenship held by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
Philippines	0.3	-	-
Egypt	-	2.7	-
Ecuador	-	-	1.0
N	300	300	300

Such results are further reinforced by the data on the citizenship held at birth (tables 12 and 13). By comparing the previous figures with such data we have to conclude that most migrants still hold the citizenship they had at birth. The percentage of migrants holding the Italian citizenship at birth is slightly lower than the percentage of migrants holding the Italian citizenship at the time of the interview, hence this accounts for a few Italian citizenship acquisitions by migrants. However, it is clear that the rate of acquisition is very low. Table 13 also shows that no one except for one Filipino, held a double citizenship at birth.

Table 12 First citizenship hold at birth by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
Italy	1.0	2.0	-
Philippines	99.0	-	-
Egypt	-	97.7	-
Ecuador	-	-	100
Spain	-	0.3	-
Missing	-	-	-
N	300	300	300

Table 13 Second citizenship hold at birth by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
Philippines	0.3	-	-
Egypt	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	-	-
N	300	300	300

Table 14 shows that most respondents' mothers were born in their countries of origin. Only 3.3% of Egyptians were born from mothers born in Italy but for more that 99% of Filipinos and Ecuadorians their mothers' country of birth was respectively the Philippines and Ecuador.

Table 14 Mother's country of birth by ethnic group (percentages)

	Mothers' country of birth		
	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
Italy	0.3	3.3	-
Philippines	99.3	0.7	-
Egypt	-	95.7	0.3
Ecuador	-	-	99.7
Spain	-	-	-
Don't know	-	0.3	-
Missing	0.3	-	-
N	300	300	300

With respect to the current legal situation of migrants in Milan, table 15 shows that most migrants of the 3 studied groups have a short-term permit to stay which is valid for 5 or less years. The percentages are the highest among Filipinos and Ecuadorians, since more than half of their members have a short-term permit to stay. Among Filipinos, 28% have a long-term permit to stay, and only a very low percentage never had a permit. Compared to Egyptians and Ecuadorians, with more than 20% of these respondents never having had a permit, Filipinos thus show the most stable and regular positions. With respect to Ecuadorians, Egyptians also show high rates of members holding a long-term permit to stay, since 27.6 % of Egyptians hold it compared to only 11.9 % among Ecuadorians.

Table 15 Migrants' legal situation by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
short-term permit of 5 or less years	54.6	28.6	54.1
long-term permit of more than 5 years	27.9	27.6	11.9
Renovating the expired permit	6.1	4.1	10.5
Never had any permit.	7.7	27.9	20.1
Other	3.4	10.3	2.7
Refusal	0.3	1.4	0.7
N	297	290	300

Table 16 shows the distribution by religion. Filipinos and Ecuadorians are overwhelmingly (around 87%) Catholic. Differently, 84.7% of Egyptians are Muslim, and 12% are Coptos. Compared to autochthonous Italians, all three migrant groups show much lower rates of atheist/agnostic members.

Table 16 Religion by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
	%	%	%	%
Protestant	3.7	0.7	0.7	1.0
Roman Catholic	87.2	1.0	87.3	84.0
Eastern Orthodox	0.7	1.0	1.0	-
Jewish	-	-	-	-
Islam	0.3	84.7	0.7	-
Hinduism	-	-	-	0.3
Buddist	-	-	-	-
atheist/agnostic	1.0	0.7	3.7	13.3
Coptos	-	12	-	-
Other	6.7	-	5.0	1.0
Don't Know	-	-	0.7	
Refusal	0.3	-	1.0	0.3
N	297	290	300	300

Table 17 further shows that Filipinos and Egyptians tend to attend religious services more often than Ecuadorians as well as than autochthonous Italians. Results show that most Filipinos attend the religious services at least once a week. In turn, Egyptians seem to attend the religious places more often since around 15% of Egyptians attend places of

worship several times a week and 24.2% at least once a week. Ecuadorians have lower levels of attendance since 34.6 % of Ecuadorians attend church once a month.

Table 17 Religion attendance by ethnic group (percentages)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
every day	1.0	17.8	-	2.7
several times a week	6.1	14.4	3.8	4.0
once a week	54.9	24.2	19.9	28.7
once a month	14.2	13.4	34.6	12.3
several times a year	19.3	14.1	22.7	15.3
once a year	-	7.4	10.1	7.0
never	0.7	5.4	7.3	16.0
Don't	1.7	1.3	0.7	-
refuses to answer	2.0	2.0	0.7	0.7
N.A.	-	-	-	13.3
N	295	298	286	300

Table 18 shows that for all of the 3 groups the mother language is almost invariably that of their country of origin. Tagalog is the language spoken by most Filipinos (74.3%), but 17.3% consider English their main language. Egyptians mostly speak Arab, and Ecuadorians' mother language is Spanish. Only 7.3 % of Filipinos, 4% of Egyptians, and, consistently with their later arrival, 0.3 of Ecuadorians declared Italian to be their main language. Given the high rates of migrants who have parents that were not born in Italy, data on Filipinos and Egyptians seem to account for a positive integration of second generations with respect to language. Such interpretation is also supported by the next figures.

Table 18 Migrants' main language by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
Italian	7.3	4.0	0.33
English	17.3	0.3	-
Arab	-	95.7	0.3
Spanish	0.3	-	98.7
Tagalog	74.3	-	0.3
Ilocano	0.3	-	-
N	300	300	300

With respect to migrants' knowledge of Italian, table 19 in fact shows that most migrants speak reasonably Italian, but only a few speak a fluent Italian. Among migrants speaking at least a fluent Italian the highest percentages are found among Egyptians with 20% speaking a fluent or better Italian. Filipinos and Ecuadorians both declared that only around 13% speak a fluent or better Italian.

Table 19 Command of Italian by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
Do not speak Italian	3.0	3.0	1.0
Speak a little Italian	27.0	30.7	34.4
Speak reasonably Italian	56.7	44.0	51.8

Speak fluently Italian	7.7	12.3	10.7
Speak Italian like their main language	2.7	4.7	2.0
Italian is their first language	3.0	5.3	-
Refuses to answer	-	-	-
Missing	0.3	-	0.3
N	300	300	300

Table 20 presents results on the levels of education held by migrants, and the three groups show relatively different distributions. Whereas at least 80% of Filipinos and Egyptians have at least an upper secondary education – which is even higher than levels of education held by autochthonous Italians – only around 60% of Ecuadorians have at least an upper secondary education.

Table 20 Highest level of education achieved by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
	%	%	%	%
Not completed primary education	0.3	1.0	0.7	0.3
Primary education or first stage of basic education	1.0	1.0	8.0	4.0
Lower level secondary education or second stage of basic education	17.3	11.1	29.1	23.3
Upper secondary education	41.3	56.9	43.5	48.7
Post secondary, non-tertiary education	19.3	9.8	8.0	2.3
First stage of tertiary education	20.0	19.2	8.7	19.7
Second stage of tertiary education	0.3	0.3	0.3	1.0
PhD		0.3	0.7	
Other			1.0	0.3
Don't know				0.3
Refuses to answer	0.3	0.3		
Missing				
N	300	300	299	300

Table 21 shows the employment situation of respondents in the 7 days preceding the interview. High employment rates among Filipinos are consistent with the legal situation of most Filipinos who either have a short- or a long-term permit to stay. This is very different from Ecuadorians who instead show high rates of illegal migrants and high rates of unemployment. An interesting result is also provided by figures on Egyptians who have the highest rate of individuals not employed and doing housework. As for the other three groups, all respondents in that category are women, but their proportion is much higher for the Egyptians. This is explained by 'traditional' patterns of migration for this group in which female immigrants, when they do not remain in their countries of origin, follow their male working partners and tend to take care of children and to be housewives.

Table 21 Migrants' situation in the last 7 days by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
	%	%	%	%
in paid work (or away temporarily)	82.0	66.0	71.3	49.7
in education, (not paid for by employer)	9.0	5.4	7.7	7.3

unemployed and actively looking for a job	3.7	13.8	14.0	1.7
unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job	4.3	2.7	2.3	-
permanently sick or disabled	-	-	-	0.7
retired	-	-	-	33.7
in community or compulsory military service	-	-	-	-
doing housework (housewife), looking after children or other persons	0.7	11.1	2.7	7.0
(other)	-	-	0.3	-
Don't know	-	0.7		-
Refuses to answer	0.3	0.3	1.7	-
N	300	297	299	300

Table 22 shows the ethnic composition of migrants' households. Migrants' households are mainly composed of members from their same ethnic group, and this holds true across all three groups. Ecuadorians show the highest levels of mixed households or of different household composition and this is partly explained by their less stable legal and economic situation which leads them to share accommodation with migrants of other origins.

Table 22 Migrants' household ethnic origin by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
	%	%	%
similar to mine	89.4	89.4	76.3
Mixed	6.5	8.4	15.8
different to mine	3.4	1.5	6.9
Refusal	0.7	0.7	1.0
N	292	274	291

2. Political attitudes

In this section we present the descriptive statistics regarding 4 indicators of political attitudes: political interest, discussion of politics, level of information about politics, and newspaper readership. All indicators reflect the political attitudes respondents have towards the politics of Milan, Italy, as well as their country of origin for migrants.

With respect to political interest, presented in table 23, all groups tend to declare to be more interested in the politics of their countries of origin than in local or national politics. Moreover, across all groups, levels of political interest toward Milan and Italian issues are always lower than levels of interest declared by autochthonous Italians. Among migrants, political interest towards the city of Milan seems to be lower than political interests towards Italian politics.

Filipinos are the ones who show the highest levels of interest towards their homeland politics, and around 55% declare to be fairly or very interested, whereas Egyptians seem to be the least interested of all 3 groups and only around 45% seem to be interested in their homeland politics. On their side, Ecuadorians is the group which is the least interested both in local and national Italian politics, but their levels of interest in homeland politics is nonetheless higher than that of Egyptians.

Table 23 Political interest in politics by ethnic group (percentages)

	Filipinos			Egyptians			Ecuadorians			autochthonous Italians	
	Milan politics	Italian politics	Filipino politics	Milan politics	Italian politics	Egypt politics	Milan politics	Italian politics	Ecuador politics	Milan politics	Italian politics
Very interested	5.3	6.7	15.4	4.3	8.0	12.4	3.7	5.0	11.3	17.0	22.0
Fairly interested	26.8	30.8	38.8	19.4	33.4	33.1	15.3	21.0	40.7	51.3	43.3
Not very interested	40.1	37.5	29.8	44.1	33.1	31.8	56.7	51.0	34.0	20.3	22.0
Not at all interested	25.1	22.7	14.4	27.1	21.1	19.1	22.0	21.3	12.7	11.3	12.7
DK	1.3	1.3	0.3	4.7	4.0	3.3	2.0	1.0	1.3	-	-
Refusal	1.3	1.0	1.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	-	-
N	299	299	299	299	299	299	300	300	300	300	100

Table 24 presents results on discussion of politics. Across the 3 groups, regardless of the territorial level to which the talk is addressed, most migrants tend to rarely talk about politics. This holds true especially with regard to politics regarding Milan or Italy for which levels of discussion are by far lower than autochthonous Italians' levels. All 3 migrant groups tend to talk more regularly or almost every day about their homeland politics than about Milan or Italian politics. The percentages of migrants regularly talking or talking almost every day about homeland politics are the highest among Ecuadorians.

Table 24 Talk about politics by ethnic group (percentages)

	Philippines			Egyptians			Ecuadorians			autochthonous Italians	
	Milan politics	Italian politics	Filipino politics	Milan politics	Italian politics	Egypt politics	Milan politics	Italian politics	Ecuador politics	Milan politics	Italian politics
Almost every day	3.0	2.7	5.4	3.0	5.7	5.3	5.0	5.3	7.0	25.7	35.0
Regularly	16.2	18.2	29.3	17.3	25.7	28.1	17.3	19.7	35.0	35.3	33.0
Rarely	59.3	58.6	55.9	52.0	46.5	43.5	45.7	50.0	46.7	30.0	22.7
Never	20.5	19.5	8.4	26.3	21.1	21.7	31.0	24.0	11.0	9.0	9.3
DK	0.3	0.3	-	1.0	0.7	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.3		
Refusal	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	-		

N	297	297	297	300	299	299	300	300	300	300	300
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Table 25 also shows that migrants' level of information tends to be rather low with respect to levels shown by the Italian control group. Across the 3 groups, most migrants tend to be only a bit informed about Milanese or Italian politics, whereas most autochthonous Italians tend to declare to be reasonably informed. Migrants tend to be more informed about the politics of their homeland countries and among the 3 groups, Filipinos are the best informed.

Table 25 Level of information about politics by ethnic group (percentages)

	Philippines			Egyptians			Ecuadorians			autochthonous Italians	
	Milan politics	Italian politics	Filipino politics	Milan politics	Italian politics	Egypt politics	Milan politics	Italian politics	Ecuador politics	Milan politics	Italian politics
Very well informed	2.3	3.7	8.7	3.7	4.3	7.4	4.3	4.0	7.4	9.7	13.3
Reasonably informed	29.4	33.2	42.6	22.3	30.0	38.5	23.4	22.7	35.4	58.7	57.7
Only a bit informed	53.2	48.7	38.3	50.7	49.0	38.8	64.2	66.2	46.5	30.7	27.7
Not at all informed	14.0	13.4	9.4	21.7	14.3	13.7	7.0	6.0	9.0	1.0	1.3
DK	0.3	0.3	-	1.3	2.0	1.3	0.7	0.7	1.7	-	-
Refusal	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	-	-
N	299	298	298	300	300	299	299	299	299	300	300

Table 26 shows that migrants tend to read news most often about the politics of their countries of origin, and that they tend to show higher proportions rarely reading newspapers rather than regularly reading them. Asymmetries between autochthonous Italians and migrants are again quite strong since, whereas most migrants declare to rarely read newspapers, autochthonous Italians declared to read newspapers almost every day.

Table 26 Reading of newspapers by ethnic group (percentages)

	Philippines			Egyptians			Ecuadorians			autochthonous Italians	
	Milan politics	Italian politics	Filipino politics	Milan politics	Italian politics	Egypt politics	Milan politics	Italian politics	Ecuador politics	Milan politics	Italian politics
Almost every day	14.7	13.8	8.4	9.0	10.7	7.3	25.4	24.1	5.0	54.7	57.7
Regularly	23.4	25.8	26.2	18.7	16.7	27.7	22.7	20.7	31.1	27.3	22.7
Rarely	45.1	44.3	51.3	41.3	44.7	39.7	43.5	46.1	48.5	14.3	15.0
Never	16.7	16.1	14.1	29.3	26.6	24.0	7.7	8.0	14.7	3.7	4.7
DK	-	-	-	1.3	1.0	1.0	0.3	0.7	0.7		
Refusal	-	-	-	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	-		
N	299	298	298	300	300	300	299	299	299	300	300

3. Political trust

With respect to levels of political trust migrants have towards different Italian institutions, table 27 shows that, in average, Filipinos tend to have higher levels of trust than Egyptians and Ecuadorians. Most often, except for trusting the police, Filipinos' trust is even higher than that of autochthonous Italians. Egyptians are the ones who show the most neutral positions. Ecuadorians instead show the lowest rates in political trust and, except for the Catholic church and schools and teachers, they tend to be closer to the position reflecting no trust at all in Italian institutions.

Table 27 Migrants' highest trust by ethnic group (0 =I do not trust at all, 10 =I totally trust)

	Filipinos		Egyptians		Ecuadorians		autochthonous Italians	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Civil servants and employees in the Milan civil service	6.34	1.66	5.62	2.54	3.83	2.12	5.23	2.23
Milan government	6.17	1.56	5.32	2.53	3.72	2.00	4.94	2.20
Schools and teachers in Milan	6.79	1.72	7.45	2.08	5.70	2.37	6.21	2.00
The city assembly	5.77	1.53	5.26	2.30	3.71	2.04	5.39	2.00
The police	6.47	2.02	5.57	2.92	5.27	2.72	7.12	2.00
Catholic church	8.35	1.96	6.01	3.00	6.36	2.73	6.20	2.73
Italian government	6.61	1.58	5.80	2.47	4.41	2.05	4.62	2.63
The legal system	6.29	1.61	6.55	2.61	4.60	2.28	5.33	2.40
Italian Parliament	6.05	1.54	5.12	2.42	3.88	2.11	4.39	2.34
The Institutions of the European Union	6.4	1.70	6.14	2.30	4.81	2.41	5.74	2.08

4. Political participation

Table 28 on political engagement shows that levels of migrants' political participation are very low compared to autochthonous Italians' levels of political action. For each of the specific items we looked at, autochthonous Italians show higher levels of political activism than migrants. Taking part in public demonstration is the activity which is the most performed by Egyptians. Egyptians also tend to have performed strikes more often than others. Signing a petition is the most performed action among Filipinos who also have high levels of displaying a badge and taking part in public demonstrations. Ecuadorians signed a petition and took part in public demonstrations more often than did other activities.

Table 28 Migrants' political participation: percentage of individuals having done political actions by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
Contacted a politician	2.0	0.3	2.3	9.3
Contacted a government or local government official	1.7	1.7	2.7	14.7
Worked in a political party	1.0	0.7	0.3	3.0
Worked in a political action group (for. Ex. Attac)	1.0	-	1.0	4.7
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	4.0	1.7	0.7	9.3
Signed a petition	4.3	1.7	3.0	29.0
Taken part in a public demonstration	4.0	4.0	3.0	17.3
Boycotted certain products	3.0	2.0	1.0	26.7
Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons	1.3	1.0	0.3	9.3
Donated money to a political 145uspicious145n or group	1.3	0.7	1.3	8.0
Taken part in a strike	1.3	2.7	2.0	17.0
Contacted the media	1.7	1.7	1.7	11.7
Contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons	3.3	2.0	2.7	4.0
N	300	300	300	300

With respect to voting, more than 95% of Filipinos and Ecuadorians and more than 85% of Egyptians were not eligible to vote in the previous national elections. This result is consistent with an ethnic conception of citizenship which submits the acquisition of the Italian citizenship to the rule of *jus sanguinis* due to which most migrants still hold a foreign citizenship which does not allow them to vote, neither at the national nor at the local level. As a consequence, we find similar percentages of migrants being ineligible to vote in local elections (table 30). In fact, differently from several countries in Europe, Italy does not allow foreign migrants who have been residing longer than 5 years to vote in the administrative elections. For the few eligible to vote, we see higher rates of turnout among Filipinos and Egyptians than among Ecuadorians.

Table 29 Turnout in the last national elections (percentages)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
Yes	2.0	8.0	1.0	90.0
no, but eligible to vote	1.7	4.7	2.7	6.3
no, not eligible	96.0	86.3	96.0	3.7
Can't remember	-	0.3	-	-
Refusal	0.3	0.7	0.3	-
N	298	300	300	300

Table 30 Turnout in the last local elections (percentages)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
Yes	1.7	6.0	0.7	87.3
no, but eligible to vote	3.4	5.7	3.4	8.3
no, not eligible	95.0	87.3	95.2	3.3
Can't remember	-	-	0.3	0.7
Refusal	-	1.0	0.3	0.3
N	297	300	300	300

Table 31 shows migrants' voting rates in their countries of origin. Percentages tend to be higher among Ecuadorians probably due to their most recent arrival. Nearly 40% of Ecuadorians voted in the last elections in Ecuador. The lowest percentage of voting in the last homeland country elections regards Egyptians among whom not even 10% of individuals did vote and of which 75.3% did not vote although being eligible to do so. This is accounted for by the fact that Egypt does not allow external voting, so Egyptians have to travel to their country to cast a ballot.

Table 31 Migrants' voting in the last elections in the country of origin (percentages)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
Yes	21.6	9.3	39.3
no, but eligible to vote	29.4	75.3	51.7
no, not eligible	46.9	10.0	7.3
Can't remember	-	3.0	-
Refusal	2.0	2.3	1.7
N	298	300	300

Although the small numbers render these distributions a bit meaningless, among the few migrants who did vote, the distribution of the party voted in the last national and local elections (table 32 and 33) shows that left and right parties tend to have a balanced share at least if we look at major parties. For example, Egyptians voted either *Democratici di*

Sinistra (a center-left party) or *Forza Italia* (a center-right party) both at national elections (table 32) and at local elections as well (table 33).

Table 32 Party voted by migrants in the last national elections (absolute values)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
	a.v.	a.v.	a.v.	%
Margherita		1	1	3.69
Democratici di Sinistra	1	6		15.44
FI – Forza Italia		7		13.76
CCD- Centro Cristiano Democratico		2		2.01
Lega Nord		1		1.01
RC Rifondazione Comunista	1	1		5.70
AN –Alleanza Nazionale		1		8.05
Italia dei valori				2.35
Comunisti italiani				1.34
Rosa nel pugno/Radicali	1			2.01
Others		1		3.7
Can not remember		1		7.4
Refusal	2	4	2	
not applicable				10.07
N	5	24	3	298

Table 33 Party voted by migrants in the last local elections (absolute values)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
Margherita		1	
Democratici di Sinistra	1	6	
FI – Forza Italia		4	
CCD- Centro Cristiano Democratico			
Lega Nord			
RC Rifondazione Comunista			
AN –Alleanza Nazionale		1	
Italia dei valori			
Comunisti italiani			
Rosa nel pugno/Radicali			1
Ulivo		2	
Can not remember		1	
Refusal	3	3	1
not applicable			
N	4	18	2

As Table 34 shows, migrants' intention to vote would be oriented to turn out since more than 60% of Ecuadorians, and around 70% of Filipinos and Egyptians say they would indeed vote if they had the right.

Table 34 Vote intention of migrants by ethnic group (percentages)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
Yes	70.5	67.2	60.9
No	19.1	21.3	27.1
Don't know	9.4	10.8	11.7
Refusal	1.0	0.7	0.3
N	298	296	300

Among those who declare the party they would vote for, if we take a look at the 2 parties which obtained the highest numbers of votes (DS and FI) Filipinos show the most center-right orientations, as 36% would vote Forza Italia and only 8% DS or

Margherita (left and center parties). Egyptians show more balanced proportions even though they still tend to be more inclined to vote for FI than for the leftist party DS or center party Margherita (table 35). Ecuadorians are more likely to vote center-right but differences are small. It is also important to remark that for all three groups at least 40% don't really know what party they would vote for.

Table 35 Party vote intention of migrants by ethnic group (percentages)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
Margherita	2.6	5.0	5.0
Democratici di Sinistra	5.7	13.6	7.7
FI – Forza Italia	35.7	23.6	11.5
CCD- Centro Cristiano Democratico	0.4		
Lega Nord			1.1
RC Rifondazione Comunista	2.3	2.5	2.3
AN –Alleanza Nazionale	0.4	0.7	0.4
Italia dei valori			0.4
Comunisti italiani			
Rosa nel pugno/Radicali			
Ulivo			
CDU	1.5	1.4	
Other			0.4
DK	39.0	44.6	60.0
Refusal	12.5	8.6	11.1
not applicable			
N	264	280	260

5. Organizational involvement

Migrants' organizational involvement tends to be much lower than autochthonous Italians' organizational involvement (table 36). It also highly differs among migrant groups. Whereas Filipinos' rate of involvement in any organization is 45.3%, it is only 16.3% among Egyptians and 31% among Ecuadorians. Rates of participation in organizational activities tend to be slightly higher than memberships across the 3 migrant groups. If we look at types of organizations migrants are involved into, engagement highly differs across migrant groups. The organizational involvement of migrants is much more homogeneous than among autochthonous Italians, and tends to be concentrated in a few types of organizations. Filipinos are mostly involved in either religious organizations or in trade unions, whereas Egyptians are mostly engaged in sport clubs or trade unions. Egyptians' high rates of trade unionism are consistent with Egyptians' high rates of strike participation, as previously results emphasized. Ecuadorians are mainly involved either in sport clubs or religious organizations.

Table 36 Migrants' organizational involvement by ethnic group

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians	autochthonous Italians
	%	%	%	%
Any involvement	45.3	16.3	31.0	69.7
Any current membership	22.0	7.3	16.7	38.7
Any participation	26.7	11.3	21.7	43.3
Average number orgs involved	1.1	0.4	0.8	2.4

Average number orgs current activity	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.7
Any involvement in migrant/ethnic org	2.0	0.3	2.7	1.7
Any involvement in own ethnic group org	8.0	1.3	3.7	-
Involvement in:				
Sport club	6.3	6.3	12.7	25.3
Cultural organisation	4.3	2.7	6.0	24.3
Political party	1.0	1.0	0.3	6.0
Trade union	15.3	5.7	6.0	20.7
Professional organisation	0.3	1.3	1.3	8.7
Human rights organisation	1.7	0.7	1.3	24.3
Environmental organizations	1.0	0.0	0.0	10.7
Peace organisation	1.3	0.3	1.3	5.0
Religious organisation	19.3	2.7	7.7	9.3
Anti racism organisation	0.3	0.3	0.7	1.7
Educational organisation	2.7	0.0	2.3	10.3
Youth organisation	4.3	1.3	1.0	9.7
Organisation for retired	0	0	0	4.3
Women organisation	0.7	0.3	0.7	2.0
Neighbour organisation	0.7	0.3	0.3	5.0

6. Perception of the political opportunity structure

Descriptive results in table 37 show that migrants perceive the political opportunity structure to be rather close for themselves. Migrants' perceptions are commonly more negative than the perceptions of autochthonous Italians. For example, with respect to difficulties to obtain a legal residence or work permit, average scores of the 3 migrant groups reflect a much more pessimist view than those of autochthonous Italians.

There are, nonetheless, different perceptions of the institutional opportunities among the studied groups. Generally, Filipinos tend to perceive the political opportunity structure slightly more open when compared to what Egyptians, but especially Ecuadorians, perceive. For example, table 37 shows that although all three groups show high rates of agreement with regard to the existence of difficulties to obtain a legal residence or work permit, Ecuadorians, who have the highest rates of illegal migrants, have the highest average score agreeing with such statement, whereas Filipinos, who are largely all legal residents, have the lowest score. Such differences also emerge with respect to the item regarding 'Getting Italian nationality is very easy' for which Ecuadorians tend to totally disagree, whereas Filipinos and Egyptians have higher average scores.

Table 37 Perception of the political opportunity structure by ethnic group (0 =totally disagree to 10 =I agree)

	Filipinos		Egyptians		Ecuadorians		autochthonous Italians	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
People who want to come to Italy from abroad face too many difficulties to obtain a legal residence or work permit	8.34	2.32	8.86	2.03	9.47	1.49	6.23	2.76
Getting Italian nationality is very easy	2.38	2.22	2.39	2.84	0.95	2.10	4.39	2.67

Foreigners living in Italy can easily bring their families with them once they have settled down	3.95	2.78	3.66	2.87	3.77	2.85	5.52	2.62
Getting a job in Italy is very difficult for immigrants	6.93	2.42	7.02	2.64	6.96	2.53	5.28	2.78
Immigrants/ethnic minorities have great difficulties in Italy to get access to public health	4.47	2.46	4.13	3.30	3.63	3.56	4.45	2.83
The cultural and religious traditions of immigrants/ethnic populations are not respected in Italy	4.3	2.95	4.41	2.95	3.18	3.74	3.62	2.83
The local government does a lot to improve the way in which immigrant/ethnic residents live in Milan	4.22	2.34	4.20	2.91	3.05	2.56	5.25	2.65
It is fairly easy for immigrant/ethnic residents to make their voice heard to the local government	3.59	2.36	2.67	2.57	1.68	2.40	4.72	2.50
Italian society has a very negative attitude towards immigrant/ethnic members	4.30	2.73	4.59	2.79	6.04	2.82	4.91	2.77
N	300		300		300		300	

7. Self-identification & values

Table 38 shows responses about the attachment to several groups of people and places. Across the 3 migrant groups, attachment to one's own ethnic group and one's own country tend to score higher than attachment to other people or places. Such results tend to show that migrants' collective identities tend to focus on their own homelands and co-nationals rather than to local places or people. A high score is also declared regarding attachment to people from the same religion for which migrant groups tend to show stronger attachment than autochthonous Italians. On their side, autochthonous Italians show stronger attachment towards the neighborhood and people of Lombardia and Milan.

Table 38 Attachment to different places and people by ethnic group (0 = No attachment at all to 10 = Very strong attachment)

	Filipinos		Egyptians		Ecuadorians		autochthonous Italians	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
People with the same religion as you?	7.4	2.1	8.0	2.4	7.0	2.2	6.9	2.8
Italian people?	6.2	2.1	6.0	2.7	4.9	2.6		
The neighbourhood you live in?	5.7	2.3	5.4	2.7	3.8	2.7	7.4	2.2
People from Lombardia?	4.8	2.3	4.7	2.8	3.4	2.5	6.9	2.4
Milan?	7.3	1.9	6.5	2.5	5.4	2.5	7.8	2.3
One's own ethnic group of origin?	7.3	2.4	8.5	1.6	7.9	2.1		
One's own country of origin?	8.8	1.7	8.8	2.0	9.2	1.6		

Such results are further emphasized by data shown in table 39. Among the few migrants that feel the same attachment towards Italians than towards co-ethnics, when asked to choose whether they would primarily describe themselves as Italian or as someone from their own original country, most migrants tend to identify with their own ethnic group than as Italians.

Table 39 Migrants' self identification by ethnic group among migrants with the same attachment score for Italians and co-ethnics

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
Italian	20.0	18.9	10.0
Origin group	60.0	70.3	80.0
Other	6.7	5.4	
None		2.7	
Do not know	13.3	2.7	10.0
N	30	37	20

The data also provide evidence on ideological orientations on a left-right scale. Table 40 shows that migrants' positioning on a left-right axis tend to be rather neutral. In accordance with their stronger inclination to vote for center-right with respect to other migrant groups as previously observed, Filipinos tend to feel slightly closer to the right pole. Egyptians and Ecuadorians instead show more neutral positions given that their average scores are close to the middle point of the left-right scale.

Table 40 Migrants' average position and % no position on a left-right axis (0=left, 10=Right)

	Autochthonous Italians		Filipinos		Egyptians		Ecuadorians	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Right-left axis	4.9	3.1	5.7	1.9	5.2	3.0	4.9	2.2
% of no position (don't know or refusal)	10.3		33.1		33.8		31.3	
N	300		300		300		300	

8. Social trust

Table 41 shows results on social trust towards all people as well as towards people of one's own ethnic group for migrants. Migrants' social trust tends to be, on average, higher towards people of one's own ethnic group than towards people in general, except for Egyptians which show similar results independently of the people referred to. It is interesting to notice that only Ecuadorians are less trusting than Italians – who are not very trusting themselves – and Filipinos are clearly more trusting than the autochthonous group.

Table 41 Social trust (0=you need to be somewhat suspicious, 10=most people can be trusted)

	Autochthonous Italians		Filipinos		Egyptians		Ecuadorians	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
All people	4.6	2.8	5.7	1.9	4.5	2.8	3.8	2.1
One's own ethnic group members	-	-	6.3	2.0	4.6	2.9	4.3	2.3

9. Discrimination & attitudes towards ethnic groups

Table 42 shows levels of discrimination against the 3 observed migrant groups. Our results indicate that experiences or perceptions of discrimination hugely vary across the

three ethnic groups. Whereas only 20.7% of Filipinos declare they were discriminated against, the proportions are double that for Egyptians and Ecuadorians.

Table 42 Discrimination in the last 12 months by ethnic group (percentages)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
Yes	20.7	41.6	38.3
No	78.6	55.7	60.3
Do not know	0.7	2.3	1.3
Refusal	-	0.3	-
N	295	298	300

Most discriminatory actions seem to take place on public transportation for Filipinos and Egyptians, and when looking for a job or at work among Ecuadorians (table 43). Filipinos also tend to feel discriminated in shops and at work whereas 50% of Egyptians who felt discriminated against declared that neighbours did discriminate against them. The place which seems the least discriminating is church and this holds true across the 3 groups.

Table 43 Place of discrimination by ethnic group (percentages)

	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
A. At school/university	14.7	5.4	21.3
B. At work	27.1	48.2	66.1
C. In the health care system	8.3	26.6	40.0
D. By the immigration office	10.0	25.2	41.7
E. By the police	10.2	37.3	43.1
F. At Church	-	0.9	10.4
G. When looking for a job	19.7	42.9	71.0
H. In restaurants, bars, pubs, or discos	18.3	19.2	21.3
I. On the street	20.3	46.5	45.9
J. By neighbours	20.0	50.0	36.4
K. In shops	28.3	24.3	25.2
L. On public transportation	36.7	55.3	52.2
N	61	114	109

These perceptions can also be compared to our results regarding autochthonous Italians' acceptance of members of the three different ethnic groups. Table 44 confirms that there are large differences regarding the three groups. Results show that percentages of autochthonous Italians not being happy with Egyptians are the highest, while for Filipinos are the lowest. Although Egyptians tend to show lower scores in declaring to have felt discriminated against as compared to Ecuadorians, autochthonous Italians' acceptance seems to be higher for Ecuadorians than for Egyptians. As a consequence, Egyptians result to be the group which is accepted the least. Autochthonous Italians' levels of acceptance of Filipinos are instead the highest. Except for marriage, more than 90% of autochthonous Italians would accept Filipinos as neighbours, as job colleagues, as city residents or as Italian citizens.

Table 44 Autochthonous Italians' acceptance of migrants by ethnic group (percentages)

AS KIN BY MARRIAGE	Filipinos	Egyptians	Ecuadorians
Not happy	14.7	34.3	23.0
Accept	77.7	56.0	65.7
Do not know	7.3	8.7	10.7
Refusal	0.3	1.0	0.7
NEIGHBOURS			
Not happy	4.3	18.0	13.0

Accept	93.0	78.3	81.7
Do not know	2.3	3.0	4.7
Refusal	0.3	0.7	0.7
AS JOB COLLEAGUES			
Not happy	2.3	13.0	10.3
Accept	94.0	81.3	83.7
Do not know	3.0	4.3	5.3
Refusal	0.3	1.3	0.7
AS CITY RESIDENTS			
Not happy	4.0	13.3	10.7
Accept	94.3	84.0	84.7
Do not know	1.3	2.0	4.0
Refusal	0.3	0.7	0.7
AS ITALIAN CITIZENS			
Not happy	6.0	16.0	12.3
Accept	91.7	81.0	83.3
Do not know	1.7	2.3	3.7
Refusal	0.7	0.7	0.7
N	300	300	300

Part II: Explanatory analyses

In this section we present explanatory analyses for migrants' political interest, migrants' political trust, migrants' political participation and migrants' vote intention. For each independent variable we present 3 regression models, one including SES variables, then social capital variables, and finally discrimination variables.

Political interest is a dichotomous variable in which we look at the probability of being very or fairly interested in Milan or Italian politics as well as in homeland politics. To model the probability of being very or fairly interested we use logistic regressions. Political trust is a continuous variable and to model the probability of trusting Italian institutions we use a linear regression model. With respect to migrants' political participation, we look at the probability of performing at least one political activity out of 13 mentioned items through a logistic regression model. Finally we look at the probability of voting thorough logistic regression models.

Given that the variable Muslim is highly correlated with being of Egyptian origin, (0.89), we only introduce the variable related to the Egyptian origin.

1. Explaining migrants' political interest in Milan or Italian politics

Table 45 Logistic regression. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Gender	0.399 (2.42)*	0.355 (2.12)*	0.355 (2.12)*
Age	-0.077 (1.70)	-0.077 (1.69)	-0.077 (1.69)
Age square	-0.001 (1.15)	-0.001 (1.15)	-0.001 (1.15)
Education	0.249 (3.36)**	0.213 (2.79)**	0.213 (2.79)**
Language command	1.095 (5.12)**	1.026 (4.64)**	1.026 (4.64)**
2nd generat.	1.961 (3.51)**	1.871 (3.34)**	1.871 (3.34)**
Egyptian	0.027 (0.14)	0.251 (1.23)	
Ecuadorian	-0.389 (1.99)*	-0.320 (1.60)	-0.448 (2.55)*
Membership		0.560 (2.35)*	0.560 (2.35)*
Participation		0.182 (0.99)	0.182 (0.99)
Ethnic involv.		0.365 (1.39)	0.365 (1.39)
Discrimination			0.012 (1.23)
Constant	150.382 (1.68)	151.149 (1.66)	150.958 (1.66)
Number of obs	879	879	879

	LR chi2(8)= 108.09	LRchi2(11)= 134.25	LR chi2(11)=134.25
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.0938	0.1165	0.1165
Log likelihood	-522.32486	-509.24628	-509.24628

Migrants' political interest in Milan or Italian politics seems to be significantly affected by migrants' gender characteristics since being a migrant male tends to increase the probability of being interested in Milanese or Italian politics with respect to women migrants. Both the levels of education and the command of Italian language is associated with higher probabilities of being interested in local and national politics. Moreover, second generation migrants tend to be more interested in local and national politics than first generation migrants. Membership in organizations also increases the probability that migrants will be interested in local and national political issues. Local and national political interest is only partly affected by the ethnic group of origin. In particular, Ecuadorians seem to have lower probabilities with respect to Filipinos of being interested in political issues regarding Milan or Italy.

2. Explaining migrants' political interest in homeland issues

Table 46 Logistic regression. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Gender	0.484	0.475	0.475
	(3.17)**	(3.10)**	(3.10)**
Age	-0.034	-0.033	-0.033
	(0.85)	(0.82)	(0.82)
Age square	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.71)	(0.69)	(0.69)
Education	0.140	0.127	0.127
	(2.01)*	(1.79)	(1.79)
Language	0.038	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.18)	(0.01)	(0.01)
2nd generat.	-0.252	-0.311	-0.311
	(0.58)	(0.71)	(0.71)
Egyptian	-0.562	-0.493	
	(3.02)**	(2.60)**	
Ecuadorian	-0.070	-0.048	0.204
	(0.39)	(0.27)	(1.30)
Membership		0.271	0.271
		(1.28)	(1.28)
Participation		0.013	0.013
		(0.08)	(0.08)
Ethnic involv.		0.133	0.133
		(0.54)	(0.54)
discrimination			-0.023
			(2.60)**
Constant	67.314	65.228	65.604
	(0.84)	(0.81)	(0.82)
Number of obs	858	858	858
	LR chi2(8) = 21.94	LR chi2(11)=26.90	LR chi2(11)=26.90
Prob > chi2	0.0050	0.0048	0.0048
Pseudo R2	0.0185	0.0226	0.0226
Log likelihood	-583.07471	-580.59809	-580.59809

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Very differently from interests towards local and national issues, the variables related to the condition of being migrants, namely language command and second generations are not significant in the model analyzing political interests towards homeland issues (table 46). There are also differences among migrant groups since Egyptians have lower probabilities to be interested in homeland issues than Filipinos do. As in previous analyses, the most classical explanatory variables such as gender and education seem to affect the probability to be interested in homeland politics among the 3 observed migrant groups. Being male and holding a high degree of education tends to be associated with higher levels of political interest in homeland issues with respect to being female and holding a low degree of education. The higher the perceptions of discrimination, the lower the levels of interest in homeland issues.

3. Explaining migrants' political trust

Table 47 Linear regression. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Gender	-0.766 (0.56)	-0.772 (0.56)	-0.772 (0.56)
Age	-0.787 (1.95)	-0.791 (1.96)	-0.791 (1.96)
Age square	-0.008 (1.62)	-0.008 (1.62)	-0.008 (1.62)
Education	1.431 (2.29)*	1.423 (2.22)*	1.423 (2.22)*
Language	-1.599 (0.88)	-1.702 (0.93)	-1.702 (0.93)
2nd generat.	5.963 (1.73)	6.184 (1.78)	6.184 (1.78)
Egyptian	-4.104 (2.17)*	-4.348 (2.27)*	
Ecuadorian	-16.829 (10.81)**	-17.024 (10.86)**	-14.809 (9.71)**
Membership		-1.377 (0.83)	-1.377 (0.83)
Participation		0.968 (0.81)	0.968 (0.81)
Ethnic involv.		-1.559 (0.84)	-1.559 (0.84)
discrimination			-0.203 (2.27)*
Constant	1,615.999 (2.01)*	1,623.457 (2.02)*	1,626.770 (2.02)*
Number of obs	458	458	458

F (dfM, dfR)	20.96 (8, 449)	15.33 (11, 446)	
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	
Adjusted R2	0.26	0.26	

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Although the analysis only includes 457 migrants out of 900 namely because of a high number of migrants who did not know what to answer, table 47 confirms that previous descriptive analyses on levels of political trust among migrant groups are indeed significant. Both Egyptians and Ecuadorians tend to have significant lower probabilities to trust Italian institutions than Filipinos. Education is, again, a factor which seems to be significant in affecting political trust as well. Having a high level of education increases the probabilities to trust Italian institutions. Results also suggest that higher levels of discrimination tend to significantly decrease the probability of migrants' trusting Italian institutions.

4. Explaining migrants' political participation

Table 48 Logistic regression. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Gender	0.668	0.664	0.664
	(2.60)**	(2.49)*	(2.49)*
Age	0.087	0.096	0.096
	(1.29)	(1.40)	(1.40)
Age square	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(1.05)	(1.14)	(1.14)
Education	0.496	0.435	0.435
	(4.23)**	(3.51)**	(3.51)**
Language	1.606	1.511	1.511
	(6.12)**	(5.51)**	(5.51)**
2nd generat.	0.332	0.263	0.263
	(0.66)	(0.51)	(0.51)
Egyptian	-0.571	-0.310	
	(1.91)	(0.98)	
Ecuadorian	-0.028	0.070	0.227
	(0.09)	(0.22)	(0.82)
Membership		0.652	0.652
		(2.35)*	(2.35)*
Participation		0.254	0.254
		(1.23)	(1.23)
Ethnic involv.		0.161	0.161
		(0.50)	(0.50)
discrimination			-0.014
			(0.98)
Constant	-177.571	-195.532	-195.296
	(1.32)	(1.43)	(1.42)
Number of obs	871	871	871
	LR chi2(8)= 77.90	LR chi2(11)=106.58	LR chi2(11)=106.58

Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1307	0.1788	0.1788
Log likelihood	-259.06167	-244.72274	-244.72274

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Migrants' probability to have participated in at least one of 13 political activities in the 12 months before the interviews seems to be affected by gender, education, command of Italian and organizational membership. Male migrants have higher probabilities of performing at least one political action than female migrants. Migrants with higher educational levels tend to be associated with a higher probability of performing political activities. Migrants with a better command of Italian have higher probabilities to be able to have access to the political sphere through political action. The probability of having performed one political action in the last 12 months preceding the interview is also affected by organizational membership since migrants who have been engaged in organizations have higher probabilities to perform at least one political activity with respect to migrants who never have been involved in any association.

5. Explaining migrants' vote intention

Table 49 logistic regression. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3
Gender	0.767 (3.97)**	0.748 (3.84)**	0.748 (3.84)**
Age	-0.077 (1.58)	-0.081 (1.65)	-0.081 (1.65)
Age square	-0.001 (1.03)	-0.001 (1.16)	-0.001 (1.16)
Education	0.301 (3.36)**	0.271 (2.98)**	0.271 (2.98)**
Language	0.368 (1.35)	0.261 (0.94)	0.261 (0.94)
2nd generat.	1.716 (2.17)*	1.813 (2.24)*	1.813 (2.24)*
Egyptian	-0.453 (1.89)	-0.387 (1.59)	
Ecuadorian	-0.269 (1.23)	-0.239 (1.08)	-0.041 (0.21)
Membership		-0.334 (1.18)	-0.334 (1.18)
Participation		0.523 (1.99)*	0.523 (1.99)*
Ethnic involv.		0.419 (0.99)	0.419 (0.99)
discrimination			-0.018 (1.59)
Constant	152.220 (1.57)	159.789 (1.64)	160.084 (1.64)
Number of obs	773	773	773

	LRchi2(8)=52.78	LRchi2(11)=59.68	LRChi2(11)=59.68
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.0608	0.0687	0.0687
Log likelihood	-408.01804	-404.5685	-404.5685

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Migrants' vote intention seems to be affected by several characteristics. First of all, socio-demographic factors such as gender affect the probability of voting. Similar to the role of such characteristic in the previous models, male migrants have higher probabilities of intending to vote than female migrants. Second generations also have more probabilities to vote than first generation migrants. Higher educational levels tend to increase the probability to vote. Participation in organizations does also increase the probability to vote.

Conclusions

With respect to political attitudes, analyses reported here show that the three studied migrant groups in Milan seem to orient their political attitudes towards their homeland politics rather than to their country or city of residence. This holds true across migrant groups, independently of their peculiar characteristics. As to levels of migrants' political participation, they seem to be rather low in Milan. Most migrants in Italy are still foreigners and tend to have closed opportunities at the institutional levels with respect to political rights they are granted. As a consequence, this seems to affect not only the possibility to access voting rights but, as descriptive results show, also levels of other types of political participation like forms of lobbying or protest actions which tend to be lower than those shown by autochthonous Italians.

Such results seem to suggest that there are good reasons to believe that institutional opportunities play a relevant role in defining constraints for migrants' political integration both with respect to political attitudes and political behaviors. All indicators on political attitudes and behaviors tend to bring evidence of strong asymmetries emerging between migrants, independently of their countries of origin, and autochthonous Italians. This seems thus to suggest a link between an ethnic conception of citizenship granting more rights to autochthonous Italians than foreigners, and asymmetries at the political level. The one exception is political trust, as no significant differences seem instead to emerge among migrants and this may also be linked to the fact that Italian institutions define similar constraints to migrants from different ethnic groups, at least regarding citizenship acquisition. In this regard, Egyptians – who are for more than 80% of Muslim religion – are never significantly different in terms of their political attitudes and behaviors to other migrant groups, except for what concerns trust and interest in homeland issues. As a consequence, religious differences do not seem to affect the role that migrants may have in the Italian political sphere.

Results seem also to show that classical explanations emphasizing individuals' socio-demographic and socioeconomic characteristics seem to be always significant in affecting political attitudes and behaviors. Indeed education is significant across all models and gender, except for political trust, as well. Membership rather than

participation tends to be significantly associated with both political action and interest in Milan and Italian politics.

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CITY REPORT: ZURICH⁵⁸

Introduction.

The aim of this report is to give a first overview of the results of the individual level data on political integration conducted in the city of Zurich. We will first present the definition of migrant adopted in the sampling procedure. The report will then be divided into two parts: the first part will present descriptive analyses of the main variables of interest for the political integration of immigrants. We will first look at the socio-demographic characteristics of the three selected migrant groups. Then we will discuss their degree of political integration by looking at variables such as political interest, political participation and political trust. As we are following a social capital approach, where involvement in voluntary organizations is expected to favor political integration we will also consider the degree of organizational membership and participation of migrants. Finally, we will also look at the self-identification and values of migrants as well as to discriminatory attitudes of Swiss citizens.

The second part of the report will focus on explanatory factors of political integration of immigrants in Zurich. Besides traditional SES variables and social capital we will also look at the impact of the length of stay of immigrants in the host country (1st vs 2nd generation immigrants), their language proficiency, religion and self perception of discrimination.

The individual survey has been conducted in Zurich between 28th of November 2006 and 5th January 2007. The data consist of a random sample of three migrant groups: Italians, Kosovars, and Turks and a control group of Swiss citizens. The Zurich sample was generated from the list of addresses provided by the Cantonal Office of Population. Given that this list provides no information about ethnic origin or identification, formal nationalities had to be used as a sampling frame⁵⁹. It is therefore not possible from this list to retrieve immigrants that have been naturalized and hence have Swiss citizenship. We thus define as migrants any person who does not have Swiss citizenship (i.e. foreigners). This is, by the way, the official definition adopted in the Swiss context. This approach contrasts, for example, from the one adopted in other countries, which consider as migrant any person who is born abroad or who has at least one parent born abroad. However, given the fact that access to citizenship is very limited in Switzerland and therefore most immigrants are foreigners, our approach allows us to grasp the bulk of migrants living in Zurich.

The interviews were conducted by telephone (CATI system) using a standardized, bilingual questionnaire for each migrant group. This was done to minimize potential biases due to different linguistic skills of respondents. Phone numbers were retrieved on the phone book starting from the name and address of the people in the sample. The average duration of each interview was 35 minutes. In this way, 300 Italians, 300 Turks, 302 Kosovars, and 301 Swiss were interviewed. The three groups of migrants were selected according to their numeric importance in the local context, but also so as to have variation in terms of ethnic and religious background. In 2005, these three groups

⁵⁸ This report has been produced by Miruna Morariu & Nina Eggert, members of the Swiss LOCALMULTIDEM team, under the supervision of Marco Giugni, the team coordinator.

⁵⁹ Kosovars were selected from the list of citizens from Serbia-Montenegro. Kosovars were identified by their names.

represented respectively, 12.8%, 19.4% and 4.5% of the foreign population in the city of Zurich.⁶⁰

Part I. Descriptive analysis:

2. Socio-demographic characteristics

In this section we will briefly present the socio-demographic characteristics of our sample.

Table 1 shows the gender distribution by ethnic group. The figures show that the three ethnic groups show a higher share of men than the Swiss and that the group of Kosovars is mainly composed by men.

Table 1: Gender distribution by ethnic group (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Male	66.0	74.8.0	58.7	47.5	61.8
Female	34.0	25.2	41.3	52.5	38.2
N	300	302	300	301	1203
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Looking at the age distribution, table 2 shows that Turks are generally younger than Italians and Kosovars, the oldest population being the Italian one.

Table 2 shows the age structure of our sample. We find here important differences between Swiss and immigrants but also between the three ethnic groups. The Italian sample is much older than the Turks and the Kosovars, 40% of Italians in our sample are older than 60. The Kosovar and the Turkish population are much younger, more than half of them are under 45. We can note that most of the Turks and Kosovars are aged between 30 and 44.

Table 2: Age intervals by ethnic group (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
16-22	1.7	7.6	14.0	7.0	7.6
23-29	1.7	15.3	8.7	12.0	9.4
30 - 44	24.3	42.2	42.0	31.9	35.1
45-59	32.3	27.9	28.0	21.6	27.5
60 and more	40.0	7.0	7.3	27.6	20.5
N	300	301	300	301	1202
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 3 indicates the mean age of the three ethnic groups and confirms that Italians in our sample are older than Turks and Kosovars. The mean for Italians is over 50 years, whereas for Turks and Kosovars it is around 40 years.

⁶⁰ The figure for Kosovars refer in fact to former Yougoslavians, as we have no valid estimation about the size and composition of the Kosovar population and the city of Zurich still registers Kosovars as former Yugoslavians or Serbia Montenegro.

Tableau 3: Mean age by group (mean)

	Mean	N	Std. dev.
Italians	54.77	300	14.58
Kosovars	40.14	301	11.99
Turks	38.98	300	12.85
Total	44.62	901	15.00

The next table shows the place of birth of the different ethnic groups. Most of the immigrants in our sample were born in their countries of origin. Indeed, over 90% of the Kosovars in the sample were born in Kosovo. In the Turkish group 12% were born in Switzerland. Italians are those showing the highest share of born in Switzerland as more than 20% of them were born in the receiving country.

Table 4: Place of birth (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Switzerland	20.7	1.7	12.3	86.7	30.3
Italy	74.7	0.0	0.0	0.3	18.7
Turkey	0.0	0.0	84.0	1.0	21.1
Serbia Montenegro	0.0	5.0	1.0	0.0	1.5
Kosova	0.3	91.4	0.3	0.3	23.2
Croatia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1
Republic of Macedonia	0.0	1.7	0.3	0.0	0.5
Former-Yugoslavia	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.3	0.4
Albania	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Other	4.3	0.0	2.1	10.1	4.1
N	300	302	300	300	1202
Total	100	100	100	100	100

One aspect of the Swiss Law on citizenship is that it relies on *jus sanguinis*, thus even foreigners born in Switzerland do not have an automatic access to citizenship and this aspect of the Swiss citizenship regime is reflected in the figures in table 4. Immigrants can apply for citizenship in Switzerland after 12 years of residence. To get an idea about the proportion of immigrants in our sample that are eligible for citizenship, we divided the length of stay in two categories: less than 12 years of residence, and more than 12 years of residence. Table 5 shows that most immigrants in our sample are eligible to citizenship, even immigrants from more recent waves of immigration such as Turks and Kosovars. It also confirms the difficult access to citizenship in Switzerland, indeed, although most immigrants do fulfill the requirements in terms of length of stay, very few do actually apply for citizenship. Another obstacle to naturalization is that, given that Swiss citizenship is a three-level citizenship (municipality, canton and confederation) some municipalities require 12 years of residence in the same place.

Table 5: Length of stay in country, more or less than 12 years (requirement for naturalization) (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Less than 12 years residence	3.4	24.7	29.0	11.7	25.7
12 or more years residence	96.6	75.3	71.0	88.3	74.3
N	238	295	259	38	830

Total	100	100	100	100	100
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Table 6 shows the length of stay in the City of Zurich. It seems that immigrants, once established in a town show a low mobility level. Indeed, most of the immigrant respondents have lived for over ten years in the City of Zurich. Over 75% of the Italians have lived almost all their lives in Zurich, whereas most of the Kosovars and Turks have lived between 11 and 20 years in the city. We also observe that only 3% of the Italians lived for less than 5 years in the city, whereas 8% of Kosovars and 10% of the Turks of our sample reside in the city for less than 5 years.

Table 6: Length of stay in city (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
1 year	0.0	1.5	1.1	4.1	1.7
2 to 5 years	3.7	8.1	10.4	11.2	8.3
6 to 10 years	4.7	21.3	18.5	11.9	13.8
11 to 20 years	16.3	47.8	45.6	18.4	31.3
More than 20 years	75.3	14.0	24.4	52.4	42.6
Almost all life	0.0	7.4	0.0	2.0	2.3
N	300	272	270	294	1136
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Our data allows us also to distinguish between first- and second-generation immigrants. In this report we use a rather simple definition of second generation, namely immigrants born in Switzerland. Table 7 shows that almost all Kosovars are first generation immigrants. The highest share of second-generation immigrants is within the Italian group, of which 20% were born in Switzerland. These figures, nevertheless, have to be taken with caution, since a broader definition of second generation of immigrants would include foreign-born immigrants who spent most of their schooling in Switzerland (or 1.5 generations).

Table 7: generation of immigrants (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Total
1st generation	79.3	98.3	87.7	88.5
2nd generation	20.7	1.7	12.3	11.5
N	300	302	300	902
Total	100	100	100	100

In order to have an idea about the conditions of stay of immigrants in our sample, and as we define immigrants as foreigners (not having Swiss citizenship), table 8 shows the type of permit the immigrants in our sample hold. More than 80% of Italians hold a long-term permit (more than five years). The picture is different for Turks and Kosovars. Among Turks almost 60% hold a long-term permit, whereas they are only 48% among Kosovars.

Table 8: Type of permit by ethnic group (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Total
Short term permit (5 years or less)	18.6	51.5	41.8	35.3
Long term permit (more than 5 years)	81.4	48.5	58.2	64.7
N	263	194	184	641

Total	100	100	100	100
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Table 9 and table 10 show the distribution in terms of religious affiliation and religious practice. Table 9 gives the distribution of religious affiliation of the three ethnic groups. Italians are mainly Catholic (almost 90%). The two other groups are composed mainly by Muslims.

Table 9: Religion by ethnic group (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Protestant	0.0	0.0	1.9	36.4	9.9
Roman Catholic	89.3	4.0	1.2	35.7	34.8
Eastern Orthodox	0.0	0.4	0.8	2.5	0.9
Jewish	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1
Islam	0.0	94.4	84.2	2.5	42.3
Hinduism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1
Buddist	0.3	0.0	0.8	1.8	0.7
Atheist/agnostic/do not belong to any denomination	5.7	1.2	4.2	11.7	5.9
Other	4.7	0.0	6.9	8.8	5.2
N	298	250	260	283	1091
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 10 shows the religious practice by ethnic group. Kosovars and Turks practice their religion more often than Italians. Around 20% of both groups answered to practice almost everyday. Italians are only 1.8% to practice every day.

Table 10: Religious practice by ethnic group (percentages)

	Italiens	Kosovars	Turks	Suisses	Total
Every day	1.8	20.8	18.3	3.0	11.2
Several time a week	2.8	7.6	6.5	4.6	5.4
Once a week	18.0	9.0	6.8	9.1	10.8
Once a month	12.7	4.9	6.5	12.2	9.0
Several times a year	36.0	27.1	8.3	16.3	22.2
Once a year	12.0	11.8	10.4	19.4	13.3
Never	16.6	18.8	43.2	35.4	28.2
N	283	284	278	263	1112
Total	100	100	100	100	100

An important aspect of integration in the literature, as well as for the Zurich integration office, is language proficiency. Table 11 shows the level of Swiss German proficiency among those whose mother tongue is not Swiss German. 24% of Kosovars Turks do not speak Swiss German, but only 4.7% of Italians answered not to speak Swiss German. Most of the Italians speak reasonably the host country language, but none of them consider it as their first language even if 20% were born in Switzerland. Among Kosovars, almost 2% consider Swiss German as their first language, and they are 6% among the Turks.

Table 11: Language proficiency (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Doesn't speak Swiss German	4.7	24.4	24.9	7.5	18.0

Speaks a little Swiss German	38.0	10.5	22.6	10.0	22.5
Speaks reasonably Swiss German	36.3	27.4	21.5	17.5	27.6
Speaks fluently Swiss German	9.8	30.5	14.2	22.5	18.7
Speaks Swiss German like native language	11.1	5.3	10.7	30.0	10.0
Swiss German first language	0.0	1.9	6.1	12.5	3.2
N	234	266	261	40	801
Total	100	100	100	100	100

The level of education also differs considerably between the three ethnic groups (Table 12). Italians show a higher education level than Turks and Kosovars. They are only 6.4% not to have completed primary education. Among Turks 15% have not achieved primary education, and 13% among Kosovars. Nevertheless, we observe a higher share of respondents having achieved tertiary education among Turks and Kosovars than among Italians.

Table 12: Highest education level (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Not completed primary (compulsory) education	6.4	13.5	15.0	0.3	8.8
Primary education or first stage of basic education	26.8	20.5	9.6	2.7	14.9
Lower level secondary education or second stage of basic education	20.1	14.8	17.4	17.9	17.6
Upper secondary education	10.1	31.3	27.6	18.2	21.8
Post secondary, non tertiary education	30.2	12.1	17.1	38.5	24.5
First stage of tertiary education	4.0	3.4	7.2	8.1	5.7
Second stage of tertiary education	2.3	4.4	6.1	14.2	6.8
N	298	297	293	296	1184
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Concerning occupation, we observe less difference among ethnic groups (table 13). Around 60% of the respondents of all groups have a paid work. The picture is slightly different for unemployment, as the figures show that around 10% of Turks and Kosovars are unemployed. Finally, we note a 30% of retired among the Italian sample.

Table 13: Professional occupation (main activity) (percentages)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Paid work	57.3	69.5	62.2	61.7	62.4
In education	1.0	3.3	5.3	6.7	4.1
Unemployed and actively looking for a job	1.7	9.5	9.9	3.3	5.8
Unemployed but not actively looking for a job	0.0	1.6	3.4	2.3	1.8
Permanently sick or disabled	3.7	5.8	5.3	1.3	3.9
Retired	31.0	5.8	6.5	18.0	16.1
In community or military service	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.2
Doing housework, looking after children or other persons	4.3	1.6	6.5	4.3	4.3
Other	1.0	2.9	0.8	1.7	1.5
N	300	243	262	300	1105

Total	100	100	100	100
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The last table of this section shows the national composition of the household. Most households are homogeneous in terms of national/ethnic background.

Table 14: Ethnic, national background of household (percentages):

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Similar to mine	76.5	85.7	86.2	66.2	81.7
Mixed	21.4	5.7	12.7	26.5	13.9
Different to mine	2.1	8.6	1.2	7.4	4.4
N	234	279	260	68	841
Total	100	100	100	100	100

3. Political interest

In this section we will focus on variables of political integration. Political integration is a multidimensional concept and includes an attitudinal and a behavioral dimension. Another important aspect of migrant's political integration, is political participation related to the home country.

The first dimension of political integration is political interest. As we are interested in political integration at the local level, we will first look at political interest at the local level, than at the national level, and finally with regard to homeland politics. Indeed, political integration of migrants has two aspects: the one related to the receiving country and the one related to their homelands. When looking at political integration of migrants, it is necessary to take into consideration their integration with regard to their homeland as it can have an effect on their degree of political integration in the receiving country. If the political opportunity structure plays a major role in explaining their political integration, one has at least to control for political attitudes and behaviors with regard to the homeland.

As in Switzerland and in Zurich, immigrants (foreigners) have no voting right we will focus on variables that apply to all migrants and Swiss citizens. We will also compare the degree of political integration of migrants with the Swiss.

Table 15 shows the political interest of immigrants at the city level. As compared to the Swiss, the political interest of immigrants is much lower, even for Italians. Indeed, around 20% of each ethnic group declares not to be interested at all in Zurich politics. At the national level (table 16), the same tendency can be observed. The main difference with interest at the local level, is that the Swiss are most interested in national politics than in local politics, whereas immigrants are a little bit more interested in local politics.

If we look at the differences among groups for the local level, the Swiss (2.9)⁶¹ show the highest interest in local politics. Kosovars (mean=2.52) are more interested than Turks (2.36) and Italians (2.36). At the national level, we find similar results. The more interested are the Swiss (3.04), and Kosovars (2.58) show a higher interest than Italians (2.37) and Turks (2.39).

Table 15: Political interest (city) by ethnic group

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Not at all interested	25.6	20.9	25.9	9.0	20.3
Not very interested	26.9	27.9	27.3	19.7	25.4
Fairly interested	33.7	29.6	31.3	44.7	34.8
Very interested	13.8	21.6	15.5	26.7	19.4
N	297	301	297	300	1195
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 16: Political interest (national) by ethnic group:

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Not at all interested	23.6	19.7	25.9	6.3	18.9
Not very interested	27.0	25.0	26.6	14.3	23.2

⁶¹ Higher values indicate higher interest

Fairly interested	38.2	33.0	30.0	47.7	37.2
Very interested	11.1	22.3	17.5	31.7	20.7
N	296	300	297	300	1193
Total	100	100		100	100

Finally, table 17 gives the degree of political interest with regard to the homeland. Kosovars are more interested in their homeland politics than Italians and Turks. Indeed, only 9.6% of Kosovars declare not to be interested at all, whereas more than 20% of Turks and Italians declare not to be interested at all in homeland politics. The same goes for those who are very interested in homeland politics. Over 45% of Kosovars are very interested, but they are only about 20% in the Italian and the Turkish group.

Table 17: Political interest (homeland) by ethnic group

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Total
Not at all interested	24.4	9.6	26.9	20.3
Not very interested	22.1	12.6	22.6	19.1
Fairly interested	35.1	30.2	30.0	31.8
Very interested	18.4	47.5	20.5	28.9
N	299	301	297	897
Total	100	100	100	100

We now turn to discussion about local (table 18) and national (table 19) politics with family and friends. The three migrant groups discuss less about politics than the Swiss, this holds true for national as well as for local politics. If we look at the differences between ethnic groups, we see that Kosovars discuss more often about politics than Turks and Italians. Over 10% of Kosovars declare to discuss almost every day about politics.

Table 18: Discussion about politics (city) by ethnic group

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Never	25.7	22.9	26.8	9.3	21.2
Rarely	42.7	42.9	37.5	39.7	40.7
Regularly	27.0	19.9	26.8	41.7	28.8
Almost every day	4.7	14.3	9.0	9.3	9.3
N	300	301	299	300	1200
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 19: Discussion about politics (national)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Never	22.7	21.3	23.7	6.0	18.4
Rarely	44.1	44.5	38.8	30.3	39.4
Regularly	29.1	21.9	27.1	53.0	32.8
Almost every day	4.0	12.3	10.4	10.7	9.3
N	299	301	299	300	1199
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Concerning discussion about homeland politics, table 22 shows that Kosovars discuss much more about their homeland politics than Turks and Italians. Over 35% of Kosovar respondents declare to discuss almost every day about homeland politics. Among

Italians, they are only 7.3% to discuss almost every day about politics and 45% declare to discuss it rarely.

Table 20: Discussion about politics (homeland)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Total
Never	14.7	12.6	24.5	17.2
Rarely	45.3	23.3	32.6	33.7
Regularly	32.7	28.2	27.9	29.6
Almost every day	7.3	35.9	15.1	19.5
N	300	301	298	899
Total	100	100	100	100

Respondents were also asked how well they think they are informed about local and national public affairs. In general, respondents from all ethnic groups consider themselves as reasonably informed about public affairs. We also observe few differences between information about the local or the national level. There are still some variations between ethnic groups. 14% of Kosovars and 16% of Turks consider not to be informed at all. Italians are only 9.1%.

Table 21: Informed about public affairs (city)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Not at all informed	9.1	14.3	16.5	3.7	10.9
Only a bit informed	28.0	24.7	29.0	10.7	23.1
Reasonably informed	44.6	41.0	35.0	52.3	43.3
Very well informed	18.2	20.0	19.5	33.3	22.8
N	296	300	297	300	1193
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 22: Informed about Swiss public affairs

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Not at all informed	8.1	13.0	16.6	1.0	9.6
Only a bit informed	28.9	30.3	27.7	11.0	24.5
Reasonably informed	49.0	38.7	35.5	58.5	45.4
Very well informed	14.1	18.0	20.3	29.4	20.5
N	298	300	296	299	1193
Total	100	100		100	100

Table 23 shows the results for information about homeland public affairs. Kosovars consider themselves much more informed about their homeland public affairs than the other ethnic groups, as they are 27.6% to declare to be very well informed. 21.9% of Turkish respondents consider themselves as very well informed but only 13.4% of Italians.

Table 23: Informed about homeland public affairs

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Total
Not at all informed	13.4	9.0	18.2	13.5
Only a bit informed	24.7	17.9	23.6	22.1
Reasonably informed	48.5	45.5	36.4	43.5
Very well informed	13.4	27.6	21.9	21.0

N	299	3001	297	897
Total	100	100	100	100

Tables 24, 25 and 26 indicate the frequency with which respondents read newspapers to get information about public affairs. The three ethnic groups show similar trends in the frequency of reading newspapers and we don't observe many differences between the different levels. Respondents read newspapers about local and national public affairs at quite the same frequency. If we find almost no differences between ethnic groups, we can still observe some variations between immigrants and Swiss citizens. Swiss citizens read newspapers more frequently than immigrants, as over 65% of them declare to read it almost every day. By contrast, less than 50% of the immigrants read newspapers almost every day.

Table 24: Reading newspaper about city

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Never	13.8	13.6	12.5	3.3	10.8
Rarely	27.2	19.9	21.0	10.0	19.5
Regularly	21.8	23.8	21.0	21.0	21.9
Almost every day	37.2	42.7	45.4	65.7	47.8
N	298	302	295	300	1195
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Table 25: Reading newspaper about Switzerland

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Never	13.0	13.9	13.6	3.3	11.0
Rarely	28.8	24.5	21.0	8.0	20.6
Regularly	22.7	25.8	20.3	23.7	23.2
Almost every day	35.5	35.8	45.1	65.0	45.3
N	299	302	295	300	1196
Total	100	100	100	100	100

The picture is quite different when looking at the frequency of reading newspapers about homeland public affairs. Immigrants read less frequently newspapers about their homeland than about the receiving country. But here we observe variations between ethnic groups. Kosovars read more frequently about their homeland than Turks and Italians.

Table 26: Reading newspaper about homeland

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Total
Never	18.4	13.9	19.7	17.3
Rarely	32.4	27.8	25.4	28.6
Regularly	29.8	24.8	29.5	28.0
Almost every day	19.4	33.4	25.4	26.1
N	299	302	295	896
Total	100	100	100	100

4. Political trust

Trust, and more specifically political trust is a central concept to the social capital approach adopted here. Trust in institutions is considered as favoring political integration of immigrants. Table 27 shows the mean level of trust by ethnic group. Trust was measured with a scale of 0 to 10, with high score indicating high levels of trust.

Table 27: Trust in institutions by ethnic group (mean).

		Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Civil servants and employees in the Zurich civil service	Mean	7.34	7.18	6.69	6.56	6.94
	N	293	276	278	293	1138
	Std. dev.	2.016	1.910	2.746	2.016	2.429
City government	Mean	6.94	7.12	6.31	6.45	6.71
	N	264	293	267	292	116
	Std. dev.	1.948	2.923	2.783	2.084	2.496
Schools and teachers in Zurich	Mean	7.01	7.71	6.61	6.61	7.00
	N	263	291	272	280	1106
	Std. dev.	2.119	2.565	2.826	2.039	2.451
The Zurich assembly	Mean	6.82	6.71	6.42	6.38	6.58
	N	256	276	267	288	1087
	Std. dev.	1.892	2.977	2.634	1.903	2.403
The cantonal parliament	Mean	6.74	6.73	6.23	6.05	6.196.43
	N	251	282	262	292	1088
	Std. dev.	1.890	2.998	2.732	2.055	2.483
The police	Mean	7.20	8.02	6.74	6.85	7.21
	N	293	299	291	293	1176
	Std. dev.	2.283	2.592	3.065	2.193	2.602
The cantonal government	Mean	6.68	7.31	6.35	6.12	6.62
	N	254	292	255	290	1091
	Std. dev.	2.892	2.889	2.796	2.139	2.511
The Church	Mean	6.51	4.48	4.28	5.53	5.32
	N	283	194	225	277	979
	Std. dev.	2.910	4.108	3.483	2.792	3.399
The Swiss government	Mean	6.77	7.48	6.09	6.26	6.66
	N	260	295	272	294	1121
	Std. dev.	1.837	2.653	2.916	2.140	2.487
The legal system	Mean	7.05	6.67	6.36	6.74	6.70
	N	260	294	270	291	1115
	Std. dev.	2.070	3.110	2.914	2.196	2.627
The Federal Assembly	Mean	6.62	6.77	5.86	6.14	6.35
	N	242	280	256	293	1071
	Std. dev.	1.855	3.054	2.970	1.934	2.542

Generally, the results suggest that migrants' degree of trust in Swiss public institutions is higher than for the control group of Swiss. Particularly, Kosovars show the highest degree of trust in Swiss public institutions, especially in the police. If we look at the

differences between ethnic groups, it appears that Kosovars and Turks trust Swiss institutions to a greater extent than Italians, except for the Church and the legal system.

5. Political participation:

Political participation concerns only activities that also migrants without voting rights can access. Thus, it does not include activities such as voting, signing initiatives and referenda. Respondents were asked what activity they did in the last twelve months. Table 28 shows the percentages of positive answers for every activity by ethnic group.

Table 28: Political participation (percentage of yes)

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Suisses	Total
Contacted a politician	1.3 (300)	6.6 (302)	2.7(299)	7.3 (300)	4.5 (1201)
Contacted a government or local government official	2.0 (300)	2.0 (300)	1.3(299)	12.0 (300)	4.3 (1199)
Worked in a political party	0.7 (300)	1.3 (302)	1.3(299)	3.0 (300)	1.6 (1201)
Worked in a political action group	1.3 (300)	1.7 (302)	2.0(299)	2.7 (300)	1.9 (1201)
Worn or displayed a badge, sticker or poster	1.0 (300)	0.7 (302)	1.0(297)	2.0 (300)	1.2 (1199)
Signed a petition	7.0 (300)	5.6 (302)	4.1(292)	45.1 (297)	15.4 (1191)
Taken part in a public demonstration	3.0 (300)	5.0 (302)	6.0(299)	8.3 (300)	5.6 (1201)
Boycotted certain products	8.0 (299)	2.0 (300)	4.7(298)	29.8 (299)	11.1 (1196)
Deliberately bought certain products for political reasons	2.3 (299)	1.0 (301)	4.4(296)	16.9 (301)	6.2 (1197)
Donated money to a political organization or group	2.7 (299)	7.7 (300)	3.0(299)	11.7 (300)	6.3 (1198)
Taken part in a strike	2.0 (300)	1.3 (302)	0.3(299)	0.7 (301)	1.1 (1202)
Contacted the media	4.0 (298)	3.3 (302)	2.7(298)	7.3 (301)	4.3 (1199)
Contacted a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons	2.0 (300)	2.0 (302)	2.7(296)	5.3 (301)	3.0 (1199)

Although all listed activities are accessible to both Swiss citizens and foreigners, the Swiss participate more than the three ethnic groups. But we can observe variations in the type of activities among ethnic groups. Italians tend to privilege the signing of petitions, boycotting products, and contacting the media. Turks are more oriented towards protest activities such as taking part in a demonstration, or buying products for political reasons. 6.6% of Kosovars have contacted a politician and 7.7% have donated money to a political organization.

We now turn to voting intention. We will not look at participation at elections as our sample of migrants is limited to foreigners having no voting rights in Switzerland. Table 29 shows the results for voting intention. Italians intend to vote by 86.6%, whereas only 57.4% of Turks intend to vote, and Kosovars are in between with 66.4%.

Table 29: Voting intention local level

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Yes	86.5	66.4	57.4	71.4	70.5
No	13.5	33.6	42.6	28.6	29.5
N	288	295	284	294	1161
Total	100	100	100	100	100

6. Associational participation

As mentioned earlier, the social capital approach states that participation in voluntary associations creates social trust which spills over into political trust and thus favors political participation. In this section we will examine the degree of organizational involvement of immigrants in Zurich. Furthermore, voluntary organizations play a particular role in Switzerland. Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity implies that Switzerland shows a high number of voluntary organizations, but also that the Swiss usually show a high level of organizational involvement. To do so, we will first look at organizational membership and then at participation in activities organized by organizations.

Table 30 confirms the high degree of organizational membership of the Swiss. Swiss respondents are by more than 80% members of an organization. The picture is slightly different for immigrants and varies across groups. Italians show the highest share of membership, with more than 50% of the respondents being a member of an organization. Turks and Kosovars are less involved in organizations, less than half of them are members of any organization. If we look at the degree of participation in organizations' activities the general picture shows a lower degree of involvement, for both the Swiss and the three ethnic groups. Swiss citizens participate more than immigrants in organizational activities. But the degree of participation varies also according to the ethnic group. Kosovars participate less than Italians and Turks.

Table 30: Organizational involvement by ethnic group

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss
Organizational membership	53.3	31.5	38.7	85.4
Participation in activities	30.7	18.9	26.7	59.1
Involvement in immigrant org.	5.4	1.3	2.0	2.0
Involvement in ethnic org.	5.7	2.6	6.1	-
N	300	302	300	301
Total	100	100	100	100

Italians are also the most inclined to join immigrants' organisations, while Kosovars and Turks are not any more likely than the Swiss. But when it turns to ethnic organisations, Italians and Turks show the same behavioural patterns, with Kosovars less inclined to join Kosovar associations.

Table 31 shows with more detail the outlook of the organisational involvement of the four groups we have studied. For almost all types of organisations, the Swiss are more likely to become involved in them than respondents of any of the three migrant groups. The one exception is trade unions and immigrants' organisations – that Italians are more inclined to join than any other group. Further to this, the associational preferences of the four groups are relatively similar in their rank orders – though not in their magnitudes. All for groups are most likely to join sports organisations, usually followed by cultural associations, humanitarian aid organisations, and religious organisations. The Swiss'

love of environmental organisations is not matched by the preferences of the immigrant groups and, as we mentioned, trade unions are frequently chosen by Italians.

Table 31. Types of organisations involved, by ethnic group.

Involvement (member or participates) in...	<i>Respondent's group</i>			
	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss
Sports organisation	13	8.2	12.5	26.6
Cultural organisation	10.4	3.9	7.7	20.9
Political party	2.7	2.3	1.3	9.3
Trade union	10.4	4.6	4.4	7.3
Professional organisation	5.0	1.3	1.7	11.0
Humanitarian aid organisation	7.4	7.8	4.4	21.9
Environmental org	4.3	1.0	2.4	21.6
Human rights or peace org	1.0	0.3	1.0	4.3
Religious org	8.0	1.6	5.1	21.6
Immigrants' org	5.4	1.3	2.0	2.0
Ethnic org	5.7	2.6	6.1	--
Anti racism org	1.0	1.0	0	1.3
Educational org	4.3	2.9	2.4	5.3
Youth org	0.7	1.0	0.3	4.7
Organisation for retired	3.3	1.3	0.7	4.3
Women org	0.7	0	1.0	2.7
Neighbour org	2.7	1.0	1.3	9.3
Other org	2.0	1.3	2.0	6.6
N	(299)	(306)	(297)	(301)

7. Self-identification and values

This section focuses on self-identification and values. Table 32 shows the degree to which respondents are attached to different places and groups of people. Higher values indicate greater attachment. For the three ethnic groups the places they are most attached to are their homeland and the City of Zurich. Turks show the highest attachment to their homeland. The most attached to people with the same religion are Kosovars. Concerning the neighborhood, Italians and Kosovars are more attached to their neighborhood than Turks.

Table 32: Attachment to different places and groups of people

		Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss
Attached to people with same religion	Mean	6.36	8.16	6.88	5.44
	N	263	290	291	265
	Std. dev.	3.1	2.6	2.9	3.3
Attached to the Swiss	Mean	7.52	7.41	6.69	8.02
	N	300	298	298	297
	Std. dev.	2.0	2.8	2.7	2.1
Attached to neighborhood one lives in	Mean	7.32	7.67	6.76	6.99
	N	296	302	298	300
	Std. dev.	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.7
Attached to the Swiss Germans	Mean	7.22	7.47	6.73	7.77
	N	298	299	299	297

	Std. dev.	2.3	2.9	2.9	2.1
Attached to Zurich	Mean	8.32	8.33	7.43	7.45
	N	300	299	297	298
	Std. dev.	1.8	2.3	2.5	2.4
Attached to ethnic group	Mean	7.75	8.37	7.18	na
	N	299	300	300	na
	Std. dev.	2.0	2.5	2.8	na
Attached to homeland	Mean	8.00	8.68	7.6	na
	N	300	299	299	Na
	Ecart-type	2.3	2.5	2.8	na

Immigrant respondents showing the same level of attachment for Switzerland/Swiss and their own ethnic group were asked what they would choose if they had to. The results are shown in table 33. Italians, Kosovars and Turks mainly choose their own ethnic group. 90.8% of Kosovars choose their own ethnic group. Italians and Turks choose their ethnic group to a lesser extent. Finally, 22.2% of Turks choose the Swiss, compared to only 13.8% of Italians and 6.9% of Kosovars.

Table 33: And if you had to choose which one best describes the way you think of yourself?

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks
Swiss	13.8	6.9	22.2
Italian/Kosovar/Turk	69.0	90.8	72.2
Other	13.8	2.3	5.6
None	3.4	0.0	0.0
N	87	131	108
Total	100	100	100

Finally, respondents were also asked about their ideological positions (table 34). Results are similar between ethnic groups. The mean for the Swiss shows that they are slightly more left oriented than Italians and Kosovars. Turks tend to position themselves rather on the left. Associational membership is also expected to favor social trust. Table 35 indicates the mean level of social trust by group. Swiss and Italians show the highest level of social trust. Turks have the lowest mean of social trust.

Table 34: Where would you place yourself on a scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? (mean)

	Mean	Std. dev.	N
Italians	4.8	2.6	266
Kosovars	4.98	4.6	220
Turks	3.9	3.3	258
Swiss	4.3	2.1	279
Total	4.5	3.2	1023

Table 35: Social trust

	Mean	Std. dev.	N
Italians	5.5	2.6	294
Kosovars	4.7	3.0	218
Turks	4.4	2.8	245
Swiss	5.6	2.3	295
Total	5.1	2.7	1052

Respondents were also asked about their level of trust in their own ethnic group. Trust in the own ethnic group is not higher than general social trust for Italians and Turks. Kosovars trust their own ethnic group more than the general population.

Table 36: Trust towards own ethnic group

	Mean	N	Std. dev..
Italians	5.3716	296	2.47230
Kosovars	5.2624	221	3.24092
Turks	4.3016	252	2.78805
Total	4.9896	769	2.85133

8. Discrimination and attitudes towards ethnic groups:

Table 37 shows the percentage of respondents feeling discriminated against because of their origin. Italians feel discriminated against to a lesser extent than Kosovars and Turks. Over 10% of Kosovars feel discriminated against.

Table 37: Feeling of discrimination

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
Yes	4.0	11.3	9.4	7.5	8.2
No	96.0	88.7	90.6	92.5	91.8
N	298	302	297	107	1004
Total	100	100	100	100	100

When looking at the environment of discrimination, we can observe that Italians feel mostly discriminated at work, Kosovars when looking for a job, whereas Turks feel discriminated to the same extent at work and when looking for a job. Turks and Kosovars also feel discriminated to a greater extent than Italians on the street and in bars and restaurants.

Table 38: Environment of discrimination

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks	Swiss	Total
At school	16.7 (12)	23.5 (34)	28.6(28)	25.0 (8)	24.4 (82)
At work	75.0 (12)	41.2 (34)	51.9(27)	62.5 (8)	45.7 (81)
In the health care system	16.7 (12)	29.4 (34)	7.4(27)	12.5 (8)	18.5 (81)
By the immigration office	25.0 (12)	17.6 (34)	18.5(27)	25.0 (8)	19.8 (81)
By the police	16.7 (12)	17.6 (34)	17.9(28)	37.5 (8)	19.5 (82)
At church	0.0 (12)	8.8 (34)	11.5(26)	12.5 (8)	8.8 (80)
When looking for a job	33.3 (12)	50.0 (34)	51.9(27)	37.5 (8)	46.9 (81)
In restaurants, bars, pubs or discos	0.0 (12)	29.4 (34)	42.9(28)	75.0 (8)	34.1 (82)
On the street	25.0 (12)	38.2 (34)	46.4(28)	62.5 (8)	41.5 (82)
By neighbours	33.3 (12)	11.8 (34)	25.9(27)	50.0 (8)	23.5 (81)
In shops	25.0 (12)	38.2 (34)	32.1(28)	28.6 (7)	33.3 (81)
On public transportation	8.3 (12)	44.1 (34)	28.6(28)	87.5 (8)	37.8 (82)

Table 39 shows the attitudes of the control group of Swiss towards the three ethnic groups. The differences between Italians and the two other ethnic groups are important. The Swiss have much more negative attitudes toward Kosovars and Turks than towards Italians. The most problematic situation would be to have a Kosovar as a close kin by marriage.

Table 39: Attitudes towards ethnic groups, percentage would not accept

	Italians	Kosovars	Turks
As close kins by marriage	1.6 (193)	29.7 (185)	26.1 (184)
On your street as neighbours	1.0 (193)	22.6 (186)	17.0 (188)
Working alongside you in your job	1.6 (192)	18.1 (188)	17.0 (188)
As residents living in Zurich	1.0 (192)	20.6 (189)	20.1 (189)
As citizens in your country	2.6 (193)	28.0 (189)	20.1 (189)

Part II. Explanatory analyses

In this section we will examine the relation between our independent variables and different dimensions of political integration. We will focus on the impact of three sets of independent variables: SES variables, social capital, and discrimination. For each set of variables we run a regression model for the three ethnic groups and add a fourth model with the ethnic group as a dummy variable.

We first present the results for the attitudinal dimension of political integration, namely interest in local politics. We first look at political interest in local politics. Table 40 shows the results of the logistic regression. Model one includes SES variables as well as language proficiency and religion.

The first model shows that SES variables play a significant role in explaining political interest. Indeed, being a man increases the probability of being interested in local politics. The age also has an impact on political interest. Finally, language proficiency also has an impact on political interest. Indeed, migrants who speaking fluently the host country language show a higher probability of being interested in local politics.

Table 40: Logistic regression with local political interest as dependent variable. Exp(B)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SES variables				
Gender (ref men)	.721*	.727**	.705*	.741
Age	1.072**	1.070**	1.074**	1.081**
Age squared	.999**	.999**	.999**	.999**
Level of education (ref: primary education not completed)				
Primary education or first stage of basic education	.997	1.015	1.001	1.137
Lower level of secondary education	.869	.892	.885	1.071
Upper secondary education	1.585	1.579	1.589	1.857*
post-secondary, non-tertiary education	1.964*	1.956*	2.052**	2.631***
First stage of tertiary education	2.122	1.987	1.913	2.345*
Second stage of tertiary education	1.470	1.400	1.373	1.634
Language (host country)	2.020**	1.965**	2.002**	1.994**
Muslims	.928	.945	.963	.630*
1st or 2nd generation	.640	.812	.825	.665
Social Capital				
Membership in any association		.930	.988	.983
Participation in any association		1.568*	1.576*	1.519
Involvement in any ethnic association		.974	.949	1.072
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination			.586*	.525**
Ethnic group				
Italians				.513*
Kosovars				1.280
Constant	.205	.192	.186	.181
Nagelkerke R2	.088	.096	.104	.119
-2 log likelihood	1160.739	1155.045	1144.478	1133.565
Degrees of freedom	12	15	16	18
N	881	881	877	877

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

In the second model we introduce the social capital variables, distinguishing between organizational membership, participation in activities promoted by organizations and finally the involvement in ethnic organizations. The effect of the previous variables remains, but from the social capital only participation in activities promoted by any type of association has an effect on political interest. It seems thus that for the attitudinal dimension of political integration participating in activities creates more social capital than does membership. The third model controls for perception of discrimination. The results suggest that the feeling of discrimination has a negative impact on political interest. Feeling discriminated against diminishes the probability of being politically interested. Finally, we introduce the ethnic group. Being an Italian has a significant negative impact on political interest. But no difference appears between Turks and Kosovars. By controlling for the ethnic group the effect of participation in organizational activities and that of gender disappears. Thus, these results suggest that political interest depends upon the educational level, perceptions of discrimination and the ethnic group, rather than on social capital variables.

The second attitudinal aspect of political integration is institutional trust. As institutional trust is a continuous variable, we run four models of linear regressions. The results are shown in table 41. In the first model, only religion has a significant effect on the level of trust. Indeed, being a Muslim has a positive impact on the level of trust. Age, gender and the educational level of immigrants do not seem to have an impact on trust. The second model includes social capital variables. None of these variables has an impact on institutional trust. The perception of discrimination doesn't have any impact either on institutional trust and the third model doesn't increase the explained variance. Finally, we find a significant effect of the ethnic group. And, controlling for the origin of immigrants, gender becomes significant. These results suggest that social capital does not explain the level of institutional trust of immigrants. Rather, religion and origin are important predictors of trust.

To conclude about the attitudinal dimension of political integration, the results suggest that the socio-economic status and the origin of migrants are more important in explaining the political attitudes of migrants than social capital.

Table 41: Linear regression with institutional trust as dependent variable. Standardized coefficients.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SES variables				
Gender	.067	.064	.065	.087*
Age	-.038	-.030	-.039	-.079
Agesquared	.110	.104	.114	.122
Level of education	.049	.052	.052	.058
Language (host country)	.042	.040	.040	.027
Muslims	.201***	.197***	.197***	.228***
1st or 2nd generation	.075	.069	.069	.061
Social Capital				
Membership in any association		-.069	-.072	-.084
Participation in any association		.043	.042	.047
Involvement in any ethnic association		.021	.021	.041
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination			.024	.024
Ethnic group				
Italians				.189**
Kosovars				.223***
Adjusted R2	.041	.040	.039	.076
N	690	690	688	688

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

The following analyses focus on the behavioral dimension of political integration, namely different types of political participation (contacting activities, election activities and protest activities) as well as voting intention.

Table 42 shows the results of the logistic regressions for the first type of political activities: contact activities. Contacting activities includes activities such as contacting a politician, contacting a government or local official, contacting the media, or a solicitor or a judicial body for non-personal reasons. The results of the first model suggest that

men tend to contact more different bodies than women. The educational level also has an impact on the probability to contact. Migrants having attained the second degree of tertiary education are more likely to take part in contacting activities. Once again, we observe that social capital variables have no effect whatsoever on contacting activities. Finally, it seems that being an Italian has a negative impact on contacting activities, as well as being a Muslim.

Table 42 : logistic regression with contacting activities as dependent variable. Exp (B)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SES variables				
Gender (woman=1)	.349**	.376**	.390**	.421*
Age	.1.072	1.071	1.066	1.077
Agesquared	.999	.999	.999	.999
Level of education (ref: primary education not completed)				
Primary education or first stage of basic education	.889	.944	.931	1.110
Lower level of secondary education	1.349	1.330	1.311	1.938
Upper secondary education	1.195	1.093	1.029	1.389
post-secondary, non-tertiary education	1.354	1.235	1.207	2.008
First stage of tertiary education	1.654	1.316	1.316	2.041
Second stage of tertiary education	5.375**	4.274*	4.310*	6.092**
Language (host country)	1.420	1.238	1.245	1.172
Muslims	.735	.780	.764	.392**
1st or 2nd generation	.790	.989	1.018	.618
Social Capital				
Membership in any association		1.389	1.342	1.308
Participation in any association		1.988	1.929	1.864
Involvement in any ethnic association		1.280	1.255	1.579
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination			2.006	1.674
Ethnic group				
Italians				.328*
Turks				1.567
Constant	.033	.019	.020	.020
Nagelkerke R2	.089	.130	.139	.164
-2 log likelihood	459.044	441.691	438.718	428.475
Degrees of freedom	12	15	16	18
N	879	879	874	874

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

The results look quite different for protest activities (wearing or displaying a badge, sticker or poster; taking part in a public demonstration, boycotting certain products; deliberately buying certain products for political reasons; or taking part in a strike) (table 43). Model 1 shows that the educational level has an impact on protest activities. Indeed, having a university education increases the probability of doing such activities. The immigration generation also plays a role, indeed, second generation migrants have more chance to do protest activities than first generation migrants. The second model shows that social capital variables have an impact on the likelihood of protesting.

Indeed, being a member of an association as well as participating in activities promoted by associations increases the chances for migrants to do protest activities. By controlling for social capital variables, the effect of the generation disappears, but the level of education still plays a role. For protest activities the results of model 4 suggest that the origin of migrants does not have any impact on their inclination to take part in protest activities.

Table 43: Logistic regression with protest activities as dependent variable. Exp(B).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SES variables				
Gender	.791	.944	.957	.954
Age	1.080	1.059	1.059	1.065
Age squared	.999	1.000	1.000	1.000
Level of education (ref: primary education not completed)				
Primary education or first stage of basic education	.581	.583	.571	.642
Lower level of secondary education	.816	.745	.730	.846
Upper secondary education	1.683	1.475	1.441	1.626
post-secondary, non-tertiary education	1.843	1.638	1.621	1.933
First stage of tertiary education	4.013**	3.263*	3.263*	3.711*
Second stage of tertiary education	3.542*	2.567	2.540	2.847
Language (host country)	.878	.741	.748	.745
Muslims (mulims=1)	.723	.818	.808	.621
1st or 2nd generation (1st generation=1)	.440*	.589	.599	.537
Social Capital				
Membership in any association		2.780***	2.812***	2.848***
Participation in any association		1.973*	1.929*	1.894*
Involvement in any ethnic association		1.122	1.104	1.145
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination (feeling of discrimination =1)			1.180	1.100
Ethnic group				
Italians				.614
Turks				.945
Constant	.038	1.030	.022	.023
Nagelkerke R2	.099	.201	.202	.205
-2 log likelihood	660.259	605.997	604.335	602.702
Degrees of freedom	12	15	16	18
N	872	872	867	867

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

We now turn to election and political party activities (work in a political party; work in a political action group; donate money to a political organization or group) (table 44). The SES variables have no effect on party and election activities. But here again, migrants participating in organizational activities have a higher chance to do one of these activities. The origin of migrants also has an impact.

Table 44: Logistic regression with party activities as dependent variable. Exp(B)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SES variables				
Gender	.563	.588	.630	.741
Age	1.126	1.112	1.116	1.126
Agesquared	.999	.999	.999	.999
Level of education (ref: primary education not completed)				
Primary education or first stage of basic education	.793	.844	.830	.968
Lower level of secondary education	.347	.338	.327	.503
Upper secondary education	.1.188	1.009	.927	1.264
post-secondary, non-tertiary education	.771	.682	.670	1.182
First stage of tertiary education	2.214	1.557	1.564	2.598
Second stage of tertiary education	1.634	1.126	1.108	1.526
Language (host country) (french=1)	1.630	1.436	1.409	1.276
Muslims	1.058	1.140	1.130	.517
1st or 2nd generation	1.094	1.385	1.480	.760
Social Capital				
Membership in any association (membership=1)		1.052	1.029	.958
Participation in any association (participation=1)		3.029*	2.969*	2.774*
Involvement in any ethnic association (involvement=1)		1.551	1.503	2.153
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination			2.075	1.694
Ethnic group				
Italians (Italian=1)				.277*
Kosovars (kosovar=1)				2.109*
Constant	.005	.003	.003	.003
Nagelkerke R2	.067	.135	.143	.180
-2 log likelihood	363.340	341.287	338.052	325.954
Degrees of freedom	12	15	16	18
N	884	884	879	879

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

The last dimension of political integration is voting intention. Respondents were asked whether they would vote at the next municipal elections if they would take place next Sunday and they were eligible to vote. The results of the logistic regressions are shown in table 45. The first model shows that the educational level plays a significant role. Yet, language proficiency, religion or the immigration generation has no effect on migrants' intention to vote. The second model includes the social capital variables. Social capital has an influence on voting intention, but here we find an effect of the involvement in ethnic organizations. Thus migrants who are members of ethnic organizations show a higher probability to intend to vote. Nevertheless, even controlling for social capital, the level of education still has an effect. The perception of discrimination has no impact on the voting intention, but model 4 shows that the ethnic

group is an important predictor of voting intention. Being an Italian increases the chance of the intention to vote.

Table 45: Logistic regression with voting intention as dependent variable. Exp(b)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
SES variables				
Gender	.825	.882	.874	.829
Age	1.055	1.057	1.057	1.046
Agesquared	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Level of education (ref: primary education not completed)				
Primary education or first stage of basic education	2.239**	2.246**	2.345**	1.652
Lower level of secondary education	2.480***	2.268**	2.359**	1.595
Upper secondary education	5.016***	4.609***	4.773***	3.488***
post-secondary, non-tertiary education	4.970***	4.694***	5.157***	3.239***
First stage of tertiary education	3.349**	3.181**	3.485**	2.622*
Second stage of tertiary education	4.450***	3.961**	4.156**	3.031*
Language (host country)	.788	.709	.688	.629
Muslims	.836	.832	.833	1.792**
1st or 2nd generation	1.031	1.108	1.097	1.612
Social Capital				
Membership in any association		1.089	1.087	1.028
Participation in any association		.949	.927	1.067
Involvement in any ethnic association		2.326**	2.307**	2.055*
Discrimination				
Self-perception of discrimination			1.247	1.438
Ethnic group				
Italians				6.664***
Kosovars				1.394
Constant	.147	.118	.115	.077
Nagelkerke R2	.124	.154	.159	.217
-2 log likelihood	960.916	941.280	929.949	889.741
Degrees of freedom	12	15	16	18
N	853	853	848	848

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

Conclusion

In this report we first presented some descriptive analyses on our main variables concerning political integration. The descriptive results showed that some differences can be observed between the three ethnic groups. They suggest that Italians are more integrated than Turks and Kosovars. This can be related to the immigration wave as Italians migrated earlier than the two other groups. Another interpretation is to be found in the political opportunity structure these groups face in Zurich. Indeed, on the institutional dimension of the political opportunity structure (access to permits, to citizenship, access to the welfare system etc.) Kosovars and Turks face a more closed opportunity structure as the immigration policy of Switzerland is based on the

distinction between EU and non-EU origin. Italians face thus more open opportunity structures than do Turks and Kosovars. The attitudes of the Swiss population towards immigrants may also play a role. We saw that Kosovars and Turks face a higher degree of discrimination than Italians.

The second part of the report looks at explanatory factors of several dimensions of political integration. The main result is that contrarily to what was expected, social capital does not seem to play a central role in explaining political integration, at least not for all dimensions, in the Swiss case. Associational membership or participation in activities promoted by associations seem to favor only activities such as protest, elections and voting intention, it has no impact on political interest or institutional trust. Socio-economic variables such as education are still important predictors of political integration.